Date:          Wed, 27 May 1998 14:02:58 EST
Subject:       Re: Math/Metaphysics



>
>If I remember correctly, the original issue was whether or not Heidegger's view 
>of mathematics as essentially axiomatic is outdated in light of Godel's 
>argument. I replied by arguing that all Godel shows is that there are no 
>"absolute" axioms in mathematics, not that mathematics can actually be non-
>axiomatic, thereby saving Heidegger's interpretation of math. Further, I argued 
>that the only way to escape axiomatization, not only that of mathematics but 
>also that of the objective sciences, was by transcending science altogether, 
>which is exactly what Heidegger does by subordinating calculative knowledge 
>to being-in-the-world.
>
>Anthony Crifasi
>
>


Right, thanks, Anthony!
So, the levstoryer being told here, or suggested, is that Heidegger's
critique of calculative thinking is refuted because calculative thinking
("science does not think" --- the Gestell--the inventory of all beings)
doesn't have these"axioms."

but doesn't heidegger already insinuate that the axioms are 
historically-determined and not "eternal"?  And to 'prove'
this axiomatically... well, isn't this discussion sorta
looking from the big end of the telescope at these issues?

The basic issues just aren't found in any theoretical 
description of calculative thinking--as though the 
correct one would be the fundamental foundation
of truth.  

That, it seems to me, is Heidegger 101.
(But then I'm always stuck repeating Heidegger 101.)

thanks again,
henry



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