From: "Anthony Crifasi" <crifasi-AT-flash.net>
Date: Sun, 11 Oct 1998 20:39:16 -0500
Subject: Re: Meaning, reality, truth


Dr. Rafael Capurro wrote:

> I quote: ""Reality", as an ontological term, is one which we have related to
> entities within-the-world. If it serves to designate this kind of Being in
> general, then readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand function as modes of
> Reality. If, however, one lets this word (not _world_! as the translator
> puts! RC) have its traditional signification, then it stands for Being in
> the sense of the pure presence-at-hand of Things. (...)
> In the order of the ways in which things are connected in their ontological
> foundations and in the order of any possible categorial and existential
> demonstration, _Reality is referred back to the phenomenon of care_."
> 
> "But the fact that Reality is ontologically grounded in the Being of Dasein,
> does not signify that only when Dasein exists and as long as Dasein exists,
> can the Real be as that which in itself it is."
> 
> would you please interpret this assertion within your view?

Reality here seems to correspond to Being, and the Real seems to correspond 
to beings. So this seems to be another way of saying that without Dasein, 
there are beings but not Being. Your nexts texts clarify this:

> "Of course only as long as Dasein _is_ (that is only as long as an
> understanding of Being is ontically possible) (H. is saying this, not me!!)
> _is there_ Being."
> 
> I repeat it with other words: only as long as Dasein _is_ _is there_ (in
> German: _gibt es_: Being is given) Being (not: beings!) Otherweise the whole
> passage would be contradictory. Now the next senctence:
> "When Dasein does not exist (_nicht existiert_), _independence_ _is_ not
> either, nor _is_ the _in itself_."
> 
> This means, that _independence_ and _as such_ are ways of saying (or
> understanding) beings in their Being.  You say, this is a _false clarity_.

The "false clarity" to which I was referring was not simply the use of the term 
"understanding;" it was the use of the term understanding without the further 
explanation that "is" and "is not" depend on what Heidegger calls 
understanding. Heidegger, on the other hand, is very careful to add that further 
explanation. As I said, many modern commentators on Heidegger simply leave 
it at this: when Heidegger says that there are beings but not Being without 
Dasein, he means simply that "there can be no saying withou a sayer," or 
"there can be no understanding without an understander." Often, it is left at this 
because traditional minds would agree, since in metaphysical philosophy, there 
can also be no saying without a sayer, or understanding without an 
understander. The problem is that the traditional mind is interpreting this 
*metaphysically,* and therefore the ease with which they accept the 
Heideggerian version is a false clarity. And the falsity of this clarity becomes 
manifest only when we add that without Dasein, beings neither are nor are not, 
since metaphysical realism would by no means accept this further explanation.

> "In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood (!, RC) nor not
> understood (!). In such a case even entities with-the-world can neither be
> discovered nor lie hidden ((i.e. if there is nobody who discovers...,RC)).
> _In such a case_ it cannot be said (!!!, RC) that entities are, nor cant it
> be said (!!!RC) that they are not."
> 
> I say it with other words: after saying that the Real (entities) are
> independenf ot Dasein, H. says that such saying, as far as it says something
> about the Being of beings, is only possible if there is Dasein (who says
> this). This looks like a triviality, but if you remember that the saying of
> the Being of beings is the question of BT and that H. is interested in
> distinguishing different modes of being (not: kinds of beings) (such as:
> Dasein, present-at-hand, readiness-to-hand, the being of mathematical
> objects, etc.) then this is not any more a triviality.

Another way to eliminate the triviality is that when Heidegger says that "it 
cannot be SAID that entities are, nor can it be SAID that they are not," he does 
not simply mean "saying" in the traditional sense. Rather, he means the very 
giving of Being, the very giving of world, without which beings can neither be nor 
not be. This makes clear how radical Heidegger's project is. For traditional 
realism, the giving of Being and of world does not depend on us except insofar 
as when something is given, there must be a receiver. That which makes it 
possible for beings to be or not be did not depend on an "understander" or a 
"sayer." Thus, for traditional realism, it makes no sense to say that without us, 
there are beings but not Being ("Being" here meaning what is necessary for 
beings to be and not be).

> H. says: (p. 251):
> "Along with Dasein as Being-in-the-world, entities within-the-world have in
> each case already been disclosed. "
> and he adds:
> "This existential-ontological assertion seems to accord with the thesis of
> _realism_ that the external world is Really present-at-hand"
> (he says_ seems_, yes, but he adds:)
> "In so far as this existential assertion does not deny that entities
> within-the-world are present-at-hand, it agrees (he says: it agrees!) -
> doxographically, as it were- with the thesis of realism in its results."
> 
> But he adds:
> "But it differs in principle from every kind of realism; for realism holds
> that the Reality of the _world_ not only needs to be proved but also is
> capable of proof."

Yes, this is why I like Heidegger, as opposed to the many commentators on 
Heidegger I have heard. Whenever he detects some initial similarity between 
traditional realism and what he is trying to say, he immediately qualifies the 
latter to make clear the differences.

> H. adds:
> "Only because BEing is _in the consciousness_ (it is H. who says this, not
> me!) - that is to say, only because it is understandable in Dasein - can
> Dasein also understand and conceptualize such characteristics of Being as
> independence, the _in-itself_, and Reality in general."
> 
> so: indpendence etc. are way of looking at the Real. To say: the real is
> _independent_ of conciousness is to look at the Real in a particular way (in
> its readiness-to-hand).

I think you meant "presence-at-hand".

> This by no way contradicts the fact, that the Real
> exists independent of Dasein (see again the text at the beginning of this
> explanation/interpetation).

Still, one can understand the traditional realist's frustration. The Real exists 
independent of Dasein, and yet without Dasein there is no independence. It 
seems like a blatant contradiction, which is precisely why this must not be 
hidden when presenting Heidegger to the traditional realist - it shows how 
radically different Heidegger's point of departure is. 

Anthony Crifasi


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