Date: Thu, 2 Jul 1998 12:24:17 -0400 (EDT) From: TMB <tblan-AT-telerama.lm.com> Subject: re: mood as color Henry, I'll read your response much more closely when I can, but a few points and an attempt to hit off the problem more clearly: 1. Cognition might not be equivalent to *thinking* for Heidegger. 2. If moods already fully and completley disclose being in the world as such, why does Heidegger paint the picture of a fleeing Dasein, either sated or lost in elation, lost in bad moods, or so lost in the world of its concerns that it *forgets* that it *has moods all the time*? I find his language a bit vague here. But clearly, he wouldn't *bother* working through this stuff, in its ontological-existential significance, if Dasein, simply by being mooded, was freely awakend to its existence, and did not, rather, in some way tend to lose its existential understanding. 3. Again, moods are more like inescapable colors. I don't see why you can't grant some recognition of how moods "color" things and some everyday language for this, how things are "colored" by moods, and how the vast poetic register relating *color* to mood can be accessed to help explain how moods *are*, but, not in order to "psychologize" (which I'm not doing). In any event, moods are not the totality of being in the world, but *one existentiale*, co-primordial with other existentiales (like understanding, projection, etc.) My point about color is for no other reason than to illustrate the definite limitations of how far we can take "mood" as such, not to pschologize it. It is a *metaphor*, but a pretty tricky one. But in any event, again, moods remain co-primordial phenomena along with others things, no? TMB --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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