File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_1998/heidegger.9812, message 86


Date: Wed, 09 Dec 1998 11:52:15 -0500
From: Stephen Schneck <schneck-AT-CUA.EDU>
Subject: Re: Heidegger in Germany


Tom,

Thank you for your very thoughtful reflections.  I'm still digesting some
of your offering, but one thing that I'm looking for as I think through it
is a reference to his own thorough turn away from the "existentialist"
ambience of B&T following the Rector period and the Nietzsche
lectures.

By chance, do you have a published version of the thinking reflected
in your posting?

Steve Schneck
-----Original Message-----
From: TMB <tblan-AT-telerama.lm.com>
To: Heidegger list <heidegger-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU>
Date: Tuesday, December 08, 1998 3:18 PM
Subject: Re: Heidegger in Germany


>
>My guess is that even a substantive reply is not going to be appealing or
>accepted by Heidegger "supporters", but I'll give it yet another go, since
>this thread is going on and on.
>
>Here are a few of the problems in Heidegger that I see, to give a very
>thumbnail sketch of some major tendencies that need addressing:
>
>His topology of Dasein fails to recognize a positive nonviolence as
>constitutive for Dasein, even as it strongly formulates a negative form of
>this in the clarification of guilt. Guilt is seen as occurring when Dasein
>is *responsible for a lack in another*. He can not put this *lack* as a
>*violence* as such. The theme of violence is not adequately engaged.
>Violence and nonviolence as such have a certain transcendental status that
>admit, fully, of a treatment at least partially independent of any
>substantive and specific projects (as does Being). That is to say, when
>there is a project with a goal, the matter of violence must always, in a
>certain way, exceed that goal. This is part of the transcendence of Dasein
>the ignoring of which constitutes the major problem of "means-ends
>rationality", but whose issue of *nonviolence* as such is barely
>articulable in the major regions of discourse, including that of
>Heidegger, which address this problem.
>
>Violence is a violence to Dasein. The character of Dasein *is* being: as
>being a being with a conception of being, but this immediately means that
>Dasein is *vulnerable* as well, and capable of pain, rupture or, as we
>know, Death. Heidegger rushes to Death, so to speak. Death operates in
>Heidegger as a kind of major organizing motif that reduces the violability
>of Dasein. By drawing up the "schematics", so to speak, of Dasein as
>Heidegger does, he accomplishes a violence to Dasein, and not only the
>explicit violence to *metaphysics* he undertakes. Metaphysics, and that is
>to say as well, the people whose writings Heidegger addresses, is in a
>certain *textual* way "sacrificed". But just as the assumed *meaning of
>being* is dwelt upon, "for the first time", in Heidegger, the assumed
>meaning of *violence* should likewise be brought into primary philosphical
>consideration, but is not.
>
>The picture of Dasein that is drawn occurs in an essentially metaphysical
>space: meta (after) physical (a first moment that is "physical"). By
>*starting with physical things* *first* (the world of the workshop, etc.)
>and transposition the worldhood structures then out into other areas, the
>basic physical orientation is anchored in place. This parallels the
>*extension* of the phenomenological apprehension of physical *objects* in
>Husserl *to* the apprehension of *spiritual* objects and idealities, etc.
>This is falsely based on the notion that the latter (if they are even
>properly termed) can, *or should*, be apprehended in the same basic
>comportment as the former. Further, both presuppose that the physical
>object is a good starting point. In Heidegger, this is definitely
>problematic, since part of what he is doing is showing the mistake of that
>very transposition, in that Dasein can not be seen as a physical object
>present at hand. Never the less, the Dasein that Heidegger portrays still
>bears the basic problems of that first *anchoring*. Generally speaking,
>the major objects for Dasein, in Heidegger, are physical (tools,
>equipment, shoes, etc.), whereas it may be at least conjectured that the
>major "objects" for Dasein are in fact *people* (parents, friends,
>siblings, lovers, etc.) The latter are simply never adequately addressed
>in Heidegger, since he lacks the language and conceptual framework to do
>so.
>
>The first moment, then, in Heidegger, is in fact *inauthentic*, that is to
>say, not authentically of the character of Dasein, and at the same time,
>*not authentically philosophical*, in so far as it passes over, in a kind
>of bad faith, the data given to be understood and explicated/interpreted.
