Date: Sun, 26 Jul 1998 23:50:45 +0200
Subject: Re:  truth
From: artefact-AT-t-online.de (Michael Eldred)


Cologne, 26 July 1998 

Henk van Tuijl schrieb:
> >_...ou monon daelousin hoti esti ti ho topos, 
> >all' hoti kai echei tina dynamin_  (208b10)
>
> >"[the courses (phorai) of the simple physical 
> >bodies] not only make it clear that place is 
> >something but also that it has a power"
>
> >There is no mention of "places differing from 
> >one another" but of place _being_ something, 
> >i.e. _ousia_. The movements of the elements 
> >show that place as _ousia_ has its being as a 
> >power, a _dynamis_, which means nothing other 
> >than _topos_ is a "principle for the change in 
> >something else" (Met. Theta 1 1046a10), namely 
> >for the movements of the simple elements. 
>
> A slightly different intepretation:
>
> Not: "it has a power" - but: "it 
> has a hold on dynamis". 

Very interesting, Henk. Wouldn’t it be better to say:
"it has a hold AS dynamis"? 

> Cf. GA15:94  the Archilochos-fragment 67A: 
> "gignooske d' hoios rusmos anthroopous echei, 
> erkenne, welcher Rhythmus die Menschen hält" 
> (roughly: see which rhythm has a hold on man).    
>
> Echoo, from Sanskrit sahate, having power 
> (German: Sieg - English: victory). 
> In Sanskrit one siegt if one is able to hold
> the enemy (up, back or in place) - not if one
> destroys him.
> (Cf. for an interesting example of echein 
> tina: Homer d419.)
> A more specific form of echein tina is logon 
> echon (lit. having a hold on logos)  
>
> Seen in this light, topos has not its being
> as power, but is a being that has a hold on 
> dynamis, i.e. it is a topos, not because it 
> is something or other, but because it does 
> something (holds change (?) up, back or in
> place).

The phrase “to have and to hold” from the Christian marriage ceremony occurs to 
me here. 

I would rather say topos indeed has its being AS power (dynamis), and that means 
that is has a hold on something else, namely, change in something else (here: 
the simple elements). 

> As Heidegger points out (cf. GA55:369), 
> change is never indefinite. In being 
> (Seiendes) Being (Sein) is bound 
> (eingegrenzt in seinem Umriß, peras,telos).
> This bringing into being is a poiein kata 
> phusin - which is also a legein. 

Which also brings beings to stand -- also in understanding (Seinsverstaendnis). 

> You wrote:
> >If this understanding of _topos_ and its power 
> >is rejected, this goes along with a rejection 
> >of the metaphysics of _ousia_ and is only 
> >possible on the basis of an alternative 
> >metaphysical casting of the whole of being 
> >as outlined in Descartes' _Meditatione_. A new 
> >cast of the dice as a whole, not piecemeal 
> >modification. 
>
> If a poiein kata phusin is also a legein, 
> the question might be asked if Descartes's 
> pronuntiatum - Ego sum, ego existo 
> (cf. AT VII 25) - is a topos in the 
> Aristotelian sense. Is it a legein kata 
> phusin? 
>
> If the Cartesian pronuntiatum is a legein
> kata phusin, the difference between the 
> Aristotelian topos and the pronuntiatum 
> is the next question in the Meditationes:
>
> "Nondum verò satis intelligo, quisnam sim 
> ego ille, qui jam necessario sum [...]." 
> (AT VII 25)
>
> Roughly: I do not yet fully understand who
> that ego is, which I necessarily am.

The phrase “poiein kata physin” comes from Heracleitus’ Fragment 112, the 
earliest of Greek thinking, and as such it is presumably at the furthest remove 
from the Cartesian pronouncement of “I am”. Heidegger’s interpretation of the 
phrase in GA55 runs along the lines that _poiein kata physin_ is not a making in 
accordance with nature but a knowing bringing forth into unhiddenness in 
accordance with how beyng itself is gathered into an emergent being in its 
defining outline and thus comes to stand in knowledge (_sophiae_). Such 
gathering into knowledge is the domain of the _logos_, the word. Thus Heidegger 
interprets the Heracleitian _poiein kata physin_ as “das sich im Wort sammelnde 
Hervorbringen des Seins ins Wort.” (“the bringing forth of being into words 
which gathers itself in words” GA55:370). 

For Cartesian metaphysics, on the other hand, there is no gathering of being in 
self-emergent, unhidden beings but rather the self-positing of the absolute 
starting point (_archae_) of “ego cogito”, of “I think” and “I can”. The 
_poiein_ of this ego is not a Heracleitian “knowing” but is a “making” and 
“doing”, and that not according to the emergence of beyng into a defined 
outline, but according to the will of the self-certain subject. Nature is 
interrogated in a mathematical way, and mathematics is the way of thinking that 
opens up the truth (disclosedness) of nature and makes it amenable to 
manipulation. The metaphysics of subjectivity as mathematical certainty is 
announced and pronounced in Cartesian metaphysics. Thus Heidegger writes in “Die 
Frage nach dem Ding”: 

“Sie [die aufgestellten Axiome] muessen 1. die schlechthin ersten sein, in sich, 
aus sich einsichtig, evidens, d.h. schlechthin gewiss. Diese Gewissheit 
entscheidet mit ueber die Wahrheit. 2. Die obersten Axiome muessen als die 
schlechthin mathematischen ueber das Seiende im Ganzen zum voraus festmachen, 
was seiend ist und was Sein heisst, von wo aus und wie sich the Dingheit der 
Dinge bestimmt.” (S.80) 

and on the next page: 

“Denken _ist_ immer als “_ich_ denke”, ego cogito. Darin liegt: ich bin, sum; 
cogito, sum -- ist die unmittelbar in dem Satz als solchem liegende oberste 
Gewissheit: Im “ich setze” ist das “ich” als das Setzende mit- und vorgesetzt 
als das schon Vorliegende, als das Seiende. Sein von Seiendem bestimmt sich aus 
dem “ich bin” als der Gewissheit des Setzens.” (S.81) 

roughly rendered:
“They (the postulated axioms) must be, firstly, the very first ones, in 
themselves, of themselves evident, i.e. purely and simply certain. This 
certainty is one factor that decides truth. Secondly, the uppermost axioms, as 
the purely and simply mathematical axioms regarding beings as a whole must 
establish in advance what a being is and what being means, which is the point of 
orientation for how the thingness of things is determined.” 
and
“Thinking _is_ always as “_I_ think”, ego cogito. This implies: I am, sum; 
cogito, sum -- is the uppermost certainty lying immediately in the postulate as 
such: In “I postulate”, the “I” as the positing agent is posited along-with and 
prior-to as that which already lies present as a being. The being of beings is 
determined from the “I am” as the certainty of positing/postulating.” 

This last sentence shows just how great the gulf is that separates Descartes 
from Heracleitus. Being becomes the positing of the self-certain subject that 
casts a mathematically axiomatic net over beings as a whole. There is not a 
trace left of the gathering saying of beyng as it emerges of itself in the 
unconcealedness of a defined, delimited being. 

Thanks!
Michael
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