File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_1998/heidegger.9807, message 37


Date: Thu, 2 Jul 1998 12:24:17 -0400 (EDT)
From: TMB <tblan-AT-telerama.lm.com>
Subject: re:  mood as color



Henry,

I'll read your response much more closely when I can, but a few points and
an attempt to hit off the problem more clearly: 

1. Cognition might not be equivalent to *thinking* for Heidegger.

2. If moods already fully and completley disclose being in the world as
such, why does Heidegger paint the picture of a fleeing Dasein, either
sated or lost in elation, lost in bad moods, or so lost in the world of
its concerns that it *forgets* that it *has moods all the time*? I find
his language a bit vague here. But clearly, he wouldn't *bother* working
through this stuff, in its ontological-existential significance, if
Dasein, simply by being mooded, was freely awakend to its existence, and
did not, rather, in some way tend to lose its existential understanding. 

3. Again, moods are more like inescapable colors. I don't see why you
can't grant some recognition of how moods "color" things and some everyday
language for this, how things are "colored" by moods, and how the vast
poetic register relating *color* to mood can be accessed to help explain
how moods *are*, but, not in order to "psychologize" (which I'm not
doing). In any event, moods are not the totality of being in the world,
but *one existentiale*, co-primordial with other existentiales (like
understanding, projection, etc.) My point about color is for no other
reason than to illustrate the definite limitations of how far we can take
"mood" as such, not to pschologize it.  It is a *metaphor*, but a pretty
tricky one. But in any event, again, moods remain co-primordial phenomena
along with others things, no? 

TMB



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