>Even as the character of Dasein is characterized as *care*, this form or
>mode of Care is viewed with a physical prejudice. This complex space of
>care is *reduced* according to this first physicalism and, then, to Death.
>The grounding of care in and of responsibility is then reduced to *guilt*.
>A general movement or progression is *superimposed*, falsely, on Dasein:
>as that of being first "lost in the world of concerns" (which are
>pre-anchored in physical Things) and a kind of awakening to *death* and
>*guilt*, whereas these latter conditions are themselves emergent precisely
>on the basis of the former (and considerably false) characterization. The
>nature of the *superimposition* is crucial to understand.
>
>The *superimposing* story works in a certain way in that it takes ahold of
>Dasein and forces a story on it: "you have started out concerned with
>physical things" (no we haven't), and you will awaken (it appears to us
>that one is actually going to sleep, but go on...) to Death and Guilt, and
>ultimately, the baroque Fourfold as the grand opening of this (crippled
>and inauthentic, reductive) gestell.
>
>There is no simple characterization of these problems of mis en scene. But
>if we grant them to some extent and think the problem of Nazism, a general
>problem emerges: that the sensitivity to violence has been somehow reduced
>to the point that Heidegger's response may be viewed as inadequate. This
>is, at the same time, a profound philosophical problem. The *de jure* of
>the truth here runs up against the notion of a "truth" that stands on its
>own and in a certain way *is*, regardless of such petty matters as
>violence. Or else, the very *being* that Heidegger opens is itself
>already, in its truth, permeated through and through with a primordial and
>irreducible moment of the "de jure" of nonviolence. This "jure" is
>justice, which is *passed over* in Heidegger, though not *ignored*, but
>rather *put into play without sufficient or even at times any question*:
>as the grounds of *guilt*. Should one be responsible for the lack of
>another? Yes, hence, Dasein is *always guilty*, *more* ("loaded up with
>guilt") or less (not so "loaded up with guilt").
>
>We term this general movement from an original *physicalism* to a moment
>beyond it (meta), with a full but *undeveloped* activation of the "de
>jure" with reference to being towards death, sacrifice, etc.,
>*metasacriphysics*. Heidegger's failure to develop nonviolence as part of
>what *is*, as equiprimordial with the "is", may be faulted and associated
>with what we *can* view as his insensitivity to the inherent violence of
>the programs in Germany that he endorsed too easily and uncritically, and
>perhaps opposed, later on, in too subtle a manner. This problem or
>potential failing (we do not rush to say it is a failing) is part of why
>the Heidegger/Nazism problem continually resurfaces. This resurfacing
>calls for philosophical treatment, which is attempted, in a rather crude
>way (owing to a certain poverty on my part) here. My own poverty, which I
>introduce into the "equation", so to speak, itself issues, in part, from
>the problems inherent in metasacriphysics.
>
>In any event, we see a profound conflict between Levinas and Heidegger,
>for example, where in the former is ethico-centric (ethics as first
>philosophy) and the latter is onto-centric (being as first philosophy).
>Sadly, both personages may all to easily stand as symbolic of failings on
>the part of both the Jews who failed to see a violence coming and the
>Germans who likewise failed to see a violence coming. In general, we term
>the tendency of the philosophical perspectives in question
>*centrocentric*, where the matter of *centrism as such* is not addressed,
>particularly in view of the gravity of any centration, and in particular,
>it's gravity of nonviolence. In the ontocentric orientation, the violence
>is not seen because one does not have the eyes to see it: violence as
>such, and nonviolence (which comes with the territory, though we must add
>that even Hitler had *his* particular form of nonviolence, however
>crippled), has not properly entered into the picture from the start. In
>the ethico-centric the original moment of nonviolence is passed over as
>the matter of violence is finalized into the form of the *obligation*, the
>imperative, the command, etc. Heidegger pointed to a necessary
>deconstruction of metaphysics, and likewise, we may point to a parallel
>deconstruction of *ethics*, of the very sort that Levians affirms and
>seeks to refurbish without adequate criticism and, again, with a failure
>to develop the implications and original data of *nonviolence as such*,
>although we should allow that Levinas is closer to nonviolence than
>Heidegger.
>
>If nonviolence is taken up from the start, SuZ is not possible in its
