File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_1998/heidegger.9805, message 221


From: "Prof. Dr. Rafael Capurro" <capurro-AT-hbi-stuttgart.de>
Subject: Re: God and Being
Date: Sat, 30 May 1998 10:53:45 +0200


Dear Michael,

I tried to answer your mail yesterday, but my system broke down. I will try
a second time now, taking the text from the disk.

Dear Michael,

thanks for your comments. I my experience (!)  there is indeed a _loosing_
from the re-presentation of a _big guy_ watching you (me) and with the
concomitant position of getting _certainty_ (or wanting some kind of
certainty) from _him_. To give up this kind of absolute ground
(theoretically and practically) means a revision of the metaphysical idea(l)
of god as a firm ground of truth (fundamentum inconcussum veritatis,
Descartes). This is one part of the story. The other part concerns the
way(s) we cast (and, as messengers (!), broad-cast) beings in their being
according to a pre-understanding of Being (excuse me for the big _B_: as you
know, Heidegger's _Sein_, although it is a substantive, is meant in a verbal
sense, which is the sense he (!) also gives to _Wesen_ , in contra-diction
to metaphysics). If there is for us (as finite beings) a definite
determination of what Being means, then our way(s) of casting beings is a
historical one. This concerns also our (pre-)understanding of the being of
God. But (!) here we have indeed a problem that was also seen by
metaphysics, as far as it did not overlooked the question of in what sense
_esse_ can be said in the same (?) sense from creatures and from the
creator. This is, as you know, the famous debate on what Przywara calls
_analogia entis_.

Now, Heidegger is in this matter in some way more fundamental, as he
questions the _notion_ of being itself, instead of taking it for granted (in
the sense of permanent presence), but in some other sense, he cannot (?)
find the (or another) way to what Scholastics were searching through the
Analogy-Debate (although Heidegger knew very well, from his very beginning,
this debate, but this is another story). The question is, in what way the
question(ing) of Being (in the verbal, historical sense, i.e. Being is being
cast through Da-sein) pre-determines also the question of a being that is in
the _limes_ . In other words, what do we mean when we use (!) the word _is_
saying_: _god (or a god, or gods, or godesses) is_. This has nothing to do
with a substitution of God through Being, which is simply a misunderstanding
of what we are debating when we start questioning the _being_ of god. If I
try to simplify this, I could say that metaphysics has been interpretring
human being taking as a measure the being of God, a measure beyond measure,
that could be related only by assuming something theo-logical in human
being(s) (the soul, Vernunft, mind etc.).

There is no case of just turning this view the other way around, i.e. trying
to think something like a _finite god_ i.e. taking the fundamental analytic
(of Dasein) as a (new ) fundament for re-viewing (also) the being of God.
This just because the _fundamental_ analytic cannot provide such a
_fundament_ as provided by metaphysics. Given the historicity of Being
(verbal sense) the question of God's being becomes more the question of
_its_ ad-venience, its being as be(ing)-coming. But this is (excuse me this
quick _dementi_) very quick said (and thought). So, in sum, no question
about God=Being (this is rubbish as far as H. is concerned), this was not
the question of metaphysics, that _just_ stated that the measure of being
should be the highest being. But doing this it discarded the historicity of
Being (verbal sense) or took for granted Being=standing presence (fulfilled
in an exemplary way in God: this syllogism can lead to the short version
God=Being, which reduces even more what metaphysics was discarding).

For all this debate there are some key texts from H., for instance:

1) Phaenomenologie und Theologie (held 9.3.1927 at Tuebingen and 14.22.1928
at Marburg, as a good-by address to his colleagues from the theology
faculty, GA 9) (the first part of this lecture has not been published, as
far as I know). Key statement: Ontology operates as a _Korrektiv_ of ontic
(pre-christian) theologic concepts (p. 64): this correction is not,
according to H., an attempt to provide a foundation of theology, but a
_formale Anzeige_. The content cannot be provided by philosophy. It is not
_Direktion_. Its foundation is not philosophy but faith.
It is only the _positive science of faith_ which _needs_ philosophy as far
as its scientificity is concerned (i.e. the _explication_ of its fundamental
concepts, as far as these concepts arise, as ontological ones, out of a
pre-christian dimension (this task is no necessary for philosophy as
philosophy). (Christian) Theology has to do not with the historical fact of
christianity but with the christian faith as a way of being of Dasein (as
far as it exists out of revelation, which is not just the transmission of
the knowledge (or information) about a fact, but the fact of being part of
this _fact_ (_mitteilen_ as _teil-nehmen_, based on a _teil-geben_...).
This relationship between _faith/god_ and _thinking/being_  is considered by
Richard Kearney (and Robinson and Cobb) in the sense of the _analogia
proportionalitatis_. See: R. Kearney: Heidegger, le possible et dieu. in:
R.Kearney, J.S. O'Leary eds.: Heidegger et la question de Dieu (Paris 1980):
still one of the best introductions to this matter(s) (in the different
senses of the word!)
In this book you can find an article by Jean-Luc Marion, that entails _in
nuce_ what he says in his book: Dieu sans l'etre.

