File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2001/heidegger.0107, message 35

Subject: Re: misunderstanding the statement
Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2001 12:58:07 -0400

----- Original Message -----
From: Rene de Bakker <>
To: <>
Sent: Friday, July 06, 2001 11:25 AM
Subject: Re: misunderstanding the statement

> > It's interesting that he still insist on a Grundstimmung in 1937.
> Gulio,
> Hiow can one talk of being, nothing, need etc. without Grundstimmung?
> We were talking about das Ganze, the whole. It is either just a word,
> or stimmungsmaessig, in the mode of a Stimmung, approachable.
> Also Dasein, or Da-sein is Stimmung. Contr.: "Da-sein ist
> Stimmung", I'll bring the page, and an anser to your question below, when
> I meet the book. If you want, I can some time bring a central passage of
> Contr. on this.

We are talking with grounding-attunement (Grundstimmung) and how the "who"
finds itself (Befindlichkeit) and looses itself and this is prior to
cognition and volition and that a "mood brings Dasein before the
"that-it-is" of its "there", which, as such, stares it in the face with the
inexorability of an enigma" (from BT H136). Sure, a manner of thinking with
moods, anxiety, boredom, dismay, awe, distress that show the Da of Dasein
and says that Dasein is "open" where the disclosedness that Dasein is says
that Dasein is illuminated. Mostly i'm interested in starting from
grounding-attunement and not cognition so if you have more to add in showing
us how you read Contributions on this 'topic' and how it relates to Being
and Time, I would certainly be attentive to what you say.

> The Contr. in English, in fact the complete later Heidegger in that
> is rubbish. Sheehan is quite clear on this, that is: only negatively:
> It becomes just bad mystics.
> If one wants to be even a bit serious about reading H., one will learn
> If one finds that provincial, that doesn't bother me at all.

The English lends itself well to parody and you are right its more serious
with German. I read that essay and mostly it shows universal confusion
amongst everybody but i doubt this doesn't apply to German readers.

> Your 'true' btw is parented with the German 'treu'. In Swedish a wife
> is a hustru, true to the house. The German Wahr(heit), according to H,
> has lost, or never really had its original meaning of wahren, save.
> Compare: gewaehren = grant.
  This an interesting insight but it relates to the notion of preservation,
restoration, safe-keeping? Perhaps one stumbles on Heidegger's saying that
"truth is un-truth"? True to the house would mean leading words in such a
manner that they show their sheltered, withdrawn thrust like Hermes after he
steals Apollos cows, erases his tracks, and hides them in a cave?

> So 'true' at least is better than 'wahr'.  And he said: 'thing' is also
> than 'Ding', so it's not so that German must be better. It's just that
> this word, has to do with language, and language is Sprache, speak, and
> we can say what we want, it's die Sprache that spricht. And in Stimmung
> is Stimme, voice, as in bestimmen.

In the English of _Contributions_ heidegger speaks, as i quoted, of the
"style of reservedness". In being individualized by the uncanny Dasein then
approaches wholeness or uniqueness by saying nothing, remaining silent. That
would be the mood of deep awe? No, you can't say what you want, there is a
manner of approaching, your defining style where either you find what you
are seeking or you loose it.

And Heidegger is from Schwabia, as was
> Hoelderlin. The house (Anwesen) of Heidegger's
> forefathers stands or stood near the headwaters of the Danube, Hoelderlin
> wrote
> "Der Isther" and in the Abendlaendisches Gespraech Heidegger and another
> watch this house, and, talking of Hoelderlin's poem, there is the
> Are we
> walking here in the woods by the Isther, because Hoelderlin wrote 'Der
> Isther',
> or did Hoelderlin write 'Der Isther', because down there the Danube flows?
> A question, that doesn't need an answer. A good question is half the
> And rivers, the spirit of the river is the begining of things, the Indus,
> the Paktol,
> the Danube, the Rhine, the Mississippi. Heidegger liked Huckleberry Finn
> very much.
> Hoelderlin: a river makes the land urbar, so that man can live or dwell.
> We've lost
> that. Now, that is cold. But nothing negative, in the petty sense.

Poetry does give a positive determination to language, even in a cold color.

> You have no idea of the richnesses of Heidegger.

Not sure what is bothering you but the "nothing" really points not to a lack
but plenitude and richness. