Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2001 12:20:27 +0200 From: artefact-AT-t-online.de (Michael Eldred) Subject: Re: The misunderstanding statement 2 Cologne 21-Jun-2001 allen scult schrieb: > I think I've come to an understanding of what I was asking about. Or > at least I've come to a "shared understanding" through a > communication-with Dasein-as-Other ( and whoever else might be > reading this post!). That is, I can put what I think I understand > into a form which is averagely intelligible. There's not much to be > said for for "intelligible averageness," but insofar as our > intention is to "show" one another what it is we think we understand, > the possibility of a primordial understanding of the thing itself > recedes from view. That primordial understanding which recedes from > view as I try to make statements about it is identified by Aristotle > as apophainesthai: the letting something be seen from itself. The > apophantic "as" of something constitutes its nature as already > interpreted and exists in language itself as expression. At the > beginning of #35 Heidegger says: > > Die Sprache als die Ausgesprochenheit birgt eine Ausgelegtheit des > Daseinverstaendnisses in sich > > (As expression [ expressedness?], language harbors in itself an > interpretedness of the understanding of Dasein.) > > But when actually expressed in a statement, the primordial > interpretedness held securely in language is dissipated. It can only > be recovered by circumspective reflection on language itself as > discourse ( Rede). But how should I "say" that? It turns out that > even though saying is seeing, there's no way for me to say what I > see. So I'm going to bed. > > Allen Allen, I think you've put it very nicely. From the early twenties, Heidegger is searching for the opening of world prior to the _logos_, understood as "Aussage" (literally: saying-out), i.e. a statement in its expressedness, which for Plato and Aristotle is _the_ point of access to beings in their being (_to on_ is _on legomenon_ for the Greeks). Plato and Aristotle are always taking how things are said (_legetai_, "man sagt", "one says") as their starting point for talking things through (_dialegesthai_). It's like trying to tell (express in language to) someone else how to drive a car. If you understand how to drive, a car opens itself to you in this possibility of its being (it is something that is 'good-for' driving) and you just do it. But try putting this understanding into words! Nobody would understand you, and nobody can learn how to drive just by being told how to do it. This means that 'putting things into words' always relies on a more primordial opening of world and beings in their being prior to language. Learning-by-doing relies on this implicit world-understanding prior to explicitness. Michael _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- artefact text and translation _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- made by art _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ _-_-_-_-_-_- artefact-AT-webcom.com _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ Dr Michael Eldred -_-_- _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- > > > At 5:03 PM -0500 6/20/01, allen scult wrote: > >The "statement" I'm asking about is what Heidegger calls, "Die > >Aussage" in Section # 33 of SuZ. For Heidegger "the statement" ( M > >and R translate "assertion.") is a "derivative mode of > >interpretation." Heidegger goes on to distinguish between "the > >primordial 'as' of interpretation ("ermeneia" he calls it here) > >which truly understands circumspectively " and the "apophantical as" > >of the "Aussage." The Aussage is derivative in that its ontological > >roots in the "primordial as" have been covered up by considerations > >of the ready-to-hand.So, Heidegger concludes, the "expressed > >statement" no longer really "understands," no longer really "sees," > >but merely re-enacts the conventions of the "they." What is > >required in order to reconnect the assertion with its ontological > >origins is, of course is the "existential-hermeneutical as" of > >Heidegger's analytic. > > > >If I am understanding this correctly, language-as-rhetoric-- that > >is, as statements expressed "out of" pragmatic considerations--has > >lost the status which Heidegger ascribed to it in the twenties in > >his readings of Aristotle, when Verstehen was identified with > >Aristotelian Phronesis. Now, understanding is embodied in the > >"speechless" discourse of thinking, responses to the call of > >conscience, correspondences with the "Voice of Being." The dasein > >analytic opens the eyes and ears to ermeneia by seeing through > >rhetoric in its readiness-to-hand. > > > >Any corrections of my misunderstanding statements here would be > >greatly appreciated. > > > >Thanks, > >Allen > >-- > >Professor Allen Scult Dept. of Philosophy > >HOMEPAGE: " Heidegger on Rhetoric and Hermeneutics": Drake > >University > >http://www.multimedia2.drake.edu/s/scult/scult.html Des > >Moines, Iowa 50311 > >PHONE: 515 271 2869 > >FAX: 515 271 3826 > > > > > > --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- > > -- > Professor Allen Scult Dept. of Philosophy > HOMEPAGE: " Heidegger on Rhetoric and Hermeneutics": Drake > University > http://www.multimedia2.drake.edu/s/scult/scult.html Des > Moines, Iowa 50311 > PHONE: 515 271 2869 > FAX: 515 271 3826 > > _ --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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