From: "Peder Wuth Pedersen" <wuth-AT-coco.ihi.ku.dk>
Subject: Re: truth
Date: Sun, 23 Aug 1998 22:39:34 +0200



-----Original Message-----
From: Henk van Tuijl <Henk.van.Tuijl-AT-net.hcc.nl>
To: heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
<heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
Date: 23. august 1998 05:03
Subject: Re: truth


>Peder Wuth Pedersen wrote:
>> So the question is
>> this: can there be any untrue "disclosedness" (aacording to Heidegger)
and
>> what is to be the meassure the truthvalue. It seems to me that Tugenhats
>> criticism goes very deep. Can anyone help me save Heidegger from knock
out ?
>
>Peder, I let the Heidegger of BT speak for himself:
>
>To be closed off and covered up belongs to Dasein's
>_facticity_. In its full existential-ontological
>meaning, the proposition that "Dasein is in the
>truth" states equiprimordially that "Dasein is in
>untruth". But only in so far as Dasein has been
>disclosed has it also been closed off; and only in
>so far as entities within-the-world have been
>uncovered along with Dasein, have such entities,
>as possible encounterable within-the-world, been
>covered up (hidden) or disguised. It is therefore
>essential that Dasein should explicitly appropriate
>what has already been uncovered, defend it _against_
>semblance and disguise, and assure itself of its
>uncoveredness again and again. The uncovering of
>anything new is never done on the basis of having
>something completely hidden, but takes its
>departure rather from uncoveredness in the mode of
>semblance. Entities look as if ... That is, they
>have, in a certain way, been uncovered already, and
>yet are still disguised. (SZ:222, M&R:265)
>
>In questions of (un)truth one can only assure
>oneself again and again. Even Popper admits:
>
>"[...] while we can never have sufficiently good
>arguments in the empirical sciences for claiming
>that we have actually reached the truth, we can
>have strong and reasonably good arguments for
>claiming that we have made progress towards the
>truth [...]" (_Objective knowledge_ 57 f.)
>
>Kindest regards,
>Henk
>
>
>
>     --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>
Henk


Thank you very much for replying. Tugendhat actually comments on this
passage from SZ. I let Tugenhat speak for himself:

“…dabei waere die these von der Wahrheit als Entdeckendsein nur dann
einleuchtend, wenn man daran festhaelt, das die falsche Aussage nicht
entdeckend ist. Statt dessen  sagt nun Heidegger, in der falschen Aussage
sei das Seiende “in gewisser Weise schon entdeckt und doch noch verstellt”
(222 (your quote above Henk)). Das verdecken der falschen Aussage schliesst
demnach ein gewisses Entdecken nicht aus. Aber in welchem sinn ist dann die
falsche Aussage entdeckend und im welchem verdeckend ? Da Heidegger weder
das entdecken der wahren Aussage noch das verdecken der falschen Aussage
naeher qualifiziert, bleibt ihm nur der Ausweg einer quantitativen
Bestimmung: in der falschen Aussage sei das Seiende “nicht voellig
 verborgen” (222). Sollen wir also sagen: in der falschen aussage sei das
Seiende teilweise entdeckt und teilweise verborgen ? Dann wuerde sich das
falsche aus einem Teil Wahrheit und einem Teil unbekanntheit zusammensetzen.
Natuerlich hat das Heidegger nicht gemeint, aber dann bleibt eben, wenn mann
man sich auf beiden Begriffe Entborgenheit un Verborgenheit beschraenkt, gar
keine Moeglichkeit, den besonderen Sinn des Falschen und damit auch den des
Wahren zu bestimmen.”


(to those not familiar with German: Tugenhats point is that since Heidegger
claims that “Entities look as if ... That is, they have, in a certain way,
been uncovered already, and yet are still disguised” the true statement must
be part true and part untrue (hidden). Obviously this can not be what
Heidegger means. So the question is what is to be the measure of the true
statement. If both the true statement and the false statement include one
part coverdness and one part uncoverdness how is one to differentiate
between the true and the untrue.)

If you look at section 44 of SZ the following happens. First truth is
defined as disclosedness to that which is the object of true intentionality
as it is in itself. The “as it is in itself” is important because it gives a
meassure that can differentiate between true and untrue (much like Husserls
evidence). Later in section 44 the “as it is in itself” disappears and truth
is defined as disclosedness in general and with the “as it is in itself”,
the meassure disappears. The question remains: how am I to know if there is
true disclosedness. Or using Popper : On what ground can we ”have strong and
reasonably good arguments for claiming that we have made progress towards
the truth”. How does truth show itself as opposed to untruth?


Kindest regards

Peder




     --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---