Date: Mon, 18 May 1998 11:24:26 +0200
From: Henk van Tuijl <Henk.van.Tuijl-AT-net.HCC.nl>
Subject: Re: language


Michael Staples wrote:
Henk, from where are you extracting this conclusion that poetry is
listening? 

See my last mail on Glenn Gould and Dylan Thomas. I gather that you
disagree with what I tried to convey.

Michael:
And from where are you extracting this distinction between language and
poetry?

You caught me here. I am indeed his master's voice incarnated. In only
three instances in my mails to Henry, Greg and you I have come up with
something that is not a rough translation, paraphrase or reference to
passages in GA04, GA05, what has to become GA07, GA12, GA13, GA14 and
GA39. See in particular the second part of GA39, GA07 (still Neske's
_Vortraege und Aufsaetze_) "... dichterisch wohnet der Mensch ..." and
GA12 "Das Wort". The documentaries on Glenn Gould and Dylan Thomas, a
reaction on Foti's _Heidegger and the poets_ and May's impression that
Heideggerian "saying" is equivalent to Taoistic "Dao" (in Parkes's
translation).     

Michael:
[Henk:] Heidegger himself makes a formal distinction between thinking
and poetizing.
[Michael:] i.e., a distinction between listening (if poetry is only a
listening), and thinking (if thinking is something other than
listening). 

You are, of course, free to think that thinking = poetizing = listening.
It is certainly not un- Heideggerian. You could add that poetizing measuring - and if you are reading the _Werke_ in the GA you will
certainly find more "=".    

Michael:
H also draws a distinction between different "kinds" of thinking. I'm
wondering if the distinction to which you refer is directed toward all
"kinds" of thinking, or one particular "kind" of thinking?

I do not know if he explicitly totally excludes some kinds of thinking
from his _Zwiesprache_ between poetizing and thinking. Why do you deem
it necessary to approach Heidegger in so legalistic a manner? The effect
of Clintonian definitions?

Michael:
[Henk:} He defines the task of thinking somewhere as the abandonment of
current thinking to the destination of the matter of thinking.

[Michael:} Perhaps it means something more to you.

It does.

Michael:
How are  these -- art, music, and poetry -- "only" a matter of listening
that excludes them from language as "only" a matter of something else?

Again, see for "listening" my last mail. See for an overview of the
(possible) relations between Being, language and poetry my mails to
Henry and Greg. See, if you want it from the horse's mouth, the _Werke_
in the GA to which I referred.

Michael, I have clearly not given _an_ answer in my last mail. I have
the impression that one could only satisfy you by giving _all_ the
_Belegstelle_ on the subject you bring up. For almost all the _Werke_
that have or will find a place in _Abteilung I_ and some _Werke_ in the
other _Abteilungen_ the index of Hildegard Feick is very useful,
although not complete. There is also no _Seitenkonkordanz_ with the GA.
The number is: ISBN 3-484-70014-9.

Kindest regards,
Henk



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