File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_1998/heidegger.9807, message 157


Date: Sun, 19 Jul 1998 00:26:27 +0100
From: jim <jmd-AT-dasein.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Assertorial Truth, Mineness, Directions


Does anybody have any comments on the following:

I first introduce the notions of a weak and strong 'truth-maker' principle.
The weak truth-maker principle simply states that when an assertion is
true 'there is something' - a truth-maker - which makes it true. There are
no assertions that are purely and simply, irreducibly true. The stronger
truth-maker principle states that when an assertion is true its truth-
maker is "that about which the assertion is made." The two principles
are not the same. E.g., one can hold that the assertion "that 16 - 10 = 6"
is made true by something, but that 'this something' is not that about
which the assertion is made, namely, 16, 10, and 6. Rather, the
assertion is made true by certain more fundamental truths of ZF (or
GBN) set theory. (Clearly, as this example brings out, the stronger
truth-maker principle can be invoked to buttress some forms of
reductionism.)

In SuZ(Sec.44), Heidegger's argument concerning what we can call
Assertorial Truth progresses from an initial acceptance of the weaker
form of the truth-maker principle to a later acceptance of the stronger
form. Thus, apropos of epistemic assertions, Heidegger seems to be
arguing that in proof or demonstration or verification, there is not only
'something which makes assertions' true - a truth-maker - but also
something which must become apparent or visible. What's more, since
this truth-maker must become apparent or visible in the 'sensually'
phenomenal context of proof or demonstration or verification, the truth-
maker itself must become sensually phenomenally present (I submit that
it must be sensually phenomenally present.) The conclusion of his initial
considerations is that the 'Essence' of Assertorial Truth can never be
answered by the Correspondence Theory simply for the reason that the
essence of Assertorial Truth, whatever it turns out to be, must be what
makes it possible that the truth-maker is sensually phenomenally
present. To make any sense of a Correspondence Theory, one must
assume that this 'sensual phenomenal presence' is possible; thus, one
cannot invoke such a theory to explain the presence.

Can we get any closer to the truth-maker than just that it must be
sensually phenomenally present? It's in trying to answer this question
that it comes to seem that Heidegger endorses the stronger version of
the truth-maker principle. In his discussion of the example of the person
with his back turned to a wall while truly asserting about a picture on the
wall that it is hanging crookedly, Heidegger seems to hold that the truth-
maker of an assertion is 'that about which the assertion is made'. In his
discussion of the picture, Heidegger suggests that the assertion "that the
picture on the wall is hanging crookedly" is simply about the very picture
itself. He also suggests that 'what' is sensually present to one's
perception or awareness when, presumably, one turns around and
looks upon the wall, is the very picture itself. (It's for this reason that
Heidegger asks and answers the following: "Und was wird durch die
Wahrnehmung ausgewiesen? Nichts anderes als "dass" es das Seiende
selbst "ist," das in der Aussage gemeint war.") I.e., Heidegger tells us
that 'what' is sensually phenomenally present is the picture itself, and, in
particular, that this sensual phenomenal presence is the picture showing
itself how it is shown by or pointed out in the assertion (c als wie
seiend es in der Aussage aufgezeigtc) as hanging crookedly. In short,
it seems that Heidegger comes to adopt the following form of the
stronger truth-maker principle for Assertorial Truth: an assertion is
made true by that about which the assertion is made. Truth is finally
"explained" in terms of what makes it possible that 'that about which an
assertion is made' shows itself sensually phenomenally.  

(1) If it seems reasonable to assume not only that one understands 'that
about which an assertion is made' only if one knows how 'one would go
about' proving or demonstrating or verifying it, but also that proving or
demonstrating or verifying requires 'accessibility' to Vorhandensein; and
therefore, Zuhandensein (eg. how does the person in the example know
how to turn around and locate a space), then can't we argue that
Entdeckend-sein is attributable to an entity only if Jemeinichkeit can be
attributed.
 
(2) Didn't Heidegger ever read directions? Does anybody get frustrated
with the Vor/Zuhandensein distinction? It seems clear to me that Zu-
accessibility, so to speak, is sometimes derivative from Vor-
accessibility, eg, in the case of one's using directions to acquire a 'bodily
naturalness' with respect to something. Does anybody have views
concerning the claim that H's assertions to the effect that Vor is
derivative from Zu needs to be supported by appeal to body
epistemology, ie, our knowledge of our own bodies?
Any comments?
Kindest regards 
jim


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