>fruition, and a more radical and general critique of centrocentrism is
>possible. But SuZ and perhaps much of Heidegger's ontotheology must be
>left aside. But neither is TaI (_Totality and Infinity_) possible, since
>the major operators in that remain *metaphysically neutral* (symmetry,
>self-other, even the attempt to focus on "face"). An original moment of
>nonviolence *as such* remains undeveloped, a moment that should come into
>a certain radicalized explication and self-announcement in the basic
>moment of philosophical questioning, but does not. If Heidegger and
>Levinas can be momentarily and cautiously seen as stereotypical of certain
>major orientations, the figure of Gandhi may likewise be seen as
>representative of the development and fruition of nonviolence. Generally
>speaking, his behavior and thinking would never have been able to
>cooperate with the developments in Germany before the Holocaust, as his
>personal history amply testifies. Likewise, and here it is most
>astounding, the failure of *either* Levinas *or* Heidegger to recognize
>and dwell in any way on Gandhi is remarkable, since in the case of the
>former, we see in Gandhi a certain definite and rich, extreme, and
>undoubtedly important development of a positive ethical orientation and
>relation to the other, in responsibility, obligation, etc., while in terms
>of the latter, we see the *existential* themes and matters such as
>being-towards-death, etc., likewise developed in an extraordinary way,
>indeed, and in deed, in a manner that is of world-historical importance of
>the kind that a Heidegger should recognize, but doesn't, since he
>dismisses that brown-skin and "savage" world entirely.
>
>How did the Jews read the writing on the wall? How did the Germans? And
>how would Gandhi have done so? To enter into into the *substantive*
>engagement concerning, specifically, Heidegger, one may keep this question
>in mind while entering, again, into the issues concerning language, being,
>writing, the sign, responsibility, guilt, action, events, attunement,
>world-historical constitution, individualization, conscience, being,
>indication, thrownness, projection, time, being in the world with others,
>silence, the holy, the precious, the sacred, sacrifice, fear, terror,
>love, the "inadmissible" nonviolence, Being, Ethics, technology, etc. ad
>infinitum.
>
>Generally speaking, the event of the Holocaust calls into question the
>metasacriphysical. In fact, every event of violence does this, even as
>metasacriphysics proceeds so fully on the basis of a too swift and
>accepted inclusion, within itself, of *necessary violence*. The difference
>between the *precious* and the *sacred* markes this rift, summed up,
>radicalied, problematized and metasacralized in the Abrahamic story.
>Judgment concerning this is not attempted here. One wouldn't want to be
>like the *Jains*, of course, sweeping the street before oneself to avoid
>stepping on microorganisms, but, in truth, this would appear to be an
>ethical parallel to the metaphysical orientation that *lets beings be* in
>order to, for a time, examine them in their being. In fact, implications
>along these lines (concerning vegetarianism) are clearly indicated in
>Derrida's chapter in the volume on _Religion_ (Derrida/Vattimo). Or,
>likewise, this extreme tendency may be seen as a parallel to the Cartesian
>comportment of *normalcy* (a *hyperbolic* normalcy) of the radical
>questioner. In fact, the Jainist extremism is *part of what should be in
>the territory of possibility* when any sort of "ethics" is taken up as
>"first philosophy". And the Cartesian normalcy clearlyl markes precisely
>the centrocentric character of *thought*/meditation. And the *history* of
>Jainism (lacking great violences, torture, etc.) may be presented as a
>preliminary datum to be contrasted with the history of religious violence
>and the complicity of philosophy (where it is non-religious) with
>violence. That is, again, just another *preliminary* datum and issue and
>is meant simply to give an preliminary indication of the "lay of the
>land", so to speak.
>
>This alernative extremity, hubris, extreme of caution, etc., simply
>presents a certain potentiality for being, a tendency, possibility, etc.,
>which may mark for us, in this territory, the extreme condition of a
>strong engagment, in one's doings, of the matter of nonviolence in the
>condition of preliminary questioning (when in doubt, be very nonviolent).
>We pass no judgment here on the adviseability of this stance, but simply
>show that this demonstrates a whole range of the kind of thought/action
>that one may in turn deem as *missing* in Heidegger. Regardless of
>developed explorations, the redemption of Heidegger's passage on racism,
>the case of his veiled attack on National Socialism, etc., we must judge
