Date: Fri, 1 May 1998 15:02:48 -0500
Subject: Re: Heidegger & Kuhn


> Thanl you for your reply concerning Heidegger and Kuhn.  I agree with
> you that this marks the essential difference between the two.  But do 
> you think that, given this way of looking at Heidegger, viz., as a 
> supporter of the view that objectivity traditionally conceived is 
> parasitic upon actual lived practice, anything of real substance 
> distinguishes Heidegger from the pragmatic tradition?  For they also
> argue that objectivity without personal involvement is a myth, i.e., 
> that the thing-in-itself is a myth, and that theory and practice should
> not be (or cannot be) separated.  

Heidegger does not argue that things themselves are myths, as pragmatists 
do. That is the radical difference between Heidegger and everyone else. 
Pragmatists are still within the conceptual tradition even though they *appear* 
to have transcended it, because they generally reason as follows: 

1. The idea of "things themselves" is meaningful only if the idea of a purely 
objective experience is meaningful (since things themselves are supposed to 
be what would be reached in a purely objective experience).
2. The idea of a purely objective experience is non-sensical.
3. Therefore, the idea of "things themselves" is not meaningful.

>From this conclusion, they argue that truth cannot be a discovery of things 
themselves, since the latter is meaningless. Thus, truth must be purely 
pragmatic in nature, since the idea of things themselves is meaningless 
precisely because every activity is thoroughly infected with pragmatic content.

Now, look at premise #1 above. To accept that premise is to essentially accept 
the basic ideal of being as objective being. Heidegger denies precisely that 
point. He is not saying, as the pragmatists generally say, that the objective 
ideal is meaningless, so that "things themselves" are therefore meaningless. 
Rather, he is saying that it is precisely through praxis that we encounter beings 
"as they really are." The very equation of being with objectivity is what 
Heidegger is rejecting. It is the ontological nature of praxis that the pragmatists 
did not consider.

Anthony Crifasi


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