Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2001 15:32:07 -0500 From: allen scult <allen.scult-AT-drake.edu> Subject: Re: Dasein for whom? --Boundary_(ID_VnyBY91jz5RKbeIpYQIudw) At 2:55 PM -0400 6/9/01, HealantHenry-AT-aol.com wrote: >You well know, Allen, that. . . Hen, and now Gulio, happily welcomed back, I always get anxious when accused of knowing anything well! Probably stems from a summer long ago when I was working at Calby's Men's Store in Philadelphia. After I had srewed up a sale, Mr. Calby said, " C'mon Allen, you know this stock better than I do." I was fired soon thereafter. But don't let that cramp your style. Such repetition is no doubt good for the clarification of how one stands-in-relation-to. As Gulio suggests, Heidegger conversations are especially suited to provoking an appropriate humility before language. No, not really before Language, but rather before the language of Heidegger, as on-the-way-to-being-language-understood by this community. Gulio puts it thus: o have interiorized memory, also, i was musing, trying to jog a fading memory that bothers me somehow; is that not the ability to call up a reference? To centralized a logos or conversation? To show our culture, humanity, and civility? To give comfort to those who are just like us, from the same cultural root?" These are some of the rhetorical ins and outs of "discoursing-about." What we "show" one another when we interpret-for. I myself prefer texts where this for-whom is artfully disclosed,to grand effect, as in Nietzsche, for example. The moments when the for-whom of Nietzsche's grand style reaches me add an unspeakable depth to what I am coming to understand through his words. Same thing used to happen to me through the words of the Torah. Perhaps still does. "Ontological rhetoric," Henry, doesn't cut it for me. I am not a "vessel." Of course, as you say, language discloses more than you or I understand. but this disclosure includes the "for whom" in which we are participating as we interpret. Dasein as being-with needs to be theorized with a persistent recognition of the rhetorical-factical for whom-- the "how" of the for-whom, The way we attempt to make the shareable graspable-- How we make care operative in discoursing-about. My God, it's hard enough to make sense ( or not make sense), let alone making-sense- for- someone. Of course the Other in Heidegger is not "really" other, but rather the Other-as-the-Same. Note the following from #26 of SuZ: ". . .die Anderen sind vielmehr die, von denen man selbst sich zumeist nicht unterschiedet, unter denen man auch ist." ( The others are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself--those among whom one is too.) Am I mis-reading this? Or is this "among-whom-one-is-too" the "fudge" which makes the shareable graspable? The following seems to support this reading. It's a few sentences later in #26: "Auf dem Grunde dieses mithaften In-der-Welt-seins ist die Welt je schon immer die ich mit den Anderen teile." (By reason of this with-like(?) Being-in-the-World the world is always the one I share with Others.) Nobody shares like Heidegger! Thanks, Allen -- Professor Allen Scult Dept. of Philosophy HOMEPAGE: " Heidegger on Rhetoric and Hermeneutics": Drake University http://www.multimedia2.drake.edu/s/scult/scult.html Des Moines, Iowa 50311 PHONE: 515 271 2869 FAX: 515 271 3826 --Boundary_(ID_VnyBY91jz5RKbeIpYQIudw)
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You well know, Allen, that. . .
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