From: "Henk van Tuijl" <h.vantuijl-AT-home.nl>
Subject: Re: what's in a name?
Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2001 10:01:00 +0100


From: "allen scult" <allen.scult-AT-drake.edu>
To: <heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2001 8:43 PM
Subject: Re: what's in a name?


> I think that's the working assumption of a phenomenology which takes
> certain words seriously as signs, indications,  showing the way to
> the things themselves.  As one of my students put it this morning, "
> The only way to know whether a sign is 'true" or not is to follow
> it."  If a given name is indeed determined by the thing itself, it
> must be said oracularly ( as words directly inspired, "dictated"
> perhaps  by the thing itself) and understood as "true, i.e. as
> bearing a determined relationship to the thing itself.
>
> The question then arises about relationship between the words of
> Hericlitus and the words of the Oracle.  In Fragment 51, he describes
> the sayings of the Delphic Oracle as "signs."  Are there different
> degrees of directness in how the sayings of the Oracle and of Herclit
> us are determined?  I know we spoke some time ago on the list about
> the relationship between mantike and ermeneutike.  Does that
> difference apply here?

In his commentary on Fragment 93 Conche points out that _eris_ and
_zaeloosis_
are important aspects in Heraclitus' philosophy which is based on antagonism
and competition.
Following Conche Heraclitus is in Fragment 93 the opponent of the god
Apollo.
Apollo could have said (_legein_) what he had to say or could have hidden it
(_kruptein_), like Heraclitus. Instead Apollo chooses to give signs
(_saemainein_).
Conche's interpretation is not unique. Fink for example also notices the
competition between Heraclitus and Apollo (GA15:85).

However, in Heidegger's translation of Parmenides _saema_ becomes _Zeignis_
instead of _Zeichen_. _Saema_ is no longer a sign standing for something
else
but a pointing out and showing of what should be seen (GA15:398).
This translation is corroborated by Aubenque in his translation of
Parmenides.
Parmenides' _Zeignis_ shows that something _is_ true.

Elsewhere (GA55:397) Heidegger gives a description of the relation between
_Zeichen_ and _Zeignis_. He indicates that to understand a sign standing for
something else (_Zeichen_), we need already have had a showing (_Zeignis_)
of
what that sign (_Zeichen_) is standing for.

If we may believe Conche the god Apollo utters signs in the sense of
_Zeichen_,
leaving mankind completely in the dark about the corresponding _Zeignisse_.

Heraclitus is obviously not a seer. Homer sings about the _mantis_ Kalchas
and
refers to him as _hos aeidae_: he who had seen. Only someone who has seen,
actually sees (the well known perfectum propheticum). Kalchas sees what is,
what will come and what has been. He does see this because he is what
Heidegger
calls a _mainomenos_, "one who goes through the roof" (very rough
translation).
As one who goes through the roof the _mainomenos_ is able to have at the
same
time a view of both what is present and what is absent. This ability allows
Kalchas to (fore)tell the Greeks before Troy why the gods are angry. He
understands the sings (_Zeichen_) of the oracle because as a seer he also
sees
the corresponding _Zeignisse_ that cannot be seen by anyone else. (GA05:345
ff.).

Henk















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