2) As _Anhang_ to this, Heidegger's letter  from 11.3.1964 (!) to a
theological debate (Gespraec) at the Drew University, Madison, USA (it would
be interesting to hear from our US colleagues of this forum what _happened_
at this forum: who was there, what was the _impact_ of Heidegger's letter
etc.), where H.  refers to the problem of _objective language_
(objektivierendes Denken): at the end of this letter there is a hint to
_language as information_. According to H. _Denken_ is not primarily fixed
in its function of _propositions about things_ (_denken_ or _sprechen
ueber_, not _von_ , in the language of H. _Gespraech mit einem Japaner), but
a _Sichsagenlassen_ (let ourselves being told) and a co-responding to this
being-told: not a _Sagen ueber Objekte_ but a _Sagen von dem, was sich dem
Menschen ... zuspricht_. More simply: thinking is originally _fuzzy_! this
is not a bad thing! (see H. Putnam on the _porosity_ of language).

3) Brief ueber den Humanismus: (GA 9)
- p. 338: referring to the connection between: "In dieser Naehe zum Sein
vollzieht sich, wenn ueberhaupt, die Entscheidung, ob und wie der Gott und
die Goetter sich versagen und die Nacht bleibt, ob und wie der Tag des
Heiligen daemmert, ob und wie im Aufgang des Heiligen ein Erscheinen des
Gottes und der Goetter neu beginnen kann. Das Heilige aber, das nur erst der
Wesensraum der Gottheit ist, die selbst wiederum nur die Dimension fuer die
Goetter und den Gott gewaehrt, kommt dann allein ins Scheinen, wenn zuvor
und in langer Vorbereitung das Sein selbst sich gelichtet hat und in seiner
Wahrheit erfahren ist. Nur so beginnt aus dem Sein die Ueberwindung der
Heimatlosigkeit, in der nicht nur die Menschen, sondern das Wesen des
Menschen umherirrt." (no sense of identifying god and being; the question of
being is a pre-condition for the _advent_ of (no: not of god) other
dimensions (such as das Heilige);
(Naehe zum Sein - das Heilige - Wesensraum der Gottheit - die Goetter - der
Gott)

related to this p. 351 (citation from Vom Wesen des Grundes: _ein
zureichender Begriff es Daseins_ as pre-condition for the question about how
to think ontologically Dasein's relation to god;

after this:
"Erst aus der Wahrheit des Seins, laesst sich das Wesen des Heiligen denken.
ERst aus dem Wesen des Heiligen ist das Wesen von Gottheit zu denken. Erst
im Lichte des Wesens von Gottheit kann gedacht und gesagt werden, was das
Wort _Gott_ nennen soll. Oder muessen wir nicht erst diese Worte alle
sorgsam verstehen und hoeren koennen, wenn wir als Menschen, das heisst als
eksistente Wesen, einen Bezug des Gottes zum Menschen sollen erfahren
duerfen?"
(Wahrheit des Seins - Wesen des Heiligen - Gottheit - Gott)

3) Nietzsches Wort _Gott ist tot_: God as a name for ideas and ideals (moral
god). god as _causa sui_.
Nietzsche: we have killed god, how did we do this? Nietzsche says: "Wie
vermochten wir das Meer auszutrinken? Wer gab uns den Schwamm, um den ganzen
Horizont wegzuwischen? Was taten wir, als wir diese Erde von ihrer Sonne
losketteten?" H. on this: the sun are (Plato's) ideas, i.e. the horizon
within which being(s) as such shows itself, the _horizon_ is the
meta-perceptual world of true being. All this is like the sea which sorround
the earth (and that we have drunk!). The result? things are now ob-jects of
our subjectivity. Nietzsche's mad man is indeed mad (in German: ver-rueckt,
mad and ec-centric, he looks for got)

