Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2001 12:50:49 +0200 From: artefact-AT-t-online.de (Michael Eldred) Subject: Re: Bodenstaendigkeit, autochthony Cologne 03-Jun-2001 Kenneth Johnson schrieb Sat, 2 Jun 2001 12:03:37 -0700: > Michael Eldred schrieb: > > >Kenneth, > > >You can take a sneak preview of the paper I presented to the UNT > >Heidegger2001 Symposium at > >http://www.webcom.com/artefact/cstgenpr.html (sorry, no audio). It was > >an extremely lively and envigorating meeting (perhaps even > >enpropriating?). > > Hey hello Herr Michael, thanks I will and thanks for the report. The last > couple weeks I've wondered where our two good doctor Eld's were jetting > around at these days. I thot perhaps you'd decided to stay awhile over here > in the land of Sam for other work n wreckreations and the last I heard of > Stuart's whereabouts he was also existing somewheres about the New World > over on the High Humidity Coast. Hi Kenneth, Nice to hear from you again in response to my epistle from Germany. Jetting is a real drag, arriving is better and talking to some kindred questioners near-bliss. It would seem however that philosophy is primarily the realm of Epicurian _lathe biosas_, the quiet Platonic "dialogue of the soul with itself" or the Heideggerian "existing in namelessness" (Humanismus-Brief). > You also schrieb: > > > In fact, most people have inordinate > >difficulty in thinking > >mathematically -- an astounding fact! Descartes, Leibniz et al eagerly > >responded to the sending of > >being in casting _all_ realms of beings mathematically. Today, this > >mathematical casting has > >taken a digital twist, and is just as totalizing. So too, the thinking > >of being and enpropriation could > >one day become a 'self-evidence' (just like the notions of us having > >'ideas' in our 'heads' are > >today, or our 'being' being determined by a digital genetic code) > >without anybody having even > >heard the name 'Heidegger'. > > the "idea" of having "ideas", hmmm, nice imaging! -anyway you know my > limitations here, I always risk myself inside partial or total > misunderstandings of 'the way' of the thinking here so I'm always > 'condemned' to a surface view wherever Heidegger is concerned. A not too > bad a place tho, since the surface is where appearance can be seen as "pure > appearance" (and nothing besides), as the place of a pure manifestation of > a non-linguistic conceptuality (or, more correctly, a non-linguistic > concieviality) (or, more cryptically, a place where codalisticity and > timeicity divergently merge to assume the artificial camerical form of a > cinimaeically present-ing photovoltaically generated-timewave driven > phonemial graphiisticality of an inelastic (frozen) digitalisticity as it > presents itself autonomaically at x frames per x time). This imagined place of "pure manifestation", "non-linguistic" -- and the imagining already ensnared in language. > Or perhaps this to ask, what does it mean to "think" mathematically as > opposed to thinking calculatively? All symbols, phoneme-nal or matheme-nal, > are, it seems to me, are nothing more than mimetic promptings that holdover > in extension a particular memory busily engaged in some "pointings toward", > all this in order to stretch out its mental continuity far beyond what > would be possible without these prompts. > > Or I guess what I'm wondering Michael is whether the core part of the > notion of digital being (which you refer to as historically exhibiting a > totalizing "nature") is at bottom untenable. I mean that the digital is > surely a grand machine for looking at existence as it flows along on the > level of a macro-scopic viewing, but at a much higher resolutioned > micro-scopic level it would necessarily have to be viewed as analogic, i.e. > without the ruptures which a digital casting would impose, else we should > have long ago become iced up inside the first isolate interstice between > some unwavering 1 and its likewise discretely frozen discontinently > adjacent 0 (to become no more than "sweet dreams and flying machines in > pieces on the ground" - Sweet Baby James). "At bottom untenable" -- yes. And the bottom only becomes tenable, i.e. we only get a hold on it, through some casting or other that gathers and draws (in the double sense) the 'bottom' in/into defining outlines. Just such an outlining is the digital casting of being in which the oneness of beings (_to hen_) has achieved its ultimate mathematical interpretation in number (_arithmoi_). > And besides, the genetic code as it actually exists 'in-itself' is nothing > digital, no numbers in there nor word signs, of which both are no more than > artificial impositions used only for calculating coordinates of extension > between the various analogic behaviors of its acids as they produce its > differences, and all entirely environ.mentally driven. "The genetic code as it actually exists 'in-itself' " -- the genetic code does not actually exist 'in-itself'. Nothing 'exists' prior to drawing and gathering. Nothingness quivers mysteriously, perhaps not even a silent humming. > For us everything is always and necessarily viewed interpretivly, as > necessarily perspectival, and only indiscretely conceptual and whatever is > otherwise left over from this state is - - well, in Kate's words, "and > where this wind is blowin' to, there ain't no way of knowin" (especially > not digitally, except of course for EMoore here, who, with (the "jealous") > god on his side, views digits from an otherwise more 'semen.al' perspective > and which is certainly his god given rite to do). "For us everything is always and necessarily viewed interpretively" -- couldn't agree more. > >Propriation says simply that being and human being belong together. > >There is a simplicity of > >saying here. Being has to make do with humans to open itself as the > >truth or Da of being. And > >humans have to put up with being human beings, exposed to the truth of > >being, and that > >predominantly in the mode of un-truth (i.e. as partial truth, > >distortion, concealment, human lies and > >deception, etc.). Making do and putting up with characterize propriation > >in its finiteness. > > This has the elegant ring of beauty to it, like a phrase out of Conrad, and > so is undoubted.ly true - - > > This kind of '"simplicity of saying" is sort of like a semaphoric language > where the truth/untruth dyad changes nature according to the sharpness > quotient of a distant viewing, and again depending whether these dyads are > employed at the micro or the macro and whether truth is (oxymoronically / > chameleonically) cast simultaneously as an analogically presented digital > phenomenon. I mean, at the digital level of a viewing of symbolic > language's 'parts' we are quite easily separated out as discrete > propositions, but certainly not as discrete actualities. > > Nice to hear your voice again, > kenneth > Cheers, Michael _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- artefact text and translation _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- made by art _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ _-_-_-_-_-_- artefact-AT-webcom.com _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ Dr Michael Eldred -_-_- _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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