From: "Anthony Crifasi" <crifasi-AT-flash.net>
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 1998 09:33:11 -0500
Subject: Re: truth


Michael Eldred wrote:

> As I pointed out in my last post, =93certitude=94 is not enough to characterize a 
> casting of being, but is only one moment of a whole articulated structure 
> (Gefuege) of being. You truncate the understanding of being, that is, your way 
> of arguing is consistently analytic in the sense that it dissolves the elements 
> one from the other instead of having an insight into the whole. In picking out 
> certitude and finding passages in Aristotle where something roughly resembling 
> =93certitude=94 can be read, all the other elements of the Gefuege of being 
> disappear from sight, thus e.g. the shift from subject as _hypokeimenon_ to 
> subject as =93I think=94 and, more particularly, the shift from an inner nature of 
> physical beings to =93res extensa=94, the dissolution of _ousia_. 

But to argue that "the shift from the subject as hypokeimenon to subject as I 
think" is as fundamental an "element" as certitude is to already assume that 
certitude was not the essence of truth for Aristotle, which is precisely the point 
in question between us at the moment. In other words, while I am trying to 
argue from Aristotelian texts that certitude is no less essential for Aristotle than 
for Descartes, you cannot yet respond that I am "dissolving the elements one 
from the other," because that already assumes that the other "elements" (eg. 
the shift from hypokeimenon to "I think") are just as fundamental if not more so 
than certitude in the first place.

> For a totally contrary account to your =93explanations=94 of scientific progress cf. 
> e.g. Heidegger =93Die Frage nach dem Ding=94, the lecture script from WS 1935/36 
> esp. B 1.5 d) =93Demarcation of the Greek Experience of Nature against that of 
> Modernity=94 and the sections on =93The Mathematical=94.

I will definitely look at that text. Thank you for the reference.

> If the modern world and the ancient Greek world were founded on the same 
> fundamental casting of being, there would be no historical difference between 
> these worlds i.e. no difference on the deepest level. The modern world would be 
> Aristotle=92s metaphysics =93merely=94 and =93simply=94 modified slightly in the light of 
> new scientific discoveries. 

And that is precisely what I am arguing. When I say that Newtonian science 
"rejected" Aristotle, I mean that it rejected Aristotle *on the ground of Aristotle's 
own philosophy,* which means that it rejected Aristotle's more "specific" 
scientific claims (natural place, etc.) while implicitly keeping Aristotle's own 
grounds for science and truth. That is why I have been trying to find Aristotelian 
texts which indicate that (1) Aristotle himself recognized the specific opposition 
between his own metaphysics and that of the Newtonian view (eg. atomic 
theory, natural selection, accidental vs. substantial change), and (2) that the 
Newtonian view emerges "merely" from rejecting certain elements of 
Aristotelian metaphysics while leaving others (eg., Aristotelian place = not only 
position, but also power; Newtonian place = only position, not also power; thus, 
the Newtonian position emerges from a rejection of the Aristotelian idea of 
natural place or "power," leaving the notion of position only). Further, regarding 
the latter, I have argued that the rejection occurred precisely due to the fact 
that the alternatives could explain the same phenomena cited by Aristotle but 
more simply - a principle which Aristotle himself explicitly endorses at Phys 
189a15-18. Thus, I am arguing the rejection occurs on Aristotle's own ground of 
science, and essentially remains so today for that reason. 

> > At Phys. 208b10-22, Aristotle argues that places differ from one another "not 
> > only in position but also in power." Thus, up and down differ "not only in 
> > position but also" in that they are the places to which fire and earth
> >  naturally 
> > tend, respectively. So if this idea of the power of place is rejected, then
> > place will differ "only in position, not also in power," which is essentially the
> >  notion which emerged from the Newtonian revolution.
> 
> This is a mistranslation. The relevant passage reads:
> 
> _...ou monon daelousin hoti esti ti ho topos, all=92 hoti kai echei tina dynamin_ 
> (208b10)
> =93[the courses (phorai) of the simple physical bodies] not only make it clear 
> that place is something but also that it has a power=94

The specific line to which I was referring was 208b22. I cited the entire passage 
from 10-22 only for context. Unless the translations I have are all wrong, there 
Aristotle states explicitly that places differ "not only in position but also in 
power."

Anthony Crifasi



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