File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2001/heidegger.0102, message 14

Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2001 01:53:47 +0100
Subject: Re: Liberation of Selfhood.

Hi Jud,

really enjoyed your exposee on shelfhood, but at the end i'm getting a
bit puzzled though, --- on the one hand you write:

>- an 'I' incidentally, who was not the same 'I' who went to bed last
>night - and not even the same 'I' who first started to read the beginning
>of this sentence - but an ever-changing "me" who undergoes constant

yet on the other, you propose to us that:

>our new scientific philosophy urges maximum enjoyment of our
>earthbound modality of existence

but how can an 'I' know (assess, experience) any maximalisation of X
if this 'I' is constantly changing (being an other 'I'); i mean, if the 'I'
at t1 is not the same as the 'I' at t2, how could I-t2 say/know something
(X) is maximalized (or not)? and in reference to what or to whom ?

--- not to I-t1, because I-t1 does not exist anymore at t2 and thus every
frame of reference to maximalisation from I-t1 to I-t2 is logically
impossible ?

[t1 = time 1; t2 = time 2 (any moment after t1)]

[the 'maximalisation' problem can imo only be solved by inventing the
faculty of memory, but then we have to reject your thesis of "an ever-
changing "me"", because the existence of memory presupposes and
necessitates an 'I' of onto/psychological stasis, where stored and fixed
knowledges etc. give (ingrediental/essential?) permanence to the 'I'.]


--- let's enjoy the subtly of tense in this stanza:

        "If time depends on an entity,
        Then without an entity how could time exist?

        There is no existent entity.
        So how can time exist?

                      [Nagarjuna, MK:19-6]

     --- from list ---


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