Date: Sat, 30 Jan 1999 00:18:32 +0100 Subject: Re: Heidegger in Germany Cologne, 29 January 1999 h.vantuijl-AT-kub.nl schrieb: > Frank Edler wrote: > > > Your argument seems to be the following: > > > > 1. If anyone joined the NSDAP, then he/she necessarily believed in racism > and in the > > extermination of the Jewish people. > > 2. Heidegger joined the NSDAP. > > _______________________________________________ > > 3. Therefore, Heidegger believed in racism and in the extermination of the > Jewish > people. > > > > Is there anything wrong with this logic? > > Frank, > > You are not stating my position correctly. You forget that > Heidegger did see racism as a necessity (cf. the > Koinon-papers). The following is the passage which Henk cited in December 1998 as supporting his view that Heidegger saw "racism as a necessity": "'Rasse' ist ein Machtbegriff -- setzt _Subjektivitaet_ voraus, vgl. zu Ernst Juenger (_Der Arbeiter_). Das will sagen: nur wo daas Sein des Seienden wenngleich verhuellt und unbegriffen als Macht west, kommt der 'Rassen'-gedanke zur Geltung. Er wird als ein Bestandstueck der Selbstbehauptung dem Bewusstsein eines Volkes eingeschaerft und zwar im Zusammenhang einer Betonung des 'biologischen' Vorstellens ueberhaupt, zumal dann, wenn das 'Leben' bereits als 'Kampf um das Dasein' vorbestimmt ist. (Vgl. die hohe Einschaetzung Darwins im heutigen russischen Kommunismus). Umgekehrt, wo das Vorstellen nach Rassen und das Rechnen mit rassischen Kraeften aufkommt, muss dies als Zeichen dafuer gelten, dass das reine Machtwesen des Seins durch dieses selbst in die Seinsverlassenheit des Seienden losgelassen ist. Dies kennzeichnet aber das Zeitalter der Vollendung der Metaphysik. Die Rassenpflege ist eine notwendige Massnahme, zu der das Ende der Neuzeit draengt. Ihr entspricht die schon im Wesen der 'Kultur' vorgezeichnete Einspannung dieser in eine 'Kulturpolitik', die selbst nur Mittel der Machtermaechtigung bleibt." (GA69:223) Translation (rough): "'Race' is a concept of power -- presupposes _subjectivity_, cf. Ernst Juenger (_The Worker_). This means: only where the being of beings, although in a veiled and unconceived way, holds sway as power does the idea of 'race' come to the fore. It is drummed into the consciousness of a people as a component part of its self-assertion and that in connection with an emphasis on 'biological' ideas in general, especially when 'life' is preconceived as a 'struggle for existence'. (Cf. the high regard for Darwin in today's Russian Communism.) Conversely, where ideas of race and a reliance (counting) on racial forces arises, this must be seen as a sign that the pure power-essencing of being has been set loose by being itself into the abandonment of beings by being. This, however, characterizes the age of the completion (consummation) of metaphysics. The cultivation of race is a necessary measure towards which the end of modernity presses. To it corresponds the co-option of culture (which is already predestined in the essence of 'culture') by 'cultural politics' which itself remains merely a means for the empowering of power." If an essential part of Heidegger's thinking is a questioning of metaphysics, to interpret this passage as an endorsement of the necessity of "Rassenpflege" would mean denying an essential part of the thinking of being: the overcoming of metaphysics through questioning it. The questions posed by Stuart Eldon: > 1. The totality of the political is a necessity in these times - and a good > thing. > > 2. The totality of the political is a result of the modern metaphysics, the > forgetfulness of being, and is therefore not merely due to the ontic antics > of dictators, but the ontology of modernity. Therefore there is a much > larger problem to be addressed. apply mutatis mutandis to the above-quoted paasage as well. Henk, you write: > Are there in Heidegger's thinking between 1934-1944 > indications of fascistoid thinking or not? If so, > where are these to be found and how are they expressed? The passage you are citing as central evidence of "fascistoid thinking" relies on a certain reading if it is to be understood as evidence of "fascistoid thinking", a reading that goes against the grain of the questioning of being. Even assuming that the man Heidegger had a lapse and thought it was necessary to support the NSDAP and its policy of Rassenpflege right up to genocide, this schizoid lapse would fall outside of and diametrically contradict a fundamental questioning of metaphysical thinking (and its grip on the world as described in the above-quoted passage). If you take your own question seriously, namely, that the _thinking_ of the question of being itself has racist elements, you would have to show that the overcoming of metaphysical thinking itself demanded inherently and of necessity a kind of Rassenpflege (and, moreover, as you assert: genocide). But the passage in question is talking of "the consummation (Vollendung) of metaphysics". How can you construe a thinking which aims essentially at the overcoming of metaphysics (i.e. putting metaphysical thinking into question) as its affirmation and acceptance of its necessity? Since we today are not Heidegger, nor ever will be, the person Heidegger (along with the endless biographical details, most of which we will never be able to unravel) is irrelevant, but whether we ourselves, in following up on the question of being _philosophically_ are thereby letting ourselves in for unacceptable consequences. So there are some questions which arise in this regard, including the following: 1) Can putting metaphysical thinking into question in a fundamental, radical way lead to an affirmation of the hegemony of metaphysics as the self-evident way of thinking in our historical world, instead of its overcoming? 2) Is _questioning_ metaphysics an appropriate way of releasing its grip on our historical world? 3) If diagnosing metaphysical thinking as an essential part of what is problematic in our world today were a false assessment (e.g. an over-estimation of the importance of philosophical thinking), could it lead to undesirable consequences (reinforcing authoritarian, totalitarian tendencies, for instance)? Such questions are independent of whether a person named Heidegger was a member of the NSDAP. Attacking the person Heidegger in order to discredit the thinking of being remains a dubious (but convenient) strategy within philosophy. Michael _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- artefact text and translation _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- made by art _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ artefact-AT-t-online.de-_-_ _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ Dr Michael Eldred -_-_-_ _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- > The Endloesung is part of the program of > the NSDAP since 1933. Heidegger was a member of the NSDAP > since 1931/1932. He must have known about the discussions > in his party. It was an essential part of the program and > extensively discussed. Heidegger did not protest, nor did > he resign as a member of the Party. My position is that > Heidegger therefore - in principle - did agree with this > part of his Party's program. UNLESS we should have to > conclude that his political insights and thinking are on > the same level as those of the mother of Martin Walser. > > I would have expected a more fundamental criticism from > you. If I am not mistaken you have written an excellent > article on the subject of Heidegger's resistance in the > years 1934-1944. > > Perhaps we could agree on the formulation of the problem: > > Are there in Heidegger's thinking between 1934-1944 > indications of fascistoid thinking or not? If so, > where are these to be found and how are they expressed? > > Or we may take the problem up from your side: Are there > indications of resistance against the policy of the > Party? If so, where are these to be found and how are > they expressed? > > It may well be that we end up with a completely different > formulation: > > There are indications of resistance against the policy > of the Party and there are also indications of fascistoid > thinking in Heidegger's publications between 1934-1944. > What should we make of this? > > All this in the light of what Heidegger says in his > _Sophistes_: > > "Die Geschichte verstehen, kann nicht anderes besagen, > als uns selbst verstehen, nicht in dem Sinne, daß wir > konstatieren können, wie es mit uns steht, sondern daß > wir erfahren, was wir sollen." > Understanding history cannot mean anything else but > understanding ourselves, not in the sense that we are > able to decide where we stand but in the sense that > we may learn what we should do. > > Kindest regards, > Henk --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005