From: "Anthony Crifasi" <crifasi-AT-flash.net>
Date: Mon, 20 Jul 1998 11:48:57 -0500
Subject: Re:   truth


Michael Eldred wrote:

> > I am not denying that "the new discoveries in natural science are a
> >  happening 
> > within an essencing of truth." I am merely denying that that "essencing of
> >  truth" has changed from Aristotle to Descartes.
> 
> This =93merely=94 is rather an understatement considering the momentous issue at 
> stake here, viz. the fundamental difference between the modern Western and the 
> Greek historical worlds. 

I had thought that our dispute here really does not threaten Heidegger's analytic 
itself. But you appear to be saying that there is much more at stake, so 
perhaps I am missing something. Do you think that this dispute bears upon 
Heidegger's analytic itself? If so, I would be very interested in this, since I am 
thinking about making all of this the subject of my dissertation.

> > Newton's rejection of Aristotle's fire-up-earth-down-planets-circles physics
> >  was 
> > based on his discovery of one fact - the correlation between the oribital
> >  motion 
> > of the moon and the gravitational acceleration of a falling terrestrial body.
> 
> This =93one fact=94 of =93correlation=94 presupposes already the shift in the 
> understanding of physical beings from an Aristotelian to a modern understanding, 
> namely it presupposes a rejection of the ontological knowledge of beings as 
> having an inner nature. The comparison between the moon and sublunar bodies and 
> thus the correlation of their motions only becomes conceivable or thinkable at 
> all on the basic of another ontology -- the ontology of modern subjectivity 
> which casts physical beings as uniform (merely res extensa) in uniform time and 
> space. 
> 
> There is no fact =93discoverable=94 which could disprove an inner nature to things, 
> as drafted in Aristotelian ontology.

It may be true that Aristotle's idea of "inner nature" cannot be completely 
disproven by new "facts," but what Aristotle himself states about "nature" does 
imply two main ways in which new "facts" can (and did) render his view more 
and more in-credible in comparison to alternative views.

First, in Phys. lI.8, Aristotle makes clear that his idea of "nature" as an intrinsic 
principle of motion necessarily implies a telos specific to that nature. But 
Aristotle explicitly opposes his teleology to the "survival of the fittest" view of 
nature, put forth in his time by Empedocles (Phys. 198b29-33). The two views 
are rivals because both seek to explain the same natural phenomenon - the 
fact that beings are naturally generated with characteristics and tendencies fit 
for their survival and benefit; but Aristotle explains this by positing a specific 
natural tendency towards a specific good, while the other explains this simply 
by the non-survival (and therefore the disappearance) of all beings which were 
generated without survival characteristics. Now, Aristotle's response to the 
latter view (198b33-199a1) is that although it can explain why most beings at 
present have survival characteristics (ie, the ones that didn't have died out), it 
cannot explain why such characteristics for the most part continue to appear, 
since such characteristics supposedly appear purely by chance. This is where 
new "facts" become important. Should new discoveries offer an explanation of 
the continual appearance of specific characteristics, then Aristotle's direct 
objection against the "survival of the fittest" view of nature loses its force. And 
indeed, this is precisely what happenned. Although Darwin knew nothing of 
genetics, he posited unknown intrinsic natural causes which determined the 
inheritance of characteristics, while keeping the principle of "survival of the 
fittest." These natural causes were later clarified in the new science of 
genetics, and indeed today, biological teleology has been all but completely 
rejected in favor of the "survival of the fittest" view of nature. Now, I am not 
saying that science has "advanced" in some absolute sense. I am merely 
saying that there is no need to propose an upheaval in the essencing of truth 
itself; new discoveries within the SAME essencing of truth suffice. Modern 
science merely answered an objection posed by Aristotle himself.

Secondly, regarding the change to "res extensa in uniform time and space," 
the reason for this change was simply that the very same phenomena which 
Aristotle's theory of NON-uniform space (ie, natural place) was meant to 
explain could be explained equally well without this presupposition, thereby 
leaving (by negation) a space which UN-differentiated. For example, in order to 
explain why air rises and earth falls, Aristotle posited that they had a natural 
tendency towards the places which were best for them (ie, where their being 
would be best preserved). But as Pascal showed with his balloon and suction 
experiments, air has weight just like any other terrestrial substance, 
suggesting that all bodies have the same uniform tendency. There was no need 
to posit specific "natural places" in order to explain the difference in behavior 
between air and earth. It is the same with Newton's first law of motion. Many 
people are absolutely shocked (as I was) to learn that Aristotle himself 
specifically addresses Newton's first law of motion, at Phys. 215a19-22. More 
interesting, however, is that there he specifically opposes this view to natural 
place. Aristotle argues that since an absolute void implies no differentiation 
between one place and another, then if there were such a void, there would be 
no reason for a moving body to stop in one place rather than any other, so that 
it would continue to move forever until obstructed by something else. Since this 
is never observed to occur, Aristotle presents this as an argument against the 
existence of voids. So the very idea of such motion is not the result of a new 
"essencing of truth;" rather, as Aristotle himself recognized, it would be the 
direct consequence of the rejection of natural place (ie, the rejection of 
differentiated place is UN-differentiated place). Thus, the more new "facts" 
(such as Pascal's the balloon experiments) offer an explanation of the behavior 
of bodies without recourse to natural place, the more is the idea of 
undifferentiated uniform space supported over Aristotle's theory of differentiated 
natural place.

> > None of these discoveries [you give several examples] requires a CHANGE in the 
> > essencing of truth. They are merely patterns in nature which were accessible
> >  in Aristotle's time, but which were simply not discovered yet.
> 
> This would mean that there were =93patterns in nature=94 which are observable and 
> thus discoverable independently of the fundamental understanding of being, i.e. 
> that there could be such a thing as ontology-free facts, facts prior to ontology. 

Not at all - it would merely mean that these discoveries could be explained 
without a CHANGE in the essencing of truth, not without an essencing of truth 
simply.

> What =93cannot be otherwise=94 is for Aristotle _to anankaion_, i.e. what is 
> necessary. What is necessary has nothing at all to do with the certainty of a 
> subject, let alone absolute certainty, but with the nature of beings, i.e. with 
> their fundamental ontological casting. 
>
> What you refer to as =93certain=94 finds its parallel in Aristotle in the word 
> =93phaneros=94, i.e. what is clear, what shows itself clearly in the light to all 
> eyes. It is not an inner process within the consciousness of a subject 
> convincing himself, but rather a self-revealing of beings in the open. 

It is true that "what is necessary" by itself has to do with the nature of beings, 
but KNOWLEDGE OF what is necessary also implies conviction on the part of 
the knower, as Aristotle says at Nic. Eth. 1139b32-35. Although it is not "the 
consciousness of a subject convincing himself" (since for Aristotle, more is 
originally certain than just the consciousness of the subject), nevertheless 
conviction is still a necessary element for scientific knowledge. 

Anthony Crifasi


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