Date: Wed, 1 Jul 1998 09:24:20 +0100 From: jim <jmd-AT-dasein.demon.co.uk> Subject: Re: In dubium revocari In message <199806291953.OAA22737-AT-endeavor.flash.net>, Anthony Crifasi <crifasi-AT-flash.net> writes >So both Aristotle and Descartes hold that human >knowledge requires starting points which are absolutely indubitable (cannot be >otherwise). The only difference, then, is that Aristotle considers it to be >absolutely indubitable that "the thing out there is really there in the way it >shows itself," whereas Descartes argues (through the dream and 'evil genius' >arguments) that this is not in fact absolutely indubitable, and therefore cannot >serve as a first principle of human knowledge. I agree, Anthony, that both A and D have 'the same picture' of human knowledge as a kind of monolithic edifice grounded in first principles. But isn't it a kind of a mistake to characterize their views as a difference of opinions about a 'fact', about what is "in fact absolutely indubitable"? I'm not sure of my Aristotle, but in D's case, failing to be "absolutely indubitable" is not a failure "in fact." It is a necessary failure. There's a world of difference between holding, on the one hand, that "actually, as a matter of fact, it's always the case that I might be mistaken," and holding, on the other hand, that "necessarily, it's always the case." In the former case, the person can go on to respond: "but this factual possibility can be checked, and doesn't prevent me from reaching the indubitable wrt to any specific case." On the other hand, the person who holds that neccessarily there is always the possibility of mistake, does not have that response available. This person has to see our everyday epistemic practices as truly falling short of knowledge/certainty. This person must see these practices as affording us something like "knowing/being certain for all practical purposes," and not anything stronger. > That, then, is the reason for his >systematic doubt, not any fundamental move away from the Aristotelian model >of science and knowledge as what is absolutely certain. > D keeps the 'model' but the nature of the certainty required seems radically different. > >Specifically addressing Protagoras, Aristotle states that if all >appearances are true, then all of them must be both true and false at the same >time, since men can have contrary appearances (1009a7-12). He then goes >into the intricate discussion of their arguments for why all appearances are true >(the argument from dreams, the hallucinations of the sick, the perceptions of >animals, etc.) This is precisely why this entire discussion is in the >Metaphysics, instead of On the Soul, or some other such work - because it is >part of his of defense of the very first axioms of demonstration, which is a >discussion proper to First Philosophy, since all the sciences depend on these >axioms for their very procedure (according to Aristotle). But doesn't A reject the Protagorean view because he adheres to a kind of "realism" wrt the so-called 'objective' world: nothing can be which is both F and not-F (at the same time). And isn't that a view about just the "walk about" world around us? But D calls this walk-about world into question. > So the issue in >question at this point in the Metaphysics is indeed whether or not the dream >argument renders dubitable that "the thing out there is really there in the way it >shows itself," since if this is indeed rendered dubitable, then the principle of >non-contradiction is no longer absolute, which would result in the destruction of >all science and knowledge. But dubitable, uncertain in what sense? For all practical purposes? Dubitable, in fact; but not neccessarily so? > >Now, the first main sense of "falsity" above includes dreams, precisely in the >sense relevant to the Cartesian dream argument. Anthony, I don't have my D with me, but he allows that even in the case of dreaming there is some "contact" with the world -- I think this is the passage concerning the painters. Also, contrary to what almost everyone says, I argue that D is NOT TALKING about dreaming qua "having a dream" (maybe Aristotle is?). D says that dreaming and waking are the only two CONDITIONS under which we can have experience/perceptions. Doesn't the devastation of the dream argument come when D applies this CONDITIONS-view to itself and assumes that any given dream and it's supposed 'awake-state counterpart' are indiscernible. From this, it follows that we cannot know under what CONDITIONS we are having experience/perception. But isn't it the case that for A, dreaming is not one of only two exclusive CONDITIONS under which exp/perc is had, but is a state had when one is asleep? So, A sees dreams as 'episodes' from which we wake up, and go on to tell other people about? I don't have my A with me either. But if that is the case, then even if A holds, like D, a kind of 'indiscernibility' view about any given dream and an awake-counterpart, the falsity will not undermine the being of 'what is out there'. Despite the falisty, it can still be held that a person can wake up and check on his experience after (in this way, A seems to still hold onto the world).?? For D it isn't possible. > Descartes uses the "falsity" >of dreams in this sense to argue precisely that the "truth" of non-dreaming >experience is not indubitable, and therefore cannot serve as an absolutely >indubitable foundation of knowledge. Although D does see a kind of "falsity" with dreams, D also says that the 'stuff' of dreams can sustain our contact with the world. D's positions BEFORE the point he self-applies the premise that wake- dream are the only two CONDITIONS for exper/perc, do not threaten the very possibility of certainty wrt the very being of the world out there, so to speak, or some reality or truth or objective matter (I forgot what term he uses). There is still something out there. So, upto this point, D and A seem to be sharing similar views about dream, exper/perce. So, this 'falsity' is that which characterizes a dream qua STATE from which we can wake up and tell others about, etc.( like A?) But once D assumes that any given dream-state and an awake-state are indiscernible, and applies this assumption to his CONDITIONS view, the falsity of the dream becomes devastating! The reason is that the 'results' of any alleged 'test' for telling the difference between an awake state and a dream state are also themselves experi/percv'd under one of the two CONDITIONS. So, we would need another test, inorder to tell under which CONDITIONS we are experi/percvng the given 'results'; but the 'results' of this test are also exper/percvd under one of the two CONDITIONS, ad infinitum. So, necessarily, we can't tell under which CONDITION we are having exper/perce. The falsity of the dream infects not only any given current state, but even the CONDITIONS under which that state is had. That's why 'dubitability/uncertainty' is necessarily the case. Is this also the case with A? I simply don't know the answer to this. But even with this "infection of falsity," D allows us contact with the world out there. It is a purely "formal" or purely "conceptual" contact. I think he mentions that the stuff of our exper/percp, whether had under condition of Dream or Wakefulness, can contain concepts of what is absolutely simple(?). (Could this be a reference to A? I don't know. The passages are extremely obtuse). After this, D starts casting aspersions on math. From here, only something with the power of a "malignant demon" can 'cut off' this "formal" or "conceptual" contact. Which is where D goes in Med two. > So I don't see anything in the senses of >"truth" and "falsity" used by Descartes in his dream argument which would be >foreign to Aristotle's mind. The only issue between them is whether or not this >"falsity" of dreams leads to the dubitability of the difference between dreaming >and waking. Yes, but isn't the nature of this dubitability different as for A and D? For A, it seems like the kind of dubitability that we sometimes actually, in fact, experience. But it later 'works itself out', somehow. And we end up telling others about it. But for D, the dubitability can never work itself out: the experience of "this dubitability 'working itself out'" is itself had under one of two CONDITIONS. Of that much, and only of that much, can we be certain. But we cannot tell which of the two CONDITIONS it is under which we are experiencing the dubitability's "working itself out." For D, the 'falsity' is built into the very nature of exper/perc. Is that the case with A? It's like Wittgentein mentions: we are trying to check on the valididty of a newspaper article by examining other copies of the same paper. But my position here pivots on my EXTREMELY LIMITED exposure to A. Regards, jim --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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