From: "cesaro" <cesaro-AT-internet-zahav.net>
Subject: re:older post. worldless x 
Date: Sun, 30 May 1999 22:15:17 +0200



Kenneth,
    Here I try to resend my former response to one of your last posts. I
hope this time it shall be legible. Don't worry, I don't think there is
something wrong with your computer. The problem is with mine. I work with a
Hebrew version of Windows full with bugs, and sometimes the characters get
entagled. I'm sorry to bother the list with illegible posts. This time it is
suposed to work. So here it is.

>     Here are some thoughts which came to my mind after reading your "older
post." They are pretty instinctive-reactions without
> thinking them through properly. So concede that they won't perhaps suit my
> intentions perfectly but I want to send them anyway.
>     Basically, I am sure that your thread of thinking holds within itself
a lot of not-yet realized
> potential; and am very sympathetic to it. But there is something in the
curse to which you are taking it which (on my view) doesn't enable you to
take the matter too far. My argument is a bit paradoxical. It goes as
follows. The dissolution of subjectivity is
> one of the main points towards which your thematization of the
x-experience
> aims, providing it with a phenomenal-theoretical base. But the very way in
> which you put the problematic doesn't get us beyond a stand point which
> remains essentially subjectivistic.
>     I explain: your main efforts are now directed towards the
communication
> of an experience, an "experience which I had and you can have too if you
> try." This would work fine if, as you seem to presupose, "me", "you" and
> "he" were basically self-enclosed unities which pass through experiences
and hence "have" them. Your account of the disolution of
> subjectivity, as I see it, does not transcend the horizon of regarding
> people as enclosed selves, that is (ultimately), worldless and
> self-suficient subjects which can "have" experiences, even if these entail
self-transformation and self-dissolution.
>     Being and Time represents, on my view, one of the strongest attacks
upon
> the notion of the self-enclosed subject. Pay attention that the strenght
of
> Heidegger's attack upon the I-subject (which, in the Mcquirre translation,
is
> repetitively characterized as nothing less than a "perversion"); lies not
> upon the presenting of any subject-desmembering experience. On the
contrary,
> the main moods which are here discussed, like anxiety and perhaps
> resolution, are such that mainly tend to individualize. So, where the
book's
> strenght in this respect resides?
>     The way I see things, the notion of existentiality is here central.
> Heidegger concedes that, ontically, we may experience ourselves as
> subjects-which-have-experiences (yes, and in principle, even experiences
of self-dissolution!) But these experiences are *existentially* founded.
Being-in-the-world is
> always more primordial than the I who experiences. Without
> being-in-the-world, no l and no experiences; and any analysis of these
which
> does not take account of their ultimate worldly-existential foundation
> remains essentially limited and uncapable of reaching the core of the
> matter. Heidegger's analyses of moods are accounts of fundamental ways of
> 'being-in' (*the world*) in which this being-in is in a certain way
disclosed. Moods, therefore, are not restricted to the realm of
> 'inner-experience' but they are *essentially* worldly, existential.
>     There. This is my problem with your x-self thematization. Too much
> self-experience centered, to that extent that it remains basically
worldless and (paradoxically) subjective, personal. In short, too
> ontic-existentiel as Heidegger would say; which is fine, but not as
philosophically fruitfull as it
> could be. How would you try to thematize the x-self as a way of
> being-in-the-world, that is, (yes) an experience but one which has an
> essentially worldly, being-there, existential foundation?
>
>     Had I made myself understood? Hope this can open something.
>
>     My kindest regards,
>     Guillermo.
>
>




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