Date: Fri, 8 May 1998 20:46:54 +0100
From: jmd <jmd-AT-dasein.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: R: thinker and thought


In message <199805081149.GAA02715-AT-endeavor.flash.net>,
Anthony Crifasi <crifasi-AT-flash.net> writes
>Michael Staples wrote:
>
>> >Perhaps there is an implicit interest, and an explicit admonition of
>> >solipsism in Heidegger's work, don't you think?. Weather or not he set
>> >out to combat solipsism directly is probably beside the point, though in
>> >a way you could probably make a case for that. The topic of God is
>> >entirely different, and I don't think this topic should be treated quite
>> >the same way. But I don't think it is in fact possible that we could all
>> >be solipsistic and still be Heideggerian.
>
>It depends on whether or not you believe that presence is prior to praxis. For 
>traditional solipsism, there is no notion of praxis being prior to presence, so 
>since they argue that solipsism results from the philosophy of presence (ie, 
>traditional epistemological problems concerning how we can know things which 
>are present to us), then solipsism is the *absolute* result of philosophy, not 
>merely the result of considering things in the mode of presence (only). For 
>Heidegger, on the other hand, presence is not the way of encountering beings 
>which is most prior (philosophically speaking), so that even if solipsism were to 
>be the "logical" result of the philosophy of presence, there would still be 
>another way of encountering beings which is unaffected by that "logical" result 
>(since logic itself is obviously derived only in the mode of presence). So I 
>suppose that "we could all be solipsistic and still be Heideggerian," but only if 
>we reject the traditional notion that presence is prior to praxis. 
>
>Anthony Crifasi
>
>
>     --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

Anthony,
I don't understand your response to Michael. Accepting the position that praxis
is prior to presence, not only ontologically prior, but logically prior -- in the
sense that presense can be made no sense of, cannot cohere without praxis,
cannot even be thematized without the assumptions of praxis -- then, accepting
that position, it seems it would make no sense to "suppose that 'we could all be
solipsistic and still be Heideggerian', but only if we reject the traditional notion
that presence is prior to praxis." If you reject that traditional notion and endorse
the VIEW that praxis is prior to presence in the ontological and logical sense,
then from WITHIN, as it were, this VIEW solipsism would seem to be either
self-refuting or simply not even THINKABLE. Self-refuting by a simple bit of
argumentation: if [Solipsism AND Praxis is prior to Presence], then [I cannot
even "make sense" of ME -- there is no ME -- without both the WORLD and
THEM]; I can "make sense" of ME (I hope, in a most unambitious sense, i.e.,
without all the Kantian and Cartesian baggage); so [Not Solipsism]; therefore,
not Solipsism. It seems not THINKABLE in the sense that the very concepts
and notions in which Solipsism is couched are not available WITHIN the View
(that one's harder to elaborate).
Cheers
jim. 
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