Subject: Re: Truth Date: Tue, 26 Jan 1999 21:02:28 +0100 Anti, >To say that conceiving truth as propositional is metaphysical is just novel Heideggerian semantics. As you well know, in the analytical tradition since early Wittgenstein it is precisely the other way around: any non-propositional conceptions of truth are metaphysical. And Habermas is one of the very few philosophers who have actually argued why truth should be conceived as property of statements rather than experience (see his 'Wahrheitstheorien' in _Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns_, Suhrkamp 1984).> As you well know, all interesting questions concerning life and ethics are already (!) for Wittgenstein I beyond propositions. This is more the case for Wittgenstein II who in fact, with his theory of _Sprachspiele_ as _Lebensformen_ is not far away from what H. intended to say concerning the openness of _truth_ . Some place H. says that it would have been better not to use the word _truth_ for the dimension he was pointing to with _aletheia_. So, if Habermas is criticizing Hs conception of truth he may be talking about something else... >I thought the innermost heart of the thinking of being could not be brought to argumentative language.... Seriously, it will always be possible to for you to say that someone hasn't understood "the innermost heart of the thinking of being"; you can not be refuted by any number of passages, and that is precisely the problem.> But this is a problem of any (!) thinking including Habermas! If you do not try to _realize_ what the other is talking about, you will never be able to get into a conversation. There is nothing _mystical_ or specific Heideggerian in this. I you try to refute Professor Habermas, he may tell you, that you did not reach into the innermost heart of the thinking of communicative action or whatever. Is it important that Habermas has a problem with his mouth so that it is hardly difficult to understand whe he speaks publicly? and what is the meaning of this for his career and for his thinking which is trying to get people into a dialogue?... Are people who constatly talk (and write) about dialogue (including K.O. Apel) not often the ones who are mostly not able to dialogue? etc. etc. Does this minimize the concept of communicative action? rafael --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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