From: "Peder Wuth Pedersen" <wuth-AT-coco.ihi.ku.dk>
Subject: Re: truth, disclosedness, obscurity
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1998 06:05:54 +0200



-----Original Message-----
From: Anthony Crifasi <crifasi-AT-flash.net>
To: heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
<heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
Date: 25. august 1998 06:23
Subject: Re: truth, disclosedness, obscurity


Peder wrote:

> On page 218 Heidegger introduces a deeper concept of truth, truth as
> disclosure. This happens when he says that the true statement shows the
> being AS IT is in itself (Das gemeinte Seiende selbst zeigt sich SO WIE es
> an ihm selbst ist (sz 218). This  definition of truth leaves room for
false
> disclosure. If the being is shown as it is in itself it is true an if it
> shows itself as it is not in itself  it is untrue.
>
> When you (Anthony) write that disclosure is prior to truth, this is - if I
> have any understanding of anything anymore - only correct when you think
> truth as richtigkeit. The deeper concept of truth that Heidegger tries to
> develop is identical to disclosure. The cart and the horse are the same.
And
> this seems to be what bothers Tugendhat.

But it is "bothersome" only if you are still operating from truth
as "richtigkeit." That is why I repeated the distinction I did. It is
clear what it means for something to be disclosed as false. It is not
clear what it could mean for there to be a "false disclosure." Every
disclosure is some "manifestation" of a being, and some
manifestations can be more primordial than others, but they are all
manifestations of beings as they are. For example, Heidegger says
that presence-at-hand is a deprived mode (compared to
readiness-to-hand), not that it is a "false" mode. When you oppose
disclosure of something "as it is in itself" to disclosure of
something "not as it is in itself," you make a distinction which is
inappropriate for this sense of truth, unless by "not as it is in
itself" you mean "deprived" or "less primordial." And again, this is
bothersome only if you are still operating from truth as richtigkeit.
It is not as if disclosure is "infallible" (since it seems to be
infallibility which bothers you). Rather, disclosure can be more or
less derived or primordial. If you wish to call this "true and false
disclosure," I suppose you can use those words, but you will find the
consequences 'bothersome" only if you are still using the limited
notions of truth and falsity here.

Anthony Crifasi


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how does Heidegger know that that presence-at-hand is a deprived mode
compared to readiness-to-hand ?

regards

peder






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