Date: Mon, 20 Jul 1998 06:54:06 +0100
From: jim <jmd-AT-dasein.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Self-Certainty + God


In message <199807190623.BAA14354-AT-endeavor.flash.net>,
Anthony Crifasi <crifasi-AT-flash.net> writes
>What I am pointing out is Aristotle's often-overlooked definition of scientific 
>knowledge as what CANNOT BE OTHERWISE. It is simply this definition 
>which Descartes is using when he is seeking an absolutely indubitable starting 
>point in the Meditations.
Anthony, aren't you assimilating "knoweldge of a metaphysical
necessity" with "necessarily 'incorrigible' knowledge"? You might hold
that genuine knowledge must be of what's metaphysically necessary, but
also hold that knowing need not imply the impossibility of error
(absolute indubitability). Ie, although D was seeking knowledge of what
is absolutely indubitable, it wouldn't be correct to say that he sought
knowledge of what couldn't fail to exist, would it? This would suggest
that the existence of the self was unconditionally necessary, not
(logically) necessary GIVEN an Intentional Accident. 

> The difference between them is that for Aristotle, the 
>existence of beings other than the ego-cogito is immediately certain,
> whereas 
>for Descartes, this is dubitable, leaving only the experience as indubitable, not 
>its "external existence."
But not necessarily of beings whose existence, as such, couldn't be
otherwise. Ie, A might hold that immediate certainty of a being's essence
is knowledge of what couldn't be otherwise, in the sense that a change
in essence would involve a change in that being's very identity, but is it
immediate certainty of  a being that couldn't BUT exists (save the case
of a prime 'mover')? 

>But Descartes' states specifically that he intends his argument for the 
>existence of God, as well as of his goodness, to be based ultimately upon the 
>Cogito. So this ultimately goes back to self-certainty.
You can characterize D's philosophical project in this way, as ultimately
going "back to self-certainty." However, to do so is either misleading or
involves characterizing the project as inherently contradictory. On the
one hand, if 'Objective Validity' could be grounded on self-certainty
alone, then D wouldn't have bothered to prove God's existence (except
to save his own neck from the Inquisition); it wouldn't need proving. On
the other hand, the project thus characterized involves the following
inherently logically contradictory situation:
If Cogito, then God; if God, then 'Objective Validity'; but it's not the
case that if Cogito, then 'Objective Validity'.
The proof of God affords an epistemological and metaphysical leverage
that is not afforded by the Cogito alone.
>
Kind regards,
jim


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