Date: Fri, 25 Sep 1998 12:53:39 +0000
From: jim <jmd-AT-dasein.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Long-winded on Jemeinichkeit


I've not been around for some time, and upon my recent return I
noticed the discussion concerning Jemeinichkeit. In advance, I apologize
for my long-windedness. If I had the ability to condense my thoughts
into a poem I would, but a poet I aint and making poetry I caint !!
Sorry...

Anyway, still unsure of Jemeinichkeit, but it helped me to see it as
"homologous" to Kant's "I think," especially as this is understood in
relation to K's Transcendental Apperception (TA). Although K tried to
force TA into varieties of service, at least two phenomena it was
supposed to shed light on were (1) a "synthesizing" of elements of
Sensibility and Understanding" that K thought necessary for there to
even be such a phenomenon as "an experience," and (2) the "linkage"
among distinct "experiences" that renders them the experiences of one
and the same "consciousness/Self."  [(2) can be seen as necessary when
we look at the weakness of Hume's view of Self as a bundle of
sensations/impressions/ideas. Imagine, selecting in turn, a few
sensations/impressions/ideas from Self A, then Self B, then Self C, etc.,
and "bundling" this hotchpotch of sensations/impressions/ideas together.
It would clearly NOT engender a new Self; a Self requires some kind of
"linkage" among its sensations/impressions/ideas, in addition to its
sensations/impressions/ideas themselves, to render them as belonging to
one and the same Self, as being for that Self "my experiences." I think
TA was supposed to answer this kind of weakness (wasn't it?)].

Similarly, Jemeinichkeit is necessary for there to even be such a
phenomena/way of existing as Dasein. Eg, imagine that we could select
various "Befindlichkeits" among various singular Dasein and bundle them
up together. Clearly, the resultant bundle wouldn't be another singular
Dasein. The resultant 'item' would be at best a collection of disjointed
fragments of "ways of being," lacking the ontological structure which
"Mineness" characterizes when it characterizes Dasein's (NB: the
possessive/genitive) way of Being. Thus, such an item would lack the
unity and holistically 'referential' structure that characterizes Dasein. So,
what is more, no such item could provide the ontological ground which
sustains Zuhandensein and unitizes Vorhandenheit, ie, there could be no
entities enjoying the "style" of  being characteristic of "tools"/"equipment"
and, therefore, no Object either for such an item. In short, such an item
would lack the ontological structure for even "having" a world (in that
sense, the profile of Dasein is the the contour of the horizon of the
world: only in so far as Dasein exists is there a World????). In short,
Mineness is the ontological component that makes both Dasein and,
thus, Worldhood possible.

Does that make any sense at all and, in particular, any sense of H's
Jemeinichkeit? Is it at all helpful? Comments?
Regards,
jim


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