Date: Mon, 11 May 1998 19:39:05 +0100
From: jmd <jmd-AT-dasein.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: R: thinker and thought


In message <199805110312.WAA08319-AT-endeavor.flash.net>, Anthony Crifasi
<crifasi-AT-flash.net> writes
>Jim wrote:
>
>> Anthony,
>> I don't understand your response to Michael. Accepting the position that 
>praxis
>> is prior to presence, not only ontologically prior, but logically prior -- in 
>the
>> sense that presense can be made no sense of, cannot cohere without praxis,
>> cannot even be thematized without the assumptions of praxis -- then, 
>accepting
>> that position, it seems it would make no sense to "suppose that 'we could all 
>be
>> solipsistic and still be Heideggerian', but only if we reject the traditional 
>notion
>> that presence is prior to praxis." If you reject that traditional notion and 
>endorse
>> the VIEW that praxis is prior to presence in the ontological and logical 
>sense,
>> then from WITHIN, as it were, this VIEW solipsism would seem to be either
>> self-refuting or simply not even THINKABLE.
>
>I meant solipsism in the traditional (and most widely used) sense - the 
>solipsism of presence, not one of praxis. Traditional solipsism generally 
>reasoned as follows (I take solipsism to be the view that we cannot discover 
>other beings):
>
>1. If we can discover beings, it must primarily be by some mode of presence 
>(sensation, perception, intellection, intuition, etc.).
>2. Every mode of presence, upon examination, turns out to be unable to 
>discover beings.
>3. Therefore, we cannot discover beings.
>
>Now, this argument has force if we grant premise 1. But premise 1 is precisely 
>what Heidegger questions, since for him, the discovery of beings first and 
>primarily occurs prior to any mode of presence. So whatever is revealed in the 
>mode of presence (including solipsism IN THAT MODE), it still remains the 
>case that beings have already been discovered in another, more primordial way.
>
>Anthony Crifasi
>
>
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Anthony,
Your response helps me to better understand your earlier claim to Michael. In
light of the given comments, it seems that you do, afterall, agree with Michael
that we can't consistently endorse both Heideggerian positions apropos of
Existence/Dasein/Mit-Sein/etc. and a 'traditional' solipsistic position. Let me
explain my reading.

As you pointed out concerning your reconstruction below of the 'traditional'
solipsist (TS), H rejects (1), a pivotal assumption of TS's position.

1. If we can discover beings, it must primarily be by some mode of presence 
>(sensation, perception, intellection, intuition, etc.).
>2. Every mode of presence, upon examination, turns out to be unable to 
>discover beings.
>3. Therefore, we cannot discover beings.

In relation to these of your comments, with my earlier argument for Michael's
position I was trying to make not only the point that H rejects (1), but also
the point that his rejection of (1) is based, in part at least, on the
ontological/logical priority of Praxis over Presence. This priority,
interpolated with respect to your comments, would amount to the
(epistemological?) view that every mode of presence "presupposes," in some
sense, the "disclosure" of beings via some mode or other of praxis (PPP).

It was in relation to this last position, PPP, which seems to be central to H's
response to the tradition, that I claimed that if one accepts H's
characterization of Existence/Dasein/Everydayness/etc., then one should see
'traditional' solipsism as self-refuting.

It was this self-refuting argument which I tried to formulate earlier, albeit
poorly. Perhaps, the following would work better:

A. Assume PPP, for hypothetical deduction;
       X. So I can "make sense" of me only if both the World and Others
          are 'praxiologically disclosed';
       Y. I can "make sense" of me;
       Z. So, the World and Others are 'praxiologically disclosed' to
          me; I 'discover' the World and Others;
B. So, if PPP, then I discover the World and Others (or is it that: the "es" (of
       "es gibt") allows the World and Others to be discovered, or "dis-covers
       them "to me" or "over to me"(?) ).

Now, my earlier poorly formulated point was that (B) cannot consistently be
conjoined with Solipsism, given the understanding that Solipsism entails the
following claim:

C. I can discover neither the World nor Others.

Equivalently, any position flying both PPP and Solipsism as premises must be
self-refuting. And since PPP is definitive of a Heideggerian position -- at
least it seems arguably so -- one can't consistently fly both. That was my
intended argument for Michael's claim.

On another matter, however, Anthony, I would be reluctant to claim that your
argument characterizes 'traditional' solipsism. Rather, it seems to be a more
apt characterization of traditional philosophical scepticism as that doctrine is
diagnosed by Professor Barry Stroud in his The Significance of Philosophical
Scepticism.

My reason for saying this is that one could, for example, hold premise (1) with
respect to "res extensa" only, but postulate a special cognitive faculty for our
knowledge of Other minds, like some kind of sympathetic intellection or empathy.
In fact, I'm sure that some philosopher has held this view, but my memory fails
me (Butler, Reid, maybe Locke? maybe Bergson?). In any case, if one were to
adopt such a view, then one would not be a Solipsist in the 'traditional' sense,
as that seems to involve either the ontological position that only one mind
exist, namely, my own, and so I cannot know of Other minds by default, or the
epistemological position that I cannot know of the existence of minds other than
my own. At least that is my understanding of what the 'traditional' solipsist is
about.

Cheers
jim. 


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