Date: Wed, 27 May 1998 23:45:42 +0100
From: jim <jmd-AT-dasein.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Math/Metaphysics


In message <B170B720923-AT-marta.uncg.edu>, henry sholar
<H_SHOLAR-AT-marta.uncg.edu> writes
>
>Right, thanks, Anthony!
>So, the levstoryer being told here, or suggested, is that Heidegger's
>critique of calculative thinking is refuted because calculative thinking
>("science does not think" --- the Gestell--the inventory of all beings)
>doesn't have these"axioms."
No, that is NOT the difficulty. My initial point was that H's critique is
predicated on his positions concerning "what math/natural sciences/the
calculative are like," and that these views are questionable, in light of
various developments in these disciplines (afterall, philosophy doesn't
grow 'hermetically'; it is a citizen of every community, belonging to
none).

Thus, I was maintaining that to sustain H's position, H's views need to
be buttressed EITHER by a new view concerning "what ....are like" OR
by argument to the effect that the reasons for calling his views
questionable were themselves questionable.

Anthony is pursuing the latter line -- if I understand him correctly -- by
arguing that H's characterization of "what ... are like" as 'axiomatic' is
tenable, pace my interpretations of Godel; and thus, undermining any
need for a new view.

I am pursuing the former line, trying to argue both for a new H-ian view
of "what ... are like" which NEITHER pivots on characterizing "what
...are like" as 'axiomatic/deductive/having canonical form/...', NOR
encounters difficulties deriving from causal constraints on theories of
truth.

First, I am trying to formulate the position that H's theory of 'aletheia'
can provide a picture of "what ... are like" more in line with the practice
of these disciplines and the phenomenal character of the practitioners'
'experiences' with their various domains. Second, I am trying to argue
that the causal constraints which would entail unfelicitous consequences
from H's aletheia-position are too narrow and are (unjustifiably) purely
physicalistic. Thus, for this reason, a richer Heideggerian (-like?)
treatment of causation seems very attractive to me, perhaps of the type
H proffers in his piece on Technicity (to put it less question-begging, I
should use the word "aition" rather than "causation"). Thus, I would
argue for rejecting the widespread physicalistic views of causation.

This overall view would not only properly 'place' these disciplines in the
Worum-willen of Dasein, it would also characterize these disciplines in
accord with their actual practice (as Kuhn's position dictates any sound
characterization should/would). Of course, this doesn't confer upon
these disciplines a "status" different from that which H confers upon
them. They are derivative/secondary: they remain wedded to the
apophantic of Aussage, Satzwahrheit, ontische Warheit, ..., etc.

The advantage is that we can know clearly Heideggerian see: we can
see their place in the Umwelt, and see them as aition-born from
primary Ind-der-Welt-sein.

Anyway, THAT is the difficulty.

>That, it seems to me, is Heidegger 101.
>(But then I'm always stuck repeating Heidegger 101.)
(Is this supposed to be an ad hominen? If it is, it indicates why you are
"stuck repeating Heidegger 101": you always fail the course. Need I
remind you that the dialogue between Anthony and me is called
Philosophical Dialectic, the elenchos, our arete)

Each of my dialogues with Heidegger texts respects that a genuine trek
with Being meets no impassable crags, that Being allows of footing for
everything, that Being is not gapped; It has no missing pieces. For me,
not finding a footing for "math....calculative...," ultimately lights up a
failure of Dasein's self-understanding. We fail Being, again.

Another such failure came home deeply to me today, when the washer-
woman said to me, "Oh, I tell you, things aren't what they used to be:
everything used to work; now all the machines are broken." She knows
someone is calling, but she doesn't know who it (es) is.

Enough said, I'm out of here for a while.

I will Talk to the washer woman;
I will learn to listen to the voice of Being,
Then I will listen to learn to the voice.

Cheers, all,
jim/jmd


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