From: "Peder Wuth Pedersen" <wuth-AT-coco.ihi.ku.dk>
Subject: truth
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 1998 20:09:14 +0200


I just finished reading Ernst Tugenhats "Der wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl
und Heidegger". He is very critical towards Heideggers conception of truth.
In BT truth is defined as daseins disclosedness. This means that Dasein is
always in truth. Thus BT exposes itself to a riticism which is developed by
Tugendhat. The criticism is that:

1) his enlargement of the concept of truth into "disclosedness" and
"unhiddenness", and beyond the the field of theoretical truth into practice
and history, Heidegger does not only not answer satisfactorily as concerns
the relationship between his and traditions concepts of truth, but

2) covers up and passes over the problem of truth. The question of an
extension of the concept of truth is important  to contemporary philosophy
since the traditional concept of truth seems too narrow, and the criticism
does not affect directly the concept of disclosednes. The problem appears
when Heidegger identifies disclosedness and truth. By doing this Heidegger
abandons the specific phenomenonh of truth. Without this being recognized,
the problems of disclosedness come to replace those of truth and cause
fundamental ambiguities in BT between "disclosedness in general" and " true
disclosedness". In Heideggers later philosophy the abandonment of the
specific phenomen of truth is sharpened. Tugenhats argument is the simple
one that also error and falsehood are expressions of Daseins fundamental
"disclosedness". So when Dasein is generalized into disclosedness, the
specific phenomenon of truth disappears that requires not only
disclosedness, but disclosedness that which is the object of true
intentionality as it is in itself. But the "as it is in itself" disappears
in BT and disclosedness alone is said to be truth. The specific phenomenon
or concept of truth (the traditional) represents at least a critical
instance ( or a regulative principle) towards any given disclosedness (the
object as it is in itself). The traditional concept of truth gives the
possibility of asking towards any given disclosedness to entities as :"is
this disclosedness true or not". According to Heidegger it is not possible
to ask this question since all disclosedness is true. So the question is
this: can there be any untrue "disclosedness" (aacording to Heidegger) and
what is to be the meassure the truthvalue. It seems to me that Tugenhats
criticism goes very deep. Can anyone help me save Heidegger from knock out ?

(If what I am saying is not claer I will be happy to try and explain it
again)

Greetings

Peder




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