4) Identitaet und Differenz (p. 64): "Zu diesem Gott (god as causa sui, RC)
kann der Mensch weder beten, noch kann er ihm opfern. Vor der Causa sui kann
der Mensch weder aus Scheu ins Knie fallen, noch kann er vor diesem Gott
musizieren und tanzen"
(is it necessary to remember that this sentence is a direct hint to _David_
singing and dancing in front of the _Bundeslade_?)
(this is just to relativate some of the fine research done by Mme. Zarader
on Heidegger and the Jewish tradition)

5) Zuecher Seminar (GA 15): To the question: should we identify _Sein_ and
_Gott_:
"Die Frage wird mir fstalle vierzehn Tage gestellt" (well, today we could
say: every day through a list-server!)
"Gott und Sein ist nicht identisch (...) und ich wuerde niemals versuchen,
das Wesen Gottes durch das Sein zu denken. Einige wissen vielleicht, dass
ich von der Theologie herkomme und ihr noch eine alte Liebe bewahrt habe und
einiges davon verstehe. Wenn ich noch eine Theologie schreiben wuerde, wozu
es mich manchmal reizt, dann duerfte in ihr das Wort _Sein_ nicht vorkommen"
(should I translate this? roughly: God and Being is not identical, ich would
never try to think god's essence through Being. Some of you know maybe that
I come from theology and that I have retained an old love to it and that I
understand something about it. If I would write a Theology still, and
sometimes I would like to do it, the word _Being_ would not appear in it".
(although this is a protocol, it is a valuable testimony, istn't it?)

and of course all H.'s works on Nietzsche and Hoelderlin (and Schelling: for
instance GA 42, p. 284: how do be observe what a human being is? not when we
look ad him as an object, to whom we assign everyday feelings, but _with
regard to the abysses and highs of Being, with regard to the horrible of the
_gottheit_, the _lebensangst_ of all creatures, the _traurigkeit alles
geschaffenen Schaffens_ (the mourning or sorrow) of all produced creations,
the _Bosheit des Boesen_ (the malice, nastiness of evil) and the willing of
love" (yes, of love) "here God is not being pushed down (herabgesetzt) to
the human dimension, but the other way around: human being is experienced in
that which pushes him out of himself (was ihn ueber sich hinaustreibt...
Human being - as the other one, which can be if _the god_ is supposed to
reveal himself, if he reveals himself".
(we should ask Michael Eldred for a fine translation _made by art_ (not just
by _handicraft_ like this one!)

(and of course: die Beitraege, and H's early lectures on Paulus and Luther,
where he learned about the concept of _kairos_ etc.)

just one final hint from the Beilage to the _American letter_ (Drews Univ.)
GA 9, p. 78:
H. cites Rilke (Sonette an Orpheus I,3): poetry as an example of
non-objectifying thinking: "Gesang ist Dasein": the poet does no wishes
somehing (out of his/her desire), it is _just_ being-present (Anwesen)
_bei... und fuer den Gott_: _Anwesenheit_ means _einfaches Bereitsein, das
nichts will, auf keinen Erfolg rechnet_ (just the contrary to
_management_!): just let you tell God's presence
"Ein Hauch um nichts" a breath about nothing, breathing in and out, not an
object to be kept in our _conscience_ through neural networks

but "who has experienced theology (the christian one as well as the
philosophical one), prefers today in the dimension of thinking to be silent
about god" why? "because the onto-theological character of metaphysics has
become problematic for thinking, not because of some sort of atheism, just
because of the experience of a thinking to whom in the Onto-theo-logy has
been shown the un-thought unity of metaphysics. How does god come into
metaphysics? as a founding ground, as Being-Ground, Causa sui.

sorry for this long mail!

Rafael












-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
Von: Mike Staples <mstaples-AT-argusqa.com>
An: heidegger-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU
<heidegger-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU>
Datum: Freitag, 29. Mai 1998 16:42
Betreff: Re: God and Being


