Date: Sun, 28 Jun 1998 21:22:11 +0100
From: jim <jmd-AT-dasein.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Mind & Body, One More Time


In message <199806271643.LAA25876-AT-endeavor.flash.net>,
Anthony Crifasi <crifasi-AT-flash.net> writes
>Jim wrote:
>
>> The Pyrrhonians, unlike Descartes (and many of his contemporaries and
>> predecessors), did not have the following ideas or views: a realm of
>> "mere seemings" or "pure appearances," that some species of a "true-
>> false" distinction applied to them; and, thus, that with respect to them
>> the notion of 'certainty/knowledge' is applicable.
>
>You might want to read Aristotle's Met. Book Gamma on this issue.
> According 
>to Aristotle, the pre-socratics who denied the absolute truth of the principle of 
>non-contradiction did so because they thought that whatever appears is true. 
>And THIS they thought, according to Aristotle, because of the dream argument, 
>as well as arguments from the perceptions of the ill, the perceptions of animals 
>as differing from ours, etc.
>
Anthony, you know more Aristotle than I ever will. But the point that I
was trying to suggest, albeit unclearly, is that the ancient skeptics' notion
of "appearance," "perception," "sensation," etc., seems to be an
altogether different species of "appearance," "perception," etc., from
that we find in post-Cartesian philosophy (and maybe even post-
Scholastic philosophy?).
They advanced arguments which we also did: "arguments from the
relativity of perception" (the straight oar appearing bent in water; the
large distant tower appearing to be small (I forgot who used this one,
but it is mentioned as epistemologically harmless by Descartes), etc.) --
the 'contradictory' or 'contrary' perceptions, which is what Aristotle was
referring to, I think.
But the ancients don't seem to draw the same conclusions that we draw.
We would conclude from the "oar" argument the following lessons: since
the oar isn't bent, but 'what' I see is bent, it follows that 'what' I really
see, 'what' I am really aware of, is something other than the oar, viz, an
appearance; what's more, since there is nothing intrinsically different
about "this" seeing from any other seeing, it follows that all I ever really
see is appearance; and from here, with just a few more steps, we are
metaphysically hermetically sealed off from a world. But the ancients
always seemed to "stay with" only the epistemically harmless relativity.
They seem to never have let go of the world.

I'm completely uncertain about this! But when you read the following
quotes [from the Outlines of Pyrrhonism (from Benson Mates' new
book)], doesn't that interpretation raise its head to you?

If this idea of "two species of perception" is arguable, and the later
Western one is a piece with subjectivity, etc., then where do these two
species differ. Does the ancient species allow for a kind of
"metaphyscially harmless" subject-object distinction, one that doesn't
leave us to be worldless subjects? Could Dasein hold onto the ancient
notion in (Vorhanden) talking about perception?  

(1) "[I]n respect of touch how could one maintain that creatures
covered with shells, with flesh with prickles, with feathers, with scales
are all similarly affected?" and "sweet oil seems very agreeable to men,
but intolerable to beetles and bees; and olive oil is beneficial to men, but
when poured on wasps and bees it destroys them; and sea water is a
disagreeable and poisonous drink for men, but fish drink and enjoy it."

(2) "...the greatest demonstration of the great and boundless difference
among the intellects of men is the disagreement among the utterances of
the dogmatists, especially that concerning what it is fitting to choose and
to avoid.";

(3) "Pictures seem to the sense of sight to have concavities and
convexities but not to the touch," & "Let us imagine someone who from
birth has ...lacked hearing and sight.  He will start out believing in the
existence of nothing visible or audible, but only of the three kinds of
quality he can register.  It is therefore a possibility that we too, having
only our five senses, only register from the qualities belonging to the
apple those which we are capable of registering.  But it may be that
there objectively exist other qualities.";

(4) "...things strike us differently depending on whether we are in a
natural or unnatural state, since madmen and those possessed by the
gods seem to hear the voices of daimons, but we do not...  And the
same water seems to be boiling when poured onto feverish spots, but is
[only] lukewarm to us....  And if someone should say that a conjunction
of certain humours causes uncongenial presentations to come from the
objects to those who are in an unnatural state, then one should say that
since even the healthy have a blend of humours, these are able to make
the external objects... appear [other than they are] to those who are
healthy...";

(5) "lamplight appears dim in sunlight but bright in the dark.  The same
oar appears bent in water but straight when out of it";

(6) "[W]e deduce that since no object strikes us entirely by itself, but
along with something, it may perhaps be possible to say what the
mixture compounded out of the external object and the thing perceived
with it is like, but we would not be able to say what the external object
is like by itself...  The same sound appears one way when accompanied
by a rarefied atmosphere, another way when accompanied by a dense
atmosphere";

(7) "Silver filings appear black when they are by themselves, but when
united to the whole mass they are sensed as white...  And wine
strengthens us when drunk in moderation but when too much is taken it
paralyses the body...";

(8) "...since all things are relative, we will suspend judgment about what
things exist absolutely and in nature...  This has two senses.  One is in
relation to the judging subject [different subjects perceiving differently]...
The other in relation to the conceptions perceived with it...";

(9) "The sun is much more astounding than a comet; but since we see
the sun constantly and the comet rarely we are so astounded by the
comet that we regard it as a divine sign, but are not at all astounded by
the sun.  If, however, we imagine the sun as appearing rarely and setting
rarely, and illuminating everything all at once and suddenly throwing
everything into shadows, then we shall see that there is a great deal of
astonishment in the thing...."
Cheers,
jim


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