From: "Anthony Crifasi" <crifasi-AT-flash.net>
Date: Sun, 12 Jul 1998 10:39:22 -0500
Subject: Re:  truth


Michael Eldred wrote:

> As Heidegger says many times, explanations are a dime a dozen. The =93therefore=94 
> is, of course, not a logical one, but must be a phenomenological =93therefore=94. 
> The starting point, as H. presents it, is to take a close look at the 
> =93adaequatio=94 or =93homoiosis=94 which metaphysical thinking claims to hold sway 
> between a statement (_logos_) and the thing itself. The statement =93The ball is 
> blue.=94 is true i.e. adequate to the ball if the ball, when we look at it, really 
> is blue. What kind of adequacy is going on here? A statement itself is not 
> ball-like, not is it blue-like, so how can a statement have anything at all to 
> do with a ball? Isn=92t a statement totally and utterly incommensurable with a 
> ball in its blueness? 
> 
> But metaphysics speaks self-evidently of adequacy, without bothering itself 
> about the measure through which commensuability could be assured. The statement 
> and the ball have to measure-through a space between them in order for any 
> adequacy to be possible. This space of measuring-through is the di-mension in 
> which the two meet, and _can_ meet. H.=92s =93therefore=94 is asking for the 
> conditions of possibility (_can_) for the adequacy of the statement to the ball 
> to be possible at all, i.e. adequate or inadequate.

But the traditional metaphysical philosophers also addressed this "space" - the 
difference is that they described it *metaphysically.* For example, Aristotle 
describes the "adequation" between proposition and object in terms of an 
identical metaphysical form being in the thing and in the soul. But due to the 
scientific difficulties involved in Aristotelian hylomorphism which were 
discovered with the advancement of science in the modern period, the 
explanation in terms of form and matter came to be entirely discredited. And 
this rejection of identity between thing and soul is *precisely* what led to the 
modern epistemological problems, which led to nihilism. So it is not as if the 
question of the possibility of adequation never came up for Aristotle and the 
medievals. Rather, they simply answered the question *metaphysically,* in 
terms of Aristotelian hylomorphism. Therefore, only if this theory fails is a NON-
metaphysical analytic needed in order to address the possibility of adequation 
between statement and thing. And indeed, the epistemological spiral towards 
utter nihilism is just such a failure.

So again, as has come up in many of our conversations, the key lies in the 
Aristotelian analytic. Aristotle addresses the adequation of thing to the soul, 
and even the difference between being and beings. The only difference is that 
he addresses it *metaphysically* through hylomorphism, which later came into 
scientific discredit, which led to the modern epistemological problems, which 
led to nihilism. So a non-metaphysical analytic is necessary at all only if the 
Aristotelian metaphysical analytic indeed leads to nihilism. Otherwise, a 
metaphysical analytic would be enough.

> We take it for granted that what we say refers to something in the =91real world=92, 
> but it remains totally unclarified what =91reality=92 or =91world=92 are and how such 
> =91referring=92 is possible. In asking for conditions of possibility, H. is pursuing 
> a line of questioning which metaphysics overlooked, because the dimension itself 
> was still concealed for metaphysical thinking. 
> 
> This dimension is _alaetheia_. It should not be imagined as a kind of (physical) 
> space, but has to become an enigma for us which calls for questioning. 

But as you say here, this presupposes that alaetheia indeed cannot be 
addressed in terms of a metaphysical (physical) theory, which assumes 
precisely that Aristote's metaphysical analysis of alaetheia fails. Otherwise, 
nothing beyond the metaphysical account would be needed at all. For example, 
take the questions you pose:

> For 
> example: where and how do words meet things? 

For Aristotle, propositions and things meet in that the metaphysical form 
received into the human soul (which has a metaphysical potentiality towards 
such a reception) is absolutely one and identical with the form of the thing 
known. Only if this analysis is inadequate is anything beyond metaphysics 
needed in order to address the meeting between propositions and things.

> How can things qua things stand 
> over against us? How can one thing be commensurable with another thing at 
> all, 
> e.g. a chair with a table? How can they both be things? 

The answer to all these questions is, for Aristotle, metaphysical substance, 
which is metaphysically grasped by the human soul (another metaphysical 
being). So again, it is not as if such questions did not come up for Aristotle. 
The assumption that the question must be answered *non-metaphysically* 
assumes that the metaphysical answer given by Aristotle is not adequate.

> What enables us to refer 
> to things through language? 

This, again, is the reception of forms into the human soul, which depends upon 
Aristotelian hylomorphism.

Anthony Crifasi


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