From: "Anthony Crifasi" <crifasi-AT-flash.net>
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 1998 19:18:57 -0500
Subject: Re: truth


Michael Eldred wrote:

> For Descartes the locus of truth is the consciousness of the ego-subject> Because truth is localized there all these considerations of sensations being 
> received make sense.

The internal theory of sensation in the new science of the time was not 
dependent upon the localization of truth in the consciousness of the ego-
subject, because there were many philosophers and scientists of that time who 
accepted that new theory of sensation while remaining realists. Rather, the new 
internal theory of sensation depended upon the experimental discovery of the 
function of nerves and the brain in relation to sensation and muscular 
movement, and the subjectivization of sensation resulted from these findings. 
This explains why one could have held to the internal theory of sensation, 
without yet seeing the resulting subjectivization of sensation. It also explains 
why the dream argument failed to become widely convincing in ancient times - 
there was no sweepingly successful new science whose conclusions concided 
perfectly with it. 

According to the interpretation you are defending, however, it would be difficult 
to explain why the dream argument, as well as the ancient arguments from 
natural selection and atomic theory, were opposed by Aristotle himself to his 
own philosophy in a way strikingly similar to the way in which the modern 
versions of those theories were opposed in modern times to Aristotle's science, 
since according to your interpretation, the ancient versions meant something 
completely different due to a different historical opening. According to my 
interpretation (which of course is not original to me), the striking similarities in 
the manner in which the ancient and modern versions were both opposed to 
Aristotle is perfectly understandable, since I am not maintaining a difference in 
historical opening.

> I agree that trusting in postulates is an aspect of truth 
> for both Descartes and Aristotle. It would be strange indeed if there were no 
> points of comparison at all. But what has happened to the essence of truth in 
> Aristotelian metaphysics, viz. _homoi=F4sis_? Aristotle writes with regard to 
> falsity: =93false _logos_:  the _logos_ of non-being is insofar false=94 (Met. Delta 
> 29 1024b26), whereas the true _logos_ adapts to the being of what it refers to; 
> thus =93not because we truly opine that you are white are you white, but because 
> you are white, we say the truth when we say this=94 (Met. Theta 10 1051b8).

Those texts are perfect for this discussion. Look at rest of the very same line 
you cite from Met. Delta (1024b26). False logos is either non-being OR A 
BEING WHICH CREATES THE APPEARANCE OF BEING WHAT IT IS NOT. 
And the example he gives of the latter is A DREAM (1024b24). Thus, the 
dream argument directly addresses Aristotle's ground of truth simply by its 
contention (in both the ancient and modern versions) that everything appears to 
be what it is not, so that the locus of truth then shifts to the appearance itself 
("all appearances are true" - 1009a9). This also applies to the second text from 
Met. Theta. So the dissolution of the subject of Aristotelian metaphysics 
(ousia) is the result of something common to both the ancient and modern. The 
only difference is that in the modern world, there were corroborating details from 
an incredibly successful new science (the principles of which, as I argued, do 
*not* presuppose an egocentric locus of truth) which made the "embarrassing" 
implications of the dream argument much more difficult to dismiss.

> Moreover, the saying of the being of beings according to _dynamis_ and 
> _energeia_ is retracted in the Cartesian determination of the essence of natural 
> beings as _res extensa_. 

Again, this is perfectly understandable if we investigate the new modern 
findings which provided alternate explanations of place as only position, not 
also power. If the differences in behavior between air and earth (for example) 
can be explained without distinct natural tendencies towards different natural 
places, then there is no longer any need to posit a "power" to place in addition 
to its position. What is left is then place as position without power. And those 
findings (such as those of Pascal regarding varying air pressure at different 
altitudes) do not themselves presuppose an egocentric locus of truth. Thus, the 
change from dynamis and energeia to res extensa does not *depend* upon a 
change in the locus of truth from ousia to self-certainty.

> For, even if there is an economy of principles in the definition of the 
> regional ontology of nature in both Aristotle and Descartes, these principles 
> deal with essentially different contents. The first principle of Aristotelian 
> ontology of nature is that =93natural beings have within themselves a principle of 
> movement and rest=94 (Phys. 192b13). If there is no =93trust=94 placed in this first 
> principle by Cartesian metaphysics, from where else is a dialogue going to be 
> able to take its starting point? 

>From the phenomena which Aristotle says he is trying to explain - the motion 
of bodies. If this motion can be explained without a natural tendency towards a 
natural place or a more "perfect" state, while keeping other Aristotelian 
distinctions (such as position, as opposed to power), then the shift occurs 
within the same ground of science - the catalyst for the shift being new 
discoveries within that same ground. The change would be from one 
explanation of motion to one which has fewer principles, and also accounts for 
more phenomena (new discoveries, such as the behavior of balloons at different 
altitudes, etc.)

Anthony Crifasi


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