Date: Sun, 19 Jul 1998 00:26:27 +0100 From: jim <jmd-AT-dasein.demon.co.uk> Subject: Assertorial Truth, Mineness, Directions Does anybody have any comments on the following: I first introduce the notions of a weak and strong 'truth-maker' principle. The weak truth-maker principle simply states that when an assertion is true 'there is something' - a truth-maker - which makes it true. There are no assertions that are purely and simply, irreducibly true. The stronger truth-maker principle states that when an assertion is true its truth- maker is "that about which the assertion is made." The two principles are not the same. E.g., one can hold that the assertion "that 16 - 10 = 6" is made true by something, but that 'this something' is not that about which the assertion is made, namely, 16, 10, and 6. Rather, the assertion is made true by certain more fundamental truths of ZF (or GBN) set theory. (Clearly, as this example brings out, the stronger truth-maker principle can be invoked to buttress some forms of reductionism.) In SuZ(Sec.44), Heidegger's argument concerning what we can call Assertorial Truth progresses from an initial acceptance of the weaker form of the truth-maker principle to a later acceptance of the stronger form. Thus, apropos of epistemic assertions, Heidegger seems to be arguing that in proof or demonstration or verification, there is not only 'something which makes assertions' true - a truth-maker - but also something which must become apparent or visible. What's more, since this truth-maker must become apparent or visible in the 'sensually' phenomenal context of proof or demonstration or verification, the truth- maker itself must become sensually phenomenally present (I submit that it must be sensually phenomenally present.) The conclusion of his initial considerations is that the 'Essence' of Assertorial Truth can never be answered by the Correspondence Theory simply for the reason that the essence of Assertorial Truth, whatever it turns out to be, must be what makes it possible that the truth-maker is sensually phenomenally present. To make any sense of a Correspondence Theory, one must assume that this 'sensual phenomenal presence' is possible; thus, one cannot invoke such a theory to explain the presence. Can we get any closer to the truth-maker than just that it must be sensually phenomenally present? It's in trying to answer this question that it comes to seem that Heidegger endorses the stronger version of the truth-maker principle. In his discussion of the example of the person with his back turned to a wall while truly asserting about a picture on the wall that it is hanging crookedly, Heidegger seems to hold that the truth- maker of an assertion is 'that about which the assertion is made'. In his discussion of the picture, Heidegger suggests that the assertion "that the picture on the wall is hanging crookedly" is simply about the very picture itself. He also suggests that 'what' is sensually present to one's perception or awareness when, presumably, one turns around and looks upon the wall, is the very picture itself. (It's for this reason that Heidegger asks and answers the following: "Und was wird durch die Wahrnehmung ausgewiesen? Nichts anderes als "dass" es das Seiende selbst "ist," das in der Aussage gemeint war.") I.e., Heidegger tells us that 'what' is sensually phenomenally present is the picture itself, and, in particular, that this sensual phenomenal presence is the picture showing itself how it is shown by or pointed out in the assertion (c als wie seiend es in der Aussage aufgezeigtc) as hanging crookedly. In short, it seems that Heidegger comes to adopt the following form of the stronger truth-maker principle for Assertorial Truth: an assertion is made true by that about which the assertion is made. Truth is finally "explained" in terms of what makes it possible that 'that about which an assertion is made' shows itself sensually phenomenally. (1) If it seems reasonable to assume not only that one understands 'that about which an assertion is made' only if one knows how 'one would go about' proving or demonstrating or verifying it, but also that proving or demonstrating or verifying requires 'accessibility' to Vorhandensein; and therefore, Zuhandensein (eg. how does the person in the example know how to turn around and locate a space), then can't we argue that Entdeckend-sein is attributable to an entity only if Jemeinichkeit can be attributed. (2) Didn't Heidegger ever read directions? Does anybody get frustrated with the Vor/Zuhandensein distinction? It seems clear to me that Zu- accessibility, so to speak, is sometimes derivative from Vor- accessibility, eg, in the case of one's using directions to acquire a 'bodily naturalness' with respect to something. Does anybody have views concerning the claim that H's assertions to the effect that Vor is derivative from Zu needs to be supported by appeal to body epistemology, ie, our knowledge of our own bodies? Any comments? Kindest regards jim --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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