Date: Mon, 18 Jan 1999 22:01:19 -0800
Subject: Re: Being and Time - Div I, Ch 1 questions


> > 2. The first paragraph on p70, and the first full paragraph on p72.
> > They both seem to be saying somthing important, but I cannot, for the
> > life of me, puzzle them out.
> 
> My copy of M&R is stowed away--would you mind indicating the German
> pagination, or at least give some idea of what the paragraphs are speaking
> of?

The first paragraph is in Section 9, second full paragraph of p. 44 in
the German.  It begins with "But the explication of Dasein in its
average everydaynes..." and ends "...certain ontological characteristics
of an authentic Being of Dasein.

The second is the first full paragraph of p. 46 in the German, beginning
"At the same time it is of course misleading..." and ending "...in
designation those entities which we are ourselves"

> > 3.  p70-71, he discusses and contrasts 'Exestentialia' and
> > 'categories'.  I assume by 'categories' he is referring to Aristotelian
> > / Kantian style categories.(?)  If not, then to what is he referring?
> 
> I don't think it's necessarily anything so complicated as that.
> Existentialia are basic concepts that pertain to Da-sein and only to
> Da-sein (examples would be the three elements of Being-in), while
> categories are basic concepts that pertain to beings other than Da-sein and
> only to them (examples would be handiness (_Zuhandenheit_) and objective
> presence (_Vorhandenheit_)).  These types of basic concepts differ in kind
> because the beings they respectively designate differ in kind.  Da-sein is
> not the kind of being that can be handy or objectively present, nor are
> other, innerworldly beings the kinds of beings that can be attuned or
> understand or discourse.
> 
> I suppose that "category" alludes to Aristotelian or Kantian categories.
> But that would be because Aristotle and Kant address themselves primarily to
> innerworldly beings and address Da-sein in terms of innerworldly beings, as
> Heidegger goes on to say in the paragraph to which you refer.  But that
> allusion is, I take it, not his primary point in the paragraph in question.
> It is rather to call into question the metaphysical supposition of a common
> beingness for all beings, whether Da-sein or otherwise, with respect to
> which the differences between kinds of beings are, if you will, only
> differences in degree.  By sharply distinguishing existentialia from
> categories, Heidegger insists on the phenomenal fact that Da-sein and
> innerworldly beings show themselves as differing in kind and as having
> nothing in common.  Insofar as one adheres to the phenomena, one will not be
> disposed to represent one kind in terms of the other.

Agreed.  I got the feeling that he was not specifically referring to
Kantian categories as I read on.  I was alerted by the way "categories"
was set off with quotes and italics (I think)...it looked as if he was
using someone else's term.  But, it does now seem that such is not the
case...


Thanks for the comments.

Ryan Stubblefield


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