File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_1998/heidegger.9812, message 97


From: "Prof. Dr. Rafael Capurro" <capurro-AT-hbi-stuttgart.de>
Subject: Re: Demarcation Principle
Date: Thu, 10 Dec 1998 11:33:05 +0100


Daniel

>In one of your previous posts you mentioned your path through a Jesuit
seminary.  I found this fascinating.    And it is one of my reasons for
putting up this thesis.   The path that leads to philosophy was not one of
curiosity for knowledge, but for a spiritual practice.    Isn't this true
of Heidegger?   His primary concern is not to know but to be.   Although
the way through the priesthood can cloud the distinction, giving  knowledge
priority to being.   It is all important what you know and that determines
what you a are>

Yes.
Well I was indeed very interested in finding some kind of _secularized_
exercitia spiritualia. But what I found was the the question should be asked
the other way round: the exercitia spiritualia were a _christianization_ of
what philosophy (originary) was. Then I began reading Hadot, Foucault and
(particularly) Rabbow (in Germany: Wilhelm Schmid and Hans Kraemer, the
Plato expert; in the US: the book by Dreyfus/Rabinow on Foucault, etc.)
andand my eyes were opend. I tried to connect this with the practices of
information technology (I call this the Information-Gestellt) and the result
was first a paper and the a chapter of my book: Leben im
Informationszeitalter.



>>the following does not quite fit into your question, but anyway...
>Heid. provides, IMO, some kind of _falisification_ of metaphysics by
showing
>that at least one being (our own) _is_ not in the way of _present-at-hand_
>(Vorhandenheit) i.e. just in the _present_.
>So this makes a difference (in Bateson's sense) between metaphysics and
>ontology.

>But another way to put this is to say that metaphysics cannot be primary
because it is fundamentally a science and not a practice to be.   Whereas a
fundamental ontology can be.<

Fundamental ontology can be a practice but it is as onto-logy a theoretical
one which is of course based on a practice
. This is the reason why Medard Boss could make a psychoanalytical
(daseinsanalytical) practice out of it.


Even if you allow a competely authentic mode of doing science, it is still
fundamentally different from philosophy as a practice for reasons of the
demarcation principle mentioned above.   Even if sciences removed their
naivety specs and saw the ontological ground of their practices, they would
still be involved in an activity in which the object of their intentions
was separate from them, while for philosophy  the object of the intention
was identical with the practice.

>There is no final foundation of knowledge if you make that final foundation
some further facts to those facts you seek to ground.   But there is a
foundation, let us suggest anyway, if the foundation is not a further fact,
but the way of knowing itself.     Thus Descartes does discover a
foundation for knowledge, at least on the way to, which is not an
indubitable fact, but the quite different stance in what it is to know.
I.e. not in a proposition but in a way to be.<

The _foundation_ remains in the case of H. one of the kind of an _abyss_
(=freedom)


Rafael




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