Date: Wed, 09 Dec 1998 11:52:15 -0500 From: Stephen Schneck <schneck-AT-CUA.EDU> Subject: Re: Heidegger in Germany Tom, Thank you for your very thoughtful reflections. I'm still digesting some of your offering, but one thing that I'm looking for as I think through it is a reference to his own thorough turn away from the "existentialist" ambience of B&T following the Rector period and the Nietzsche lectures. By chance, do you have a published version of the thinking reflected in your posting? Steve Schneck -----Original Message----- From: TMB <tblan-AT-telerama.lm.com> To: Heidegger list <heidegger-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU> Date: Tuesday, December 08, 1998 3:18 PM Subject: Re: Heidegger in Germany > >My guess is that even a substantive reply is not going to be appealing or >accepted by Heidegger "supporters", but I'll give it yet another go, since >this thread is going on and on. > >Here are a few of the problems in Heidegger that I see, to give a very >thumbnail sketch of some major tendencies that need addressing: > >His topology of Dasein fails to recognize a positive nonviolence as >constitutive for Dasein, even as it strongly formulates a negative form of >this in the clarification of guilt. Guilt is seen as occurring when Dasein >is *responsible for a lack in another*. He can not put this *lack* as a >*violence* as such. The theme of violence is not adequately engaged. >Violence and nonviolence as such have a certain transcendental status that >admit, fully, of a treatment at least partially independent of any >substantive and specific projects (as does Being). That is to say, when >there is a project with a goal, the matter of violence must always, in a >certain way, exceed that goal. This is part of the transcendence of Dasein >the ignoring of which constitutes the major problem of "means-ends >rationality", but whose issue of *nonviolence* as such is barely >articulable in the major regions of discourse, including that of >Heidegger, which address this problem. > >Violence is a violence to Dasein. The character of Dasein *is* being: as >being a being with a conception of being, but this immediately means that >Dasein is *vulnerable* as well, and capable of pain, rupture or, as we >know, Death. Heidegger rushes to Death, so to speak. Death operates in >Heidegger as a kind of major organizing motif that reduces the violability >of Dasein. By drawing up the "schematics", so to speak, of Dasein as >Heidegger does, he accomplishes a violence to Dasein, and not only the >explicit violence to *metaphysics* he undertakes. Metaphysics, and that is >to say as well, the people whose writings Heidegger addresses, is in a >certain *textual* way "sacrificed". But just as the assumed *meaning of >being* is dwelt upon, "for the first time", in Heidegger, the assumed >meaning of *violence* should likewise be brought into primary philosphical >consideration, but is not. > >The picture of Dasein that is drawn occurs in an essentially metaphysical >space: meta (after) physical (a first moment that is "physical"). By >*starting with physical things* *first* (the world of the workshop, etc.) >and transposition the worldhood structures then out into other areas, the >basic physical orientation is anchored in place. This parallels the >*extension* of the phenomenological apprehension of physical *objects* in >Husserl *to* the apprehension of *spiritual* objects and idealities, etc. >This is falsely based on the notion that the latter (if they are even >properly termed) can, *or should*, be apprehended in the same basic >comportment as the former. Further, both presuppose that the physical >object is a good starting point. In Heidegger, this is definitely >problematic, since part of what he is doing is showing the mistake of that >very transposition, in that Dasein can not be seen as a physical object >present at hand. Never the less, the Dasein that Heidegger portrays still >bears the basic problems of that first *anchoring*. Generally speaking, >the major objects for Dasein, in Heidegger, are physical (tools, >equipment, shoes, etc.), whereas it may be at least conjectured that the >major "objects" for Dasein are in fact *people* (parents, friends, >siblings, lovers, etc.) The latter are simply never adequately addressed >in Heidegger, since he lacks the language and conceptual framework to do >so. > >The first moment, then, in Heidegger, is in fact *inauthentic*, that is to >say, not authentically of the character of Dasein, and at the same time, >*not authentically philosophical*, in so far as it passes over, in a kind >of bad faith, the data given to be understood and explicated/interpreted. >Even as the character of Dasein is characterized as *care*, this form or >mode of Care is viewed with a physical