File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2001/heidegger.0107, message 3


From: "Gary C. Moore" <gottlos75-AT-mail.com>
Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2001 16:13:55 +0800




"In thinking Being comes to language", then, relates to the very first sentence of the "Letter": "the essence of action" which "we are still far from pondering." This is coming close to "poetic" thinking. This is referring to a thinking poet about real actions between human beings, stripped of the covers that hide the nudity of our real emotions LIMITED ONLY BY THE HARSHNESS OF THE LAW. That restriction does not apply to absolute monarchs except by other monarchs. When Agamemnon is trapped in the net, Klytemnestra swings the ax down again and again, and all the populace can do is fear her as the manifestation of the divine. There is no sweetness and light fields of asphodels here. 

Now, to your quote at long last, "Thinking brings this relation to Being solely as something handed over to it from Being." Double talk? Is he simply saying something hands something to itself? Yes, that is EXACTLY what he is saying. How much more of a meaningless statement could one make? But the answer as already been announced: "Therefore only what already is can be accomplished. But what 'is' above all is Being." Now, from the point of view of a practical and action-effective adult (but remember, "We are far from pondering the essence of action decisively enough.") Tom does not hand himself a screwdriver and say, "Well, Tom, here is the screwdriver you wanted." If you actually heard AN ADULT seriously say that to themselves, what would you do? But if a child does it, you say, "How sweet! He is playing with himself as if he were his own imaginary playmate!" and you wouldn't think twice about it. But considering just this one point, and maybe this is really the only point ever to consider at all, what changed in this abysmal space between child and adult? "Why, that's simple! The adult HAS to be responsible, of course! The child does not!" Now the child is held, contained, made to be responsible to the adult, the parent. This is a relationship between one person and another. But the adult is required to do this also to themselves AS  relationship to their selves. We just saw, though, the child IS having a relationship to themselves. BUT IT IS NOT A SELF-RELATIONSHIP OF BONDAGE AND SLAVERY! "We are still far from pondering the essence of action decisively enough." And then, as would normally be expected, Heidegger goes on to talk of "causing an effect" and valuing "the effect . . . according to its utility." Now, those last two phrases are exceedingly obvious and commonplace are they not? Yet is this the normal way he speaks, is this the usual mode of Heidegger's words as saying the "obvious" and "the commonplace"? ESPECIALLY when he just said, "We are still far from pondering the essence of action decisively enough"? Have we not fallen into his deliberately laid trap so that when we read your quote, that you yourself say is out of context, it sounds like the worst kind of pseudo-mystical gobbledegook? Yet then I said, "But if a child does it, you say, 'How sweet! He is playing with himself as if he were his own imaginary playmate!'" WHAT GAME IS IT THE CHILD IS PLAYING?

Your Heidegger quote goes on: "Such offering consists in the fact that in thinking Being comes to language." First, let us state the obvious here. Now, this is not a reproach. I have ALWAYS missed this myself. But, nonetheless, it is still embarrassingly obvious. "Thinking" and "language" are NOT the same thing. THEY ARE INFINITELY FAR FROM BEING THE SAME THING! Now I am one of those sentimental, soft-souled, bleeding heart animal lovers. I would not hesitate one second to blow the shit of a whaler out of the water and then joyfully machine-gun the survivors as they thrashed desperately around in the water knowing they had no escape. (Richard: "Jud, I REALLY think he has gone around the bend!")Now, in Heidegger's lectures on ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS Theta 1-3, he says:

The basic form of αίσθησις (aesthesis), the relation to the surroundings as such, is αφή (aphe), touching, feeling, grasping (and likewise the other forms up to όψις (okhis)). ¶ Plants and animals are therefore besouled, έμΨυχα (emkhyxa). The ζωον (zoon) even has the possibility of taking what presents itself in the surroundings; it has το κριτικόν (to kritikon): the possibility of the separating out and bringing out of something, for example, to stalk prey, to lie in wait, to notice, to know their dwelling places, to protect itself against attackers, and so on. Therefore, exploring is proper to the animal. Is the animal then μετα λόγου? Surely not, for it is the distinguishing definition of the human over against the animal that it is ζων λόγoν έχον (zoon ) – that animal which has conversance at its disposal. According to this, then, the animal is ζωον άλογον, but as ζωον nevertheless έμψυχον (besouled), therefore not άψυχον(without soul). And so the division between άψυχον/έμψυχον does not coincide with άλογον/λόγον έχον. Therefore there is also within the έμψυχα the besouled forms of life, άλογα (plants, animals). ¶ If ψυχή (soul) is there, this does not mean λόγος is there. This is in accord with what Aristotle says in the Nicomachian Ethics, Z 2, 1139a4: “There are two parts to the soul, one defined as discourse directed, and one that is without discourse” . . . We now see that λόγον έχον is in fact necessarily an έμψυχον, but not every έμψυχον is necessarily a λόγον έχον. But here the difficulty arises again that we have already touched upon. Αίσθησις (the κριτικόν) belongs to the essence of being an animal (animality) . Is this not already a kind of λόγος, conversance? So in the end the animal is not indeed ζωον λόγον έχον? But over against this stands the fact that this determination is precisely the essential definition of the human. This shows that the question of whether the animal does not also have λόγος, on the basis of αίσθησις, can emerge only if we comprehend λόγος as conversance, instead of relying on the well-known and reductive conception and translation of λόγος as reason. If we do this, then everything becomes clear in one fell swoop. The animal may well indeed have a certain kind of exploring and perceiving, but nevertheless it remains without reason . . . We must above all adhere to what Aristotle presents as fact: that indeed the animal is αισθητικόν, κριτικόν – in the manner of bringing out. And just as little are we allowed to shove aside the developed meaning of λόγος in the sense of conversance. For the matter surely demands that we do not deny λόγος to the animal as it now stands – or else leave the question open. (pp. 105-107)

The point being made is that the overwhelming importance of the word lies not in abstraction, but in relation and in opening, i.e., “in the manner of bringing out,” which if the reasonless animal can do, then it is certain that we are NOT dealing with ANY kind of mysticism here, but rather “pondering the essence of action decisively enough.” The word is an act like making a fist. 

 

HEIDEGGER:

Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells. Those who think and those who create with worlds are the guardians of this home. Their guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of Being insofar as they bring the manifestation to language and maintain it in language through their speech. Thinking does not become action only because some effect issues from it or because it is applied. Thinking acts insofar as it thinks. END QUOTE

To me, though granted, the passage is out of context, this could be the 
ramblings of a deranged mind. The house metaphor is especially curious - 
makes little sense.

Any comments?

-- 

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