File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2001/heidegger.0105, message 8

Date: Wed, 02 May 2001 18:10:31 +0200
Subject: Re: Ge-lassen-heit

At 02:31 28-4-01 +0100, you wrote:
>hi Rene,
>>Realism, idealism, all the same. Whether one conforms to the idea,
>>or to the res, is again ... indifferent. The conformity, Richtigkeit, is the
>>decisive thing. Kant is very great, Jan.
>ho, ho, ho, what are we saying here my dear Rene, "Realism,
>idealism, all the same ... indifferent" ???
>ok :-)

Hello Jan, (back from Amst. CS?)

>Idealist indeed have the tendency of saying that either knowledge
>must conform to empirical objects or empirical objects conform
>to knowledge, or -cf. Wittgensteinian scepsis- that either how we
>speak must be a function of things or things must be a function of
>how we speak; but according to the realist Bhaskar this congruence
>is deeply misleading or better the dichotomy itself is pure nonsense,
>below some quotes from his _Realist Theory of Science_  p.250,
>which imo nicely argumentates the fundamental (ontological)
>distinction/difference between the real (objects, things) and the
>ideal (knowledge, language):
>     "Science is an activity, a process in thought and nature which
>     attempts to express in thought the natures and constitutions and
>     ways of acting of things that exist independently of thought.
>     Thought has a reality not to be confused or identified with the
>     reality of its objects: knowledge may change without objects
>     and objects change without knowledge. There is no correspon-
>     dence, no conformity, no similarity between objects and thoughts.
>     Thoughts are only like other thoughts, objects (including thoughts)
>     similar to or identical with other things. Things exist and act
>     independently of our descriptions, but we can only know them
>     under particular descriptions. Descriptions belong to the world
>     of society and of men; objects belong to the world of nature.
>     .....
>     It is entirely accidental that we exist, and understand something
>     about our bit of it. It is important to avoid the epistemic fallacy
>     here. This consist in confusing the ontological order with the
>     epistemic order, priority in being with priority in deciding claims
>     to being, the question of what has relatively underived (or indepen-
>     dent) existence with the question ofwhat entitles us to regard some
>     kinds of statements as grounds for other kinds of statements, etc.
>     In particular the question of what is capable of independent
>     existence must be distinguished from the question of what must be
>     the case for us to know that something is capable of independent
>     existence. Thus electrons could exist without material things; be
>     we could not know this proposition, let us say P, unless there were
>     material things. The truth-conditions for our knowledge of P are
>     not the same as the truth-conditions for P. There could be a world
>     without men; but there could not be knowledge without antecedents."

"There could be a world without men". We're getting used to the idea,
certainly. But what is 'being' here? Vorhanden? For whose hands?
Could there be a world WITH men, but without Dasein?

Of course, I don't deny that science is about something. Heidegger
said in 1951, at a symposium in Switzerland, that he never ever
had been able to explain, why science works., not the least of  it.
I'll look it up, it's very simple what he said there.  

>[roughly summarized: where the idealist Kant is basically contending
>that the (possible) structures of our knowledge are conditioned by the
>structures of our internal thought (i.e. logics, brains), the realist Bhaskar
>is claiming that structures of our knowledge are basically conditioned
>by the structures of/in the external world --- and these are quite different
>arguments Rene !]
>>>i'm a bit lost here Rene, but can you tell some more on Kant's views
>>>regarding the use of experiments in science ?
>>In the opus posth. is a sentence, which says:
>>Man muss etwas bei den Eindruecken denken, damit solche entstehen.
>>One should think something amidst the impressions, so that such originate.
>does this mean that Kant conceives the use of experiments (only)
>as a matter of accommodating the faculty to "think something" ?

Yes, as far as all knowledge is self-knowledge. This is already proven in
the deduction.
Now, because empirical knowledge is only possible through impression,
impression must also be self-impression, Selbst-Affektion. See in the
deduction: the determination of the inner form (Bestimmung des inneren Sinns)
It is the decision of reason, as self-consciousness, to become the empirical
subject, that eventually makes experiments. 
Kant is by the way transcendental idealist and empirical realist at the
same time.
What is found in the intuition, even time and space itself, can only be
This belongs to the definition of the category "Wirklichkeit".

>i would say the crux of experiments is "doing something", it
>is the practical (manipulative) side of 'putting questions to nature',
>and the fact that experiments are possible (and even neccesary)

Necessary only, to go on. 

>seems a nice argument pro the realistic claim that there is a world
> _out there_ that exist independent of our knowledge of it.

I look out of the window, and see it.

>ps. but, yes !! how to find a way (back) to Ge-lassen-heit ?

The strange thing is, that by talking about Kant, who has nothing
to do with Gelassenheit, the Gelassenheit gets more question-worthy. 

>how to think of Ge-lassen-heit ?
>how to speak about Ge-lassen-heit ?
>how do we act in Ge-lassen-heit ?

I think, H. is saying, that the letting is not (only)
done by us.



drs. René de Bakker
Universiteitsbibliotheek Amsterdam
Afdeling Catalogisering 
tel. 020-5252368              

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