File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_1999/heidegger.9901, message 81


Subject: Re: Routledge Guidebook to Being and Time (translation)
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 1999 16:34:44 +0100


I think this is one possible path.
i was reading on _analytical ontology_ (in _Erkenntnis_) as asking myself
what about linking this opposites too.
Does anybody has an idea how?
rafael

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
Von: jim <jmd-AT-dasein.demon.co.uk>
An: heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
<heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
Datum: Samstag, 23. Januar 1999 15:36
Betreff: Re: Routledge Guidebook to Being and Time (translation)


>In message <36A86015.6A4D1582-AT-iname.com>, Ryan Stubblefield
><vorpal-AT-iname.com> writes
>>And if you are going to bother with Quine, it would be a crime to omit
>>Davidson's continuation of the project.  Especially his paper "A Nice
>>Derangement of Epitaphs," in which he offers his (in)famous thesis that
>>all linguistic activity is interprative. (and thus there is no such
>>thing as a language so-called)
>The relation between Davidson and Quine is difficult. I do think,
>however, that "language" does not 'mean' the same thing in their mouths.
>
>Perhaps, (the later) Wittgenstein offers a closer link to H than Q to the
>so-called Analytical Tradition, if the missing link is what we seek --
after
>all, philosophy affords that lost-lane into heaven, the great forgotten
>language, the Stone, the Leaf, the Unfound Door.
>
>Can't we construe W's animadversions in PI wrt to the sign 'E' in his
>discussions on the so-called 'private-language' possibility as pivoting on
>the same basic assumptions as H's and Q's; i.e., the following
>assumption: that we can/do -- at least, seem to ourselves to -- make
>sense of our own words is a matter of translation/interpretation.
>
> How does W's interlocutor know that 'E' means the same across the
>different occasions of its invocation? In the manner that the tradition has
>passed on to us: by concentrating his attention, by mental focusing? No,
>says, W; he doesn't, because he can't. He can make sense of his own
>words because he can/does speak a language, not the other way
>around: not, because for the meaning of words, like 'E', he somehow
>mysteriously preserves/conserves a diachronic identity. I.e., because he
>dwells in the house of language, he can make sense of his own words;
>because that is the nature of his Being, because he Exists (in H's sense).
>
>Or is this reaching for straws?
>jim
>
>
>     --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---



     --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

   

Driftline Main Page

 

Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005