>according to this *other* possiibity of a much more radically manifested
>nonviolence as part of a kind of "first philosophy". We must also
>conjecture as to whether this is properly called philosophy, and include
>as one of the possibilities the affirmative answer, drawing into question
>the extent to which Heidegger was in fact doing philosphy at all. The
>freedom of this question occurs, again, within the possibility that
>Hedieggers mode of philosophizing is, from the ground up, in a certain
>inauthentic.
>
>Like it or not, Heidegger does not escape the Holocaust unscathed -- at
>least of *questions*, and it is, of course, Heidegger who shows us that
>questions somtimes mean more than answers. The indications concerning the
>*substantive* entry into the question concerning Heidegger and Nazism
>offered here are *adequate* as rough preliminaries and that is all I both
>can and need offer and which, according to my *conscience*, in an
>alternative sense of *conscience* that is well-known and which fully
>exceeds that of Heidegger, I feel I must articulate in this way. The
>matter of the Holocaust is what it is *because of violence*, and not
>simply because of *dictatorship*, "politics", "race", nor even
>"thoughtlessness" and certainly not simply because of "technology", etc.
>The problem of Heidegger is what it is because of his failure to address,
>and engage, nonviolence from the start. An addressing of nonviolence is
>necessarily and usually, though not absolutely (for essential reasons),
>also a standing in nonviolence, and thus a matter both of *thought* and of
>*action*, the conflict between the two being, of course, part of what
>aggravates the problem concerning Heidegger. This posting is part of my
>own nonviolent thoughtaction, or ahimsa satyagraha, to use Gandhi's hybrid
>term, which I offer to the best of my ability.
>
>In keeping with the grounds from which these abbreviated and poorly
>developed questions arise, let me introduce, briefly, something current
>that might be of relevance. Up to now, 1.5 million Iraqi men, women and
>children have died from the embargo placed on that country. Each week,
>another 1,125 children die. These numbers are of genocidal proportions.
>Part of what enables this atrocity is the failure to recognize embargos as
>weapons of mass destruction. Here is a call to philosphers. The
>unthoughtful approach uses superficial and nonessential clues to define
>what is and what is not violent. A bomb is patently violent, so bombings
>are viewed as violent, while embargos have the character if withdrawl, and
>not direct physical attack. Yet, clearly, the embargo has done more
>damage. An international organization (I forget which right now) has drawn
>up a petition calling for the recognition of embargos as weapons of mass
>destruction. This writing is both on the wall and "written" thoughout the
>suffering of these people. It is a philophical task to show how what is
>*essentially violent* does not need to be understood only in terms of the
>dramatic and obvious physyical attack. In quesitno, then, is the *essence
>of violence*. And in question, as well, and when one works through these
>matters vis a vis Heidegger, is whether and how Being itself is
>substantively constituted in part by a gravitas that inherently involves
>and entials essential questions *and actions* concerning violence *as
>such*, and which can not be reduced or relegated to *secondary or
>attendent roles* secondary to any centrocentric discourse, progression,
>attitude, attunment, comportment, thematics, etc. Our *actions and
>thought* both stand ready to indict, if not to convict, us concerning this
>problem in Iraq, and of course other such problems are occurring as well.
>Yet our *potential for the decent relation to such problems* can not be
>addressed via the *avoidance of indictiment or guilt*. There emerges
>another, perhaps more original sense of *conscience* founded in love and
>empahty, which must be opened and is the basis upon which any experience
>of guilt is possible. We do not consider the political "prisoner of
>conscience" to be where he or she is simply out of a desperate desire to
>avoid his or her own *guilt*, but because of a kind of original and
>positive care. This positive care and alternative sense of *conscience* is
>the *standing in nonviolence* that is not developed in Heidegger and may
>even not be possible in his general mode of philosophizing. I would be
>remiss in my claims if I did not introduce this matter of current atrocity
>somewhere along the lines of this exploration.
>
>
>Regards,
>
>Tom Blancato (TMB)
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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>



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