Date: Mon, 18 May 1998 06:37:17 -0700
From: Mike Staples <mstaples-AT-argusqa.com>
Subject: Re: language


Henk van Tuijl wrote:

> See my last mail on Glenn Gould and Dylan Thomas. I gather that you
> disagree with what I tried to convey.

Well, lets say that I am suspicious of what you tired to convey. I
understand you as trying to make a distinction that strikes me as being
untenable. But I'm open to thinking about it, and admit that my first
impression is quite often re-worked (note the long dialogue with Henry
and others involving Interpretation). I will also admit that if I can
read for myself from the horse's mouth (as you say) an unabiguous
statement that corroborates your conclusion about these distinctions
that initially impress me as being otherwise, then it is much easier for
me to focus on changing my evil ways.

> Michael:
> And from where are you extracting this distinction between language
> and
> poetry?
>
> You caught me here. I am indeed his master's voice incarnated. In only
>
> three instances in my mails to Henry, Greg and you I have come up with
>
> something that is not a rough translation, paraphrase or reference to
> passages in GA04, GA05, what has to become GA07, GA12, GA13, GA14 and
> GA39. See in particular the second part of GA39, GA07 (still Neske's
> _Vortraege und Aufsaetze_) "... dichterisch wohnet der Mensch ..." and
>
> GA12 "Das Wort". The documentaries on Glenn Gould and Dylan Thomas, a
> reaction on Foti's _Heidegger and the poets_ and May's impression that
>
> Heideggerian "saying" is equivalent to Taoistic "Dao" (in Parkes's
> translation).

Henk, please point me toward English translations where possible. I
don't read German, unfortunately.

> Michael:
> [Henk:] Heidegger himself makes a formal distinction between thinking
> and poetizing.
> [Michael:] i.e., a distinction between listening (if poetry is only a
> listening), and thinking (if thinking is something other than
> listening).
>
> You are, of course, free to think that thinking = poetizing > listening.
> It is certainly not un- Heideggerian.

I'm sorry Henk. I must have missunderstood you. I was under the
impression that you were making a distinction here that placed
poetry-as-listening one one side versus thinking-as-performance on
another.

> Michael:
> H also draws a distinction between different "kinds" of thinking. I'm
> wondering if the distinction to which you refer is directed toward all
>
> "kinds" of thinking, or one particular "kind" of thinking?
>
> I do not know if he explicitly totally excludes some kinds of thinking
>
> from his _Zwiesprache_ between poetizing and thinking. Why do you deem
>
> it necessary to approach Heidegger in so legalistic a manner? The
> effect
> of Clintonian definitions?

"Clintonian definitions?" Heh, heh. Cute.

Well, since I'm questioning the conclusion that poetry-as-listening is
mutually exclusive of thinking-as-performing (and I may have
missunderstood you as supporting this conclusion anyway), I was looking
for an explanation for why you may have concluded this in the first
place. The first question I asked myself was, "Where did Henk get this?"
Is this something the horse mouthed? Is there a place where Heidegger
says this unequivocally? Or is it one of those conclusions that one
makes because Heidegger's work doesn't seem to hang together without it?
Or is it some conclusion that may have come about for some other reason?
So it isn't that I really need to have legalistic definitions all the
time (images of third-degrees, or cross-examinations). It is that I'm
trying to zero in on where this idea came from so I can scrutinize it
myself. Unfortunately, it is difficult for me to see directly the
distinction you seemed to have been making. I don't understand it. You
seem to have been saying that poetry is "only" a listening, and has no
"performing" or "doing" features to it. You made the distinction between
poetry as a listening, which then is made into language as something
other than a listening. This sort of distinction is not going down
smoothly. If I can find a passage in Heidegger where this is referred
to, perhaps I can either convince myself that the distinction makes
sense, or I can convince you that it doesn't.

But looking back on why any of it is important, I recall that the point
here was to ask after the difference and/or sameness of poetry, art,
music, and language. Someone asked, "Can music also be a language?"
That, it seems, is where this began. You, as I understand it, are saying
"No!" the two are different. They are different in that poetry/art/music
is a listening, while language is something other than a listening.
Now...am I understanding you on this point, or did I go off on a
tangent?


Michael Staples




     --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---