From: "Prof. Dr. Rafael Capurro" <capurro-AT-hbi-stuttgart.de> Subject: Re: Demarcation Principle Date: Tue, 8 Dec 1998 20:47:13 +0100 Daniel, the following does not quite fit into your question, but anyway... Heid. provides, IMO, some kind of _falisification_ of metaphysics by showing that at least one being (our own) _is_ not in the way of _present-at-hand_ (Vorhandenheit) i.e. just in the _present_. So this makes a difference (in Bateson's sense) between metaphysics and ontology. With regard to science: in BT sciences are within an enframing of reason/undestanding (like, for instance, Newtonian physics) and they are _grounded_ in existence. This means, still in BT, that the _metabole_ (or passing over) from the _ready-to-hand_ to the _present-at-hand_ takes place. Philosophy, as Heid. following Husserl states, provides the general frame for the _regional ontologies_. But Heid., versus Husserl, looks for a _historical_ foundation of sciences as _pro-jects_ of Dasein. This makes also the point for Heid. distinction between truth (a-letheia, Wahrheit) and correctness (Richtigkeit). In this point he is in some way nearer to Kuhn as to Popper. But he is near to Popper (although Popperians see this as an undesired neighborhood, as Hans Albert, one major Popper disciple/propagator in Germany, once told me) in the sense that also for Heid. there is no _final foundation_ (Letzbegruendung) of knowledge (=metaphysics). But Popper is still a realist, looking for a correspondence criteria (at least asymptotically). His three world ontology is, I think, pretty primitive or crude. This is why it is so popular! kind regards rafael -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: Daniel McGrady <dMcGrady-AT-compuserve.com> An: INTERNET:heidegger-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU <heidegger-AT-lists.village.vir> Datum: Dienstag, 8. Dezember 1998 17:21 Betreff: Demarcation Principle Karl Popper produced a demarcation principle for science, the principle of falsifiability. Is it possible to draw a demarcation between science and philosophy along Heideggerean lines? Consider this suggestion. A scientist is concerned to know an object that they are not concerned to be. The entomologist intends to know about insects, not to be one. A cosmologist is interested in knowing about the cosmos, not in being the cosmos. On the other hand, the philosopher's concern with wisdom is such that they may beome wise, with thinking such that they might think and come to thought, with clarity such that they may be clear in thought word and deed, with existence such that they may be fully there, with mind such that they might be mindful, etc. Descartes' Meditations demarcate him as a philosopher, because his principle concern was not indubitable knowledge, but to become a knower. Husserl's hope that phenomenology be the science of sciences hides the fundamental issue for himself, that of being the transcendental ego. Heidegger: to enter fully into his inheritance of how to be. In practice, to work the conditions such that it may happen. At first it would seem that all this could be accounted for ontically rather than ontologically. E.g. someone might say that seeking to become a wise man requires purely ontic conditioning. The ontic shows itself in that the principle concern is with being a wise man. The philosopher for whom the issue is wisdom is not primarily that of becoming a wise man, but in letting wisdom be. This means more than being wise in a certain situation. For someone ontically concerned here only, the primary interest would be the situation that needs wisdom, while for someone ontologically concerned the primary interest is that wisdom show itself. One reason for drawing such a demarcation line is the attempt to save philosophy from being devoured by the sciences. Without it becoming a mere handmaiden. And thus to save its soul. Daniel --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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