>Prof. Dr. Rafael Capurro wrote:
>
>> Michael,
>> the question of god and the question of being are indeed, according to
>>
>> Heidegger (and in contra-diction to metaphysical tradition) two
>> different
>> questions concerning two different matters. According to H.
>> metaphysics
>> (Aristotle) was asking for a (!) being that would give the measure for
>> all
>> other beings (ontology=theology). H. intends to separate both
>> questions: the
>> being of god is not the measure for the being of beings. Why? Well
>> because
>> according to metaphysics the being of god is conceived as permanent
>> presence
>> (aei nun, nunc stans). H. _falsifies_ (in a Popperian way) metaphysics
>> by
>> showing that there is at least one being (Dasein) whose being is not
>> only
>> presence but - time (past and future). Further on H. shows that this
>> first
>> approximation to the question of being only provides a _relative_
>> foundation
>> of ontology, given that other ways of being (of beings) such as
>> mathematical
>> objects, readiness-to-hand etc. cannot be related to the preliminary
>> _foundation_ of the analytic of Dasein without distorting in some way
>> their
>> specificity. Further on H. states that there is no _a_ frame of
>> casting
>> being but that this question is subjected to historic variations.
>> Hegel had
>> tried to connect all this forms into a single (hi)story but the price
>> for
>> this is a a-historical (theological) fundament (metaphysics once
>> again).
>> There is no question of substituting Got for Being, but a question of
>> how
>> God's (and human's) being can be casted. Tradition thought human
>> _being_
>> according to _the_ Being of God, identifying indeed God and Being.
>> Heidegger
>> is not just doing the contrary but trying to separate the question of
>> being,
>> from the question of god and finally also from the question of Da-sein
>> as
>> far as Being and Dasein _need_ each other but are not _the same_ (in
>> the
>> sense of _das Gleiche_, maybe in the sense of _das Selbe_ i.e. that
>> they
>> belong together although they are ant-agonistic). By thus re-placing
>> the
>> question of being outside the question of god H. at the same time lets
>> open
>> the way(s) of casting god's being (I recall in this regard that K.
>> Rahner
>> was one of the first theologians to think the question of an evolution
>> of
>> christian _dogmata_...). So, thinking being within the context of
>> _a-letheia_ give us the opportunity not only to _state_ the question
>> of god
>> from a very different horizon as done by (metaphysical) tradition but
>> also ,
>> given the historicity of being, to become open for a casting of being
>> _inside_ which a god may shine. This is not a gnostic proposition of
>> _waiting for Godot_ but it means simply the acknowledgement that there
>> is
>> (probably) a being whose appearence (or disappearence) is not
>> dependent
>> (alone) on our casting. Yes, there is some _theologia negativa_ in all
>> this,
>> if we here the word _negative_ in the sense of the _lethe_ i.e. as a
>> dimension possibilitating the shining. In short: no identification of
>> being
>> and god but a separation of both questions (and subjects), although
>> replacing the question of being into an existential context gives rise
>> to a
>> _new_ thinking of god's being. All this remains terribly speculative
>> if we
>> do not conceive it in the sense of a _formale Anzeige_ i.e. as a start
>> for
>> living without fundament, open (among others) to _some-thing_ we have
>> being
>> calling (in both sense of the word) got.
>> kind regards
>> rafael
>
>Dr. Capurro. Thank you for this explanation. I have enjoyed all of your
>postings, but this one especially. At the start, I offered up a couple
>of quotes that, as I understood them, suggested that the understanding
>of God might be favorably altered by thinking about our understanding of
>God from the position of Heidegger's understanding of Being. Moreover,
>our understanding of Heidegger's understanding of Being might be
>favorably altered by thinking about it from the position of our
>understanding of God.
>
>What I had in mind at the onset was not, I think, a traditional view of
>God as a big guy with a white robe. I had in mind something more of an
>experience tha is fundamentally mysterious, or numinous. The idea of God
>as a being seems rather strange to me personally, though I have several
>born-again Christian friends who do indeed think like this.
>
>It seems to me that the objection to my quotes came in the form of
>insisting that the very term "God" is a metaphysical concoction with a
>history of God-as-a-being, which could not be overlooked. "Being" meant
>one thing (forgive the loose use of 'thing'). "God" meant another thing,
>and it simply confused the issue to say that the term "God" meant
>something less like a being, and more like Being per se.
>
>Once this was agreed to, it apparently ment that anyone who attempted to
>think "God" from a position other than the traditional metaphysics of
>a-being, was confusing the issues. My impression was that this is where
>you came into the picture by saying, "Hold the phone! It isn't that
>simple. Some people have understood God in ways that are indeed more
>in-line with Heidegger's thinking of Being." Now, is that what you said,
>or did I get that wrong? Because if that IS what you said, and it holds
>water, then it may not be so easy to write off the substitution of God
>for Being Steiner suggests, without asking after Steiner's understanding
>of God first.
>
>Michael Staples
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>     --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---



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