Date: 22 Apr 2000 11:47:00 -0700
From: Thom Whitby <beingthere-AT-britannica.com>
Subject: Re: Chairing (#199)


WELL, delightful Mr. Gadfly....

On Fri, 21 April 2000, Anthony Crifasi wrote:
> 
> Thom Whitby wrote:
> 
> >I didn't claim methodological relativism for anything other than
> >quantum cosmology, several emails ago, in an entirely different
> >context.
> 
> So do you grant that there is a best methodology in sciences other than 
> quantum cosmology? If so, which fields are these? And why these fields and 
> not others?

Good questions--but "loaded" questions. 

I've admitted--above quoted--that I claimed methodological relativism for quantum cosmology. But I don't want to too-readily connote any sense of settled attitudes toward any sciences. I'm a generalist in epistemic background (if not a dilettante--O, please, NO--yet a happy member of the Am. Assoc. for the Advancement of Science!  LOVE ScienceONLINE!!)--so, necessarily an amateur toward metatheory about science altogether.  But then, aren't we all! That said....

I'm pleased with the appoach to science that Ronald N. Giere explicates in _Explaining Science: a cognitive approach_, U. Chicago Press, 1988. Mr. Giere, you might know, is (or was in 1988) Director of the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, publishers of the Minnesota Series. I'm looking forward to reading his most recent book, written in light of the so-called "Science Wars"-- _Science without Laws_, Chicago 1999, but that will probably be a while from now.

So: "Do I grant....?" In a word: No. Also, I don't straightforwardly grant that there is a best methodology in quantum cosmology, because I'm not competent to have a genuine position on this. My impression, though, from reading here-and-there, is that (like quantum uncertainty itself), methodological relativity is inevitable. But in the case of wave-particle measurement, it's not a matter of a *best* methodology--wave or particle. It seems to be a matter of what approach to either kind of measurement best suits one's research question or project--a matter of felicity of method for prepared material. In the case of quantum cosmology, theory is very advanced, while conceptualization of what could qualify as evidence of string energies is thoroughly elusive, thus far. What method of corroboration is conceivable? seems to be the issue. So, I have no reason to suppose any evidentiary result could *not* be methodologically relative. But here, methodology is *for* evaluating theoretically-motivated tests. Pure experimental science (banging particles, and theorizing the result) allows for the *formation* of theory. It might be that some super-accelerator turns up stringy evidence, of such character that *some* string theory is discarded. Science evolves, generally speaking, by flowering, amalgamation and mitosis of partial theories. A notion of "best methodology" (which I didn't suggest earlier) is a luxurious hope, I believe, of those who don't do science. 

> 
> > > You have indeed chosen one
> > > methodology - namely, the one according to which what something *is*
> > > is not an issue of its being, but simply "due to the way we usefully
> > > see it, which is a matter of our practical perceptibility."
> >
> >You think that the way we usefully see is methodological?
> 
> No, I said that the philosophy *that* what something *is* is not an issue of 
> its being, but simply "due to the way we usefully see it, which is a matter 
> of our practical perceptibility" is a specific philosophical methodology, ...

Well, you are mistaken. First of all, in referring to the way we see (a subject matter of cognitive science), I'm not indicating any methodological stance toward what that way is. Secondly, in indicating that a way is "useful", I'm not implying that all usefulness is methodic (e.g., an interested exploration of a sculpture doesn't entail a method of exploration). Thirdly, a methodology doesn't clearly entail a philosophy, as given methods can fit into various philosophies; for example, logical analysis may work in naturalized phenomenology just as usefully as it does in ordinary-language analytic philosophy. Valuing logical analysis is not itself a philosophy (e.g., doesn't of itself imply that one is a philosophical logician).


> 
> You suggested "a few emails back" that the sciences have progressed beyond 
> the "outdated" versions that Husserl critiqued. So I asked you to cite some 
> examples in the modern sciences which show that they have indeed progressed 
> beyond Husserl's critique. 

And I would refer to cognitive science, as it is exemplified in he work of R.J. Sternberg's research group at Yale. And I indicated _Naturalized phenomenology_, which has been mentioned by others on the MH list. 

> What I am showing you is that what you have said 
> so far has essentially the same problems as those "outdated" sciences that 
> fell under Husserl's critique, thereby calling into serious doubt your 
> suggestion that the sciences have progressed beyond Husserl's critique, and 
> that philosophy needs to elicit support from the sciences in answering the 
> question of humanity.

Gee, well, then, I guess you can pack up and not worry about me anymore. One less subscriber to worry about! Take a breather! 

> 
> > > The pragmatic philosophy you have suggested here is not new.
> >
> >I haven't suggested a pragmatic philosophy yet.
> 
> "That it *is* a chair is due to the way we usefully see it, which is a 
> matter of our practical perceptibility."
> Your words.

Well, as I said earlier, I'm not adverse to being called a pragmatist. But a statement about practicality doesn't a pragmatic philosophy make. 


> >That's OK. I haven't tried to clarify otherwise. I was attending to
> >the uselessness of the notion of "being" for talking about a chair,
> >nothing more.
> 
> And in doing so, you have run into ... foundational 
> assumptions...

No, you're eager to see foundational assumptions worn on the other's sleeve, if I may say so. You've run into your own longing. 

>... such as "that it *is* a chair is due to the way we usefully see 
> it, which is a matter of our practical perceptibility." 

Lots of approaches to this statement may be taken to heart. It's fundamental assumptions are not evident, let alone implying any "foundational" assumptions (My own dispositions are evolutionary, in a non-biologistic sense, but that's another matter). 

> It is precisely such 
> assumptions that Husserl sought to critique and ground, through the 
> universal epoche. 

Yes, Husserl critically attended to the pretexts of foundational assumptions. I was especially influenced by the "Crisis" lectures and _Formal & Transcendental Logic_. He also influenced Analytic philosophy (_The Origins of Analytic Philosophy_, Michael Dummett, Harvard 1993) and the Merleau-Pontian thread in lifeworld phenomenology, which Hubert Dreyfus brought into American philosophy and which has produced a very interesting "embodied" approach to cognitive science: _Embodied Mind_, Eleanor Rosch et al., MIT 1993.

> So far, you have not shown how "educational theory" 
> addresses these fundamental problems which, according to Husserl, make them 
> subordinate to phenomenology (which does address them).

There are many, many resources within educational theory and educational psychology on aspects of child development. I have been especially influenced by Harvard's Project Zero, in the person of, first, philosopher Israel Scheffler, _Of Human Potential_ (Routledge 1981,  I believe) and the voluminous work of educational psychologist Howard Gardner: _Frames of Mind_(1983), _Unschooled Mind_(1991, I believe), _Creating Minds_(1993), _Leading Minds_(1995?), and _Reframing Intelligence_(1999). Also, the outstanding psychologist at the University of Chicago: Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, _Flow_ (1991?) and _Evolving Self_(1993), and _Creativity_ (1996)

Happy Trails

TW

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