Date: Sun, 24 Jun 2001 23:53:22 +0200
From: artefact-AT-t-online.de (Michael Eldred)
Subject: Re: The misunderstanding statement 2


Cologne 24-Jun-2001

allen scult schrieb Sun, 24 Jun 2001 10:40:08 -0500:

> Henk and Michael,
>
> Needless to say, on this one, I come down on the side of Henk,
> rhetoric, and Bourbon, though not necessarily in that order.
>
> In the Sophist lectures, Heidegger admires Plato for being able to
> "think the sophist in himself," and to display that thinking
> philosophically.  Heidegger recognized Plato in all the key
> characters in the Dialogues.  Socrates doesn't see the joke, of
> course, but we do, and so learn from Plato what Socrates himself
> might have known but could never say outright:  That the philosopher
> is distinguished from the sophist only by the capaciousness of his
> "rhetorical how"--that is by HOW he is able to put his understanding
> to words in the context of being-with.  There are key passages,
> especially in the Phaedrus and the Apology, where one can "see"
> dialectic becoming rhetoric in the course of Socrates' speech, and
> then rising to heights beyond the reach of dialectic. It is Plato's
> genius to show us, to demonstrate philosophy as a possibility of
> existence by thinking the sophist in himself on the way to
> philosophy, and through his capacious word-making to almost get us
> there.
>
> Michael says:
>
> >Rather, I want to maintain a distinction between rhetoric and philosophizing.
>
> I think everyone cognizant of the inherent duplicity of language
> wants to maintain that distinction in order that what they say be
> distinguished from the "rhetoric" of the they. This insistence is
> probably strongest on the part of politicians, theologians, and
> philosophers.  What makes Plato ( and by implication, Heidegger,
> because he understands it) stand out, rising above the rhetorical
> chatter of the rest of us, is that they are able to put their
> recognition of the impossibility of making the distinction in
> practice into practice! ( I think the last sentence has to be read
> twice to be understood)
>
> As to the bourbon matter, as Henk suggests, eke-stasis is eke-stasis
> irrespective of what you happen to be eating or drinking at the time.
> I've known some philosophers whose focus on the relevant ambiguities
> was extraordinary while supposedly under the influence.  I remember
> that night in the Symposium. . .

Allen,
Not to disappoint expectations, I cannot accept what you say:

"That the philosopher
is distinguished from the sophist only by the capaciousness of his
"rhetorical how"--that is by HOW he is able to put his understanding
to words in the context of being-with."

We are probably in agreement with each other and with Heidegger that "the constant
theme of the dialogue [Sophist] is the clarification of the sophist's existence in
its possibility". (_Sophistaes_ GA19:573) And since "the sophist is the facticity
of the _mae on_ itself" (GA19:574), catching the sophist in his existence turns
upon showing that the _mae on_ is in some sense and in particular, that the _mae
on_ can exist together with the _logos_, i.e. that the existence of _pseudaes
logos_, false speaking, is possible. What hangs on this? According to Heidegger:
"With the fundamental question concerning being and non-being, what is equally
central is the question concerning the exceptional being, the philosopher, and its
negation, the sophist. This is however, taken in the Greek way, the question
concerning the _zoion politikon_, human being in the _polis_. If there is no
philosophy, d.h. no _legein_ in a genuine sense, then there is also no human
existence." (GA19:577f)

The problem with catching the sophist lies in Parmenides: "The sophist is the
facticity of the _mae on_ itself. The sophist, however, disputes this on the basis
of Parmenides' postulate that the _mae on_ is not. He says: There is no _mae on_
and therefore there is also no possible connection between the _mae on_ and
_legein_, i.e. no _pseudaes logos_. What you lot accuse me of being, that cannot
be at all. Now, however, through the fundamental dialectic, the _symplokae_
[interweaving] of the _on_ with the _mae on_ has been shown. Now it has been made
visible the _dynamis koinonias_ [power of coexistence] of the _on_ with the _mae
on_ or rather with the _heteron_. This means that the sophist has now been
uncovered in the possibility of his existence." (GA19:575)

The aim of the dialogue, and Heidegger's recounting of it, is to show the
possibility of existence of the _pseudaes logos_, i.e. of sophistry, and thus also
the possibility of philosophy as genuinely disclosive speaking. And what is to be
disclosed? For instance, "that the philosopher, in contrast [to the sophist], ...
is completely given away to beings insofar as they have come purely into view"
(GA19:531). Learning to see "purely and adequately" (530) is the philosopher's
ecstatic job. "And _legein_, an addressing opening-up of beings is nothing other
than making present the visibility of beings themselves and thus beings in what
they are..." (GA19:579)

It is not just a matter of how the philosopher puts things into words, but, first
and foremost, what the philosopher has in view and tries to get "purely" into
view. No amount of rhetorical capaciousness can substitute for that. And I even
doubt whether it is the dialogue with others in a lived context that is primary
here, but rather the silent dialogue of the soul with itself (_ho men entos
psychaes pros autaen dialogos aneu phonaes_ Soph. 263e) This is _dianoia_:
thinking things through, taking them apart in silent discourse (cf. GA19:410).

Michael
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