Date: Wed, 27 May 1998 09:29:41 +0100
From: jim <jmd-AT-dasein.demon.co.uk>
Subject: math/meta/truth/...


About this math/metaphysics/causation stuff ...
There's a lot that I've been thinking. To be more rigorous about it, this is
my current concern:

As I only lightly, parantethically, SUGGESTED in one of my posts, H's
theory of truth would be able to answer the kinds of problems which
motivated Godel's Platonism. This view, GP, is motivated by
metaphysical constraints which G (and many others) thought a theory of
truth must respect. So, the questions arise:
(1) what metaphysical/ontological constraints must a theory of T
respect?
(2) must this constraint be respected?

In pursuit of (1): it's widely assumed that T is a semantic predicate
attaching to sentences/mental-content-specifying sentences (a view H
rejects); such sentences "have" T if, and only if their referring terms have
Referents, i.e., iff Referent has 'property' 'referred to'/designated by
Predicate ("Jim's a moron" is T iff Ref("Jim") has Ref("is a moron"), i.e.,
iff Jim has the property referred to/designated by the predicate "is a
moron," i.e., iff Jim IS a moron); what's more, 'terms' have Reference
only if they have a causal-relation to their Referents; and that, only if the
Referents can enter into causal relations (this position, according to our
'best' current epistemological theories and theories of reference (so it is
widely assumed!!!!!!!)); and that, only if the Referents are spatio-
temporal entities. So, since it is assumed that math entities aren't spatio-
temporal, it's concluded that the 'best candidate' T-theories, namely,
those respecting the CAUSAL CONSTRAINT on reference, cannot
comprehend a 'truth in math" (and since neither the Logicists nor the
Formalists can comprehend 'truth in math', the position which G
espoused must be endorsed) (so much for one of the motivations for
G's position)). 

In pursuit of (2): the CAUSAL CONSTRAINT is a source of difficulty
(of course, the view which honors sentences/mental-content-specifiying
sntences with the locus of truth is also a difficulty, but H has an answer
for thta view); this constraint poses the above difficulties only if we
endorse a rather narrow -- non-Aristotelian -- concept of causation. If
we accept a different construal of causation,  like Heidegger's Aristotle,
then we do not meet with such difficulties. However, many argue that
A's 'theory' is NOT really a theory of causation, but a theory of
explanation. However, if we accept Heidegger's interpretation of A's
position and H's theory of T, then this theory-of-explanation version of
A does not seem attractive, and 'truth in math' will not pose any
particular difficulties.

Thus, if we accept H's Aritotle and H's theory of T, we are in the clear
with respect to math; that is a big plus I think.
(as for Anthony's position on 'axiomatization', the verdict isn't in yet;
however, I don't think that accepting Anthony's postion will be to H's
demerit; thought I've been suggesting that it might, I am still arguing
back and forth over the 'whether-or-not' of it (I can't sleep at nights)).

Cheers,
jim

PS. If forgot to indicate .... Yes, it is true, Jim is a moron.


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