Date: Tue, 26 Jan 1999 17:12:18 -0600
Subject: Re: Truth


Prof. Dr. Rafael Capurro wrote:

> Anti,
> 
> >To say that conceiving truth as propositional is metaphysical is just novel
> Heideggerian semantics. As you well know, in the analytical tradition since
> early Wittgenstein it is precisely the other way around: any
> non-propositional conceptions of truth are metaphysical. And Habermas is
> one of the very few philosophers who have actually argued why truth should
> be conceived as property of statements rather than experience 
> 
> As you well know, all interesting questions concerning life and ethics are
> already (!) for Wittgenstein I beyond propositions.
> This is more the case for Wittgenstein II who in fact, with his theory of
> _Sprachspiele_ as _Lebensformen_ is not far away from what H. intended to
> say concerning the openness of _truth_ .

At first, the claim of Wittgenstein, as well as of many other modern analytical 
philosophers, that "all interesting questions concerning life and ethics are 
already ... beyond propositions" may seem strikingly similar to what Heidegger 
says about propositional truth. But there is a key difference. Heidegger adds 
that propositional truth is truth in a derived and DEPRIVED sense (ie, knowing 
is a deprived mode, not merely one among many). This is precisely why 
Heidegger's analytic truly transcends metaphysics. To stop merely with the 
analytical claim that propositional truth is not the only kind of truth is to 
implicitly grant the old metaphysical paradigm of truth as needing justification 
(ie, since there is no "criterion" or "justification" by which propositional truth 
can be judged philosophically prior to any other mode, then it is "equal" to 
them, just one mode among many). This obviously leads straight to radical 
relativism, despite the best efforts modern analytical philosophers to avoid this 
outcome.

Anthony Crifasi


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