File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_1999/heidegger.9901, message 109


Subject: Re: Truth
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 1999 21:02:28 +0100


Anti,

>To say that conceiving truth as propositional is metaphysical is just novel
Heideggerian semantics. As you well know, in the analytical tradition since
early Wittgenstein it is precisely the other way around: any
non-propositional conceptions of truth are metaphysical. And Habermas is
one of the very few philosophers who have actually argued why truth should
be conceived as property of statements rather than experience (see his
'Wahrheitstheorien' in _Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des
kommunikativen Handelns_, Suhrkamp 1984).>

As you well know, all interesting questions concerning life and ethics are
already (!) for Wittgenstein I beyond propositions.
This is more the case for Wittgenstein II who in fact, with his theory of
_Sprachspiele_ as _Lebensformen_ is not far away from what H. intended to
say concerning the openness of _truth_ .
Some place H. says that it would have been better not to use the word
_truth_ for the dimension he was pointing to with _aletheia_. So, if
Habermas is criticizing Hs conception of truth he may be talking about
something else...



>I thought the innermost heart of the thinking of being could not be brought
to argumentative language.... Seriously, it will always be possible to for
you to say that someone hasn't understood "the innermost heart of the
thinking of being"; you can not be refuted by any number of passages, and
that is precisely the problem.>

But this is a problem of any (!) thinking including Habermas! If you do not
try to _realize_ what the other is talking about, you will never be able to
get into a conversation. There is nothing _mystical_ or specific
Heideggerian in this. I you try to refute Professor Habermas, he may tell
you, that you did not reach into the innermost heart of the thinking of
communicative action or whatever. Is it important that Habermas has a
problem with his mouth so that it is hardly difficult to understand whe he
speaks publicly? and what is the meaning of this for his career and for his
thinking which is trying to get people into a dialogue?... Are people who
constatly talk (and write) about dialogue (including K.O. Apel) not often
the ones who are mostly not able to dialogue? etc. etc. Does this minimize
the concept of communicative action?

rafael



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