Date: Fri, 3 Jul 1998 23:44:58 +0100
From: jim <jmd-AT-dasein.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Mine-ness Take 999


WARNING: before reading, you might want to get the aspirin.
And Michael I am still thinking of your very thoughtful answers. Thank
you very much. Needless to say, your thoughts are always very helpful!
Unfortunately, they cn't eleiminate my own stupidity.

Confused Again:
I've been re-re-re-...reading the sections in SuZ concerning Mine-ness.
Sometime ago, Henry expressed worry that I referred to Mine-ness in
the following way:

It is a bare, a naked, an empty, a pure, irreducible, reflexivity; pure and
empty self-referential directedness.

After reading again, I return to the same characterization -- no offence,
Henry. Also, I think that it is absolutely crucial that Mineness,
CONSIDERED IN AND OF ITSELF, CONSIDERED AS BUT
ONE ESSENTIAL CONSTITUENT OF, CONSIDERED AS BUT
ONE ONTOLOGICAL EXISTENTIALE  (that's redundant, bt...) OF
Dasein, be both EMPTY, without any ontical filling at all, and self-
referential. If, SO CONSIDERED, Mine-ness were not empty, then, I
think that Derrida's criticism as mentioned by one philosopher must be
correct, namely: that H's Dasein 'comes to occupy the place of the
"subject," the cogito or the classical "Ich denke." Why do I think this:
if Mineness in itself is not empty, then ontic Dasein will have a logically
private interior. Unless the 'stuff' of ontic Dasein's "private" thoughts and
feelings are not rooted in Das Man or the other, then we end up back
with Descartes again. So, this Mineness must have nothing of its own to
offer than pure self-referentiality.

Let me try to explain my reasons.

In sections 25-27, in pursuit of the question of 'who' Dasein is, H
repeatedly warns us about the distinction between what one can
correctly say ontically, and what is attributed to Dasein ontologically.
About the apparent answer to this "who" question, the answer that
Dasein is an entity that I am myself, its Being is mine, H says:
it is ontically obvious (25: par.1,2,5,7,8);
but it ONLY signals ontological constitution, ie, does NOT show such
consitution as it is in itself (25: par.1,7,8).

Ie, this Mineness which ontically characterizes Dasein as 'in each case
being my own' is NOT, considered as such, the ontologically constituent
Mineness of Dasein. That, ontically speaking, Dasein is 'in each case my
own' ONLY INDICATES what the ontologically constituent Mineness
is.

So, how can we get a handle on this latter Mineness, as it is in and of
itself? It seems that to understand Mine-ness as it is in itself, we need to
get 'under' this ontical indication. Should we understand Mineness as
simply a giving from Dasein back to Dasein, as the ontic indication
suggests? H says, no, that such an understanding would mis-interpret
the "given" (that in each case Dasein is mine)(25: par.2). H also says
that we chould be careful to not misunderstand the given. But, why
should we be careful here to not misunderstand?

H tells us that not only is the "given" here ontical, but it might turn out
that the "who" of everyday Dasein, as determined ontically, is not I
myself (Mineness, ontologically understood). On the other hand, the
threat of misunderstandng is always present because we must use "I" in
the discussion of the answer to the "who" of Dasein. So, as a
prophylactic against this kind of misunderstanding, ie, against 'reading
the ontical AS the ontological', H tells us he will use "I" without
committment and only as a purely formal indicator of something (25:5).

As we move closer to Mineness, what does the work of answering the
question of "who"? Is it Mine-ness, in and of itself? No, it is Being-in-
the-World (does anyone feel that this would be better translated as: In-
the-World Being, keeping the prepositional in the adjective modifying
Being??). Being the other is equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world.
The other pervades the 'living out' of Dasein's existentiale: I cannot deal
with Zuhandensein without dealing with the other, because ultimately
Zuhandensein is individuated with reference to the other. Dasein
necessarily encounters others throughout its Everyday, garden living.

So, the answer to the "who" question is given by the ontical of Dasein,
ie, "the who" that Dasein is, it is ontically.

This answer seems unsatisfying to me. We still end up only with
INDICATION. We are left wanting to understand: how comes it to be
the case that, any one ontically given "who" BEs the "who" that I, myself
am? Ie, how can an ontically given 'who' get attached to the Dasein that
I myself am?

The answer must be that because, ontologically, Dasein is self-
referential. But still, how does one get a handle on this ontological
structure itself? I think that my disatisfaction derives from trying to get
between the "ontical Dasein" and "Dasein ontologically" when, ontically,
Dasein is ontological.

Maybe it would be more clear this way. Picture Dasein's Mineness
purely pre-ontologically, purely as an attribute of Dasein's self-
understanding understanding of Being, without any ontical
accoutrements. From this perspective, Mineness seems to be something
like the following purely ontological condition that:
"ontical Dasein x BE 'who x itself is' ontically."
Of course, Dasein is always ontological, so we can not have a case of
an "ontic-less" Dasein (no worldless subjects either). Therefore, Dasein
is in each case me, in each case my own (what is 'a case', but an ontical
region) -- an ontical indication of Mineness. It is in this Mineness that
the existentiale 'truth' that I am the other is grounded: all the values for x
are from the same domain, namely, Das Man.

Is this ALL misunderstanding and confusion? Or only partially? 


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