prejudice. This complex space of >care is *reduced* according to this first physicalism and, then, to Death. >The grounding of care in and of responsibility is then reduced to *guilt*. >A general movement or progression is *superimposed*, falsely, on Dasein: >as that of being first "lost in the world of concerns" (which are >pre-anchored in physical Things) and a kind of awakening to *death* and >*guilt*, whereas these latter conditions are themselves emergent precisely >on the basis of the former (and considerably false) characterization. The >nature of the *superimposition* is crucial to understand. > >The *superimposing* story works in a certain way in that it takes ahold of >Dasein and forces a story on it: "you have started out concerned with >physical things" (no we haven't), and you will awaken (it appears to us >that one is actually going to sleep, but go on...) to Death and Guilt, and >ultimately, the baroque Fourfold as the grand opening of this (crippled >and inauthentic, reductive) gestell. > >There is no simple characterization of these problems of mis en scene. But >if we grant them to some extent and think the problem of Nazism, a general >problem emerges: that the sensitivity to violence has been somehow reduced >to the point that Heidegger's response may be viewed as inadequate. This >is, at the same time, a profound philosophical problem. The *de jure* of >the truth here runs up against the notion of a "truth" that stands on its >own and in a certain way *is*, regardless of such petty matters as >violence. Or else, the very *being* that Heidegger opens is itself >already, in its truth, permeated through and through with a primordial and >irreducible moment of the "de jure" of nonviolence. This "jure" is >justice, which is *passed over* in Heidegger, though not *ignored*, but >rather *put into play without sufficient or even at times any question*: >as the grounds of *guilt*. Should one be responsible for the lack of >another? Yes, hence, Dasein is *always guilty*, *more* ("loaded up with >guilt") or less (not so "loaded up with guilt"). > >We term this general movement from an original *physicalism* to a moment >beyond it (meta), with a full but *undeveloped* activation of the "de >jure" with reference to being towards death, sacrifice, etc., >*metasacriphysics*. Heidegger's failure to develop nonviolence as part of >what *is*, as equiprimordial with the "is", may be faulted and associated >with what we *can* view as his insensitivity to the inherent violence of >the programs in Germany that he endorsed too easily and uncritically, and >perhaps opposed, later on, in too subtle a manner. This problem or >potential failing (we do not rush to say it is a failing) is part of why >the Heidegger/Nazism problem continually resurfaces. This resurfacing >calls for philosophical treatment, which is attempted, in a rather crude >way (owing to a certain poverty on my part) here. My own poverty, which I >introduce into the "equation", so to speak, itself issues, in part, from >the problems inherent in metasacriphysics. > >In any event, we see a profound conflict between Levinas and Heidegger, >for example, where in the former is ethico-centric (ethics as first >philosophy) and the latter is onto-centric (being as first philosophy). >Sadly, both personages may all to easily stand as symbolic of failings on >the part of both the Jews who failed to see a violence coming and the >Germans who likewise failed to see a violence coming. In general, we term >the tendency of the philosophical perspectives in question >*centrocentric*, where the matter of *centrism as such* is not addressed, >particularly in view of the gravity of any centration, and in particular, >it's gravity of nonviolence. In the ontocentric orientation, the violence >is not seen because one does not have the eyes to see it: violence as >such, and nonviolence (which comes with the territory, though we must add >that even Hitler had *his* particular form of nonviolence, however >crippled), has not properly entered into the picture from the start. In >the ethico-centric the original moment of nonviolence is passed over as >the matter of violence is finalized into the form of the *obligation*, the >imperative, the command, etc. Heidegger pointed to a necessary >deconstruction of metaphysics, and likewise, we may point to a parallel >deconstruction of *ethics*, of the very sort that Levians affirms and >seeks to refurbish without adequate criticism and, again, with a failure >to develop the implications and original data of *nonviolence as such*, >although we should allow that Levinas is closer to nonviolence than >Heidegger. > >If nonviolence is taken up from the start, SuZ is not possible in its >fruition, and a more radical and general critique of centrocentrism is >possible. But SuZ and perhaps much of Heidegger's ontotheology must be >left aside. But neither is TaI (_Totality and Infinity_) possible, since >the major operators in that remain *metaphysically neutral* (symmetry, >self-other, even the attempt to focus on "face"). An original moment of >nonviolence *as such* remains undeveloped, a moment that should come into >a certain radicalized explication and self-announcement in the basic >moment of philosophical questioning, but does not. If Heidegger and >Levinas can be momentarily and cautiously seen as stereotypical of certain >major orientations, the figure of Gandhi may likewise be seen as >representative of the development and fruition of nonviolence. Generally >speaking, his behavior and thinking would never have been able to >cooperate with the developments in Germany before the Holocaust, as his >personal history amply testifies. Likewise, and here it is most >astounding, the failure of *either* Levinas *or* Heidegger to recognize >and dwell in any way on Gandhi is remarkable, since in the case of the >former, we see in Gandhi a certain definite and rich, extreme, and >undoubtedly important development of a positive ethical orientation and >relation to the other, in responsibility, obligation, etc., while in terms >of the latter, we see the *existential* themes and matters such as >being-towards-death, etc., likewise developed in an extraordinary way, >indeed, and in deed, in a manner that is of world-historical importance of >the kind that a Heidegger should recognize, but doesn't, since he >dismisses that brown-skin and "savage" world entirely. > >How did the Jews read the writing on the wall? How did the Germans? And >how would Gandhi have done so? To enter into into the *substantive* >engagement concerning, specifically, Heidegger, one may keep this question >in mind while entering, again, into the issues concerning language, being, >writing, the sign, responsibility, guilt, action, events, attunement, >world-historical constitution, individualization, conscience, being, >indication, thrownness, projection, time, being in the world with others, >silence, the holy, the precious, the sacred, sacrifice, fear, terror, >love, the "inadmissible" nonviolence, Being, Ethics, technology, etc. ad >infinitum. > >Generally speaking, the event of the Holocaust calls into question the >metasacriphysical. In fact, every event of violence does this, even as >metasacriphysics proceeds so fully on the basis of a too swift and >accepted inclusion, within itself, of *necessary violence*. The difference >between the *precious* and the *sacred* markes this rift, summed up, >radicalied, problematized and metasacralized in the Abrahamic story. >Judgment concerning this is not attempted here. One wouldn't want to be >like the *Jains*, of course, sweeping the street before oneself to avoid >stepping on microorganisms, but, in truth, this would appear to be an >ethical parallel to the metaphysical orientation that *lets beings be* in >order to, for a time, examine them in their being. In fact, implications >along these lines (concerning vegetarianism) are clearly indicated in >Derrida's chapter in the volume on _Religion_ (Derrida/Vattimo). Or, >likewise, this extreme tendency may be seen as a parallel to the Cartesian >comportment of *normalcy* (a *hyperbolic* normalcy) of the radical >questioner. In fact, the Jainist extremism is *part of what should be in >the territory of possibility* when any sort of "ethics" is taken up as >"first philosophy". And the Cartesian normalcy clearlyl markes precisely >the centrocentric character of *thought*/meditation. And the *history* of >Jainism (lacking great violences, torture, etc.) may be presented as a >preliminary datum to be contrasted with the history of religious violence >and the complicity of philosophy (where it is non-religious) with >violence. That is, again, just another *preliminary* datum and issue and >is meant simply to give an preliminary indication of the "lay of the >land", so to speak. > >This alernative extremity, hubris, extreme of caution, etc., simply >presents a certain potentiality for being, a tendency, possibility, etc., >which may mark for us, in this territory, the extreme condition of a >strong engagment, in one's doings, of the matter of nonviolence in the >condition of preliminary questioning (when in doubt, be very nonviolent). >We pass no judgment here on the adviseability of this stance, but simply >show that this demonstrates a whole range of the kind of thought/action >that one may in turn deem as *missing* in Heidegger. Regardless of >developed explorations, the redemption of Heidegger's passage on racism, >the case of his veiled attack on National Socialism, etc., we must judge >according to this *other* possiibity of a much more radically manifested >nonviolence as part of a kind of "first philosophy". We must also >conjecture as to whether this is properly called philosophy, and include >as one of the possibilities the affirmative answer, drawing into question >the extent to which Heidegger was in fact doing philosphy at all. The >freedom of this question occurs, again, within the possibility that >Hedieggers mode of philosophizing is, from the ground up, in a certain >inauthentic. > >Like it or not, Heidegger does not escape the Holocaust unscathed -- at >least of *questions*, and it is, of course, Heidegger who shows us that >questions somtimes mean more than answers. The indications concerning the >*substantive* entry into the question concerning Heidegger and Nazism >offered here are *adequate* as rough preliminaries and that is all I both >can and need offer and which, according to my *conscience*, in an >alternative sense of *conscience* that is well-known and which fully >exceeds that of Heidegger, I feel I must articulate in this way. The >matter of the Holocaust is what it is *because of violence*, and not >simply because of *dictatorship*, "politics", "race", nor even >"thoughtlessness" and certainly not simply because of "technology", etc. >The problem of Heidegger is what it is because of his failure to address, >and engage, nonviolence from the start. An addressing of nonviolence is >necessarily and usually, though not absolutely (for essential reasons), >also a standing in nonviolence, and thus a matter both of *thought* and of >*action*, the conflict between the two being, of course, part of what >aggravates the problem concerning Heidegger. This posting is part of my >own nonviolent thoughtaction, or ahimsa satyagraha, to use Gandhi's hybrid >term, which I offer to the best of my ability. > >In keeping with the grounds from which these abbreviated and poorly >developed questions arise, let me introduce, briefly, something current >that might be of relevance. Up to now, 1.5 million Iraqi men, women and >children have died from the embargo placed on that country. Each week, >another 1,125 children die. These numbers are of genocidal proportions. >Part of what enables this atrocity is the failure to recognize embargos as >weapons of mass destruction. Here is a call to philosphers. The >unthoughtful approach uses superficial and nonessential clues to define >what is and what is not violent. A bomb is patently violent, so bombings >are viewed as violent, while embargos have the character if withdrawl, and >not direct physical attack. Yet, clearly, the embargo has done more >damage. An international organization (I forget which right now) has drawn >up a petition calling for the recognition of embargos as weapons of mass >destruction. This writing is both on the wall and "written" thoughout the >suffering of these people. It is a philophical task to show how what is >*essentially violent* does not need to be understood only in terms of the >dramatic and obvious physyical attack. In quesitno, then, is the *essence >of violence*. And in question, as well, and when one works through these >matters vis a vis Heidegger, is whether and how Being itself is >substantively constituted in part by a gravitas that inherently involves >and entials essential questions *and actions* concerning violence *as >such*, and which can not be reduced or relegated to *secondary or >attendent roles* secondary to any centrocentric discourse, progression, >attitude, attunment, comportment, thematics, etc. Our *actions and >thought* both stand ready to indict, if not to convict, us concerning this >problem in Iraq, and of course other such problems are occurring as well. >Yet our *potential for the decent relation to such problems* can not be >addressed via the *avoidance of indictiment or guilt*. There emerges >another, perhaps more original sense of *conscience* founded in love and >empahty, which must be opened and is the basis upon which any experience >of guilt is possible. We do not consider the political "prisoner of >conscience" to be where he or she is simply out of a desperate desire to >avoid his or her own *guilt*, but because of a kind of original and >positive care. This positive care and alternative sense of *conscience* is >the *standing in nonviolence* that is not developed in Heidegger and may >even not be possible in his general mode of philosophizing. I would be >remiss in my claims if I did not introduce this matter of current atrocity >somewhere along the lines of this exploration. > > >Regards, > >Tom Blancato (TMB) > > > > > > > > > --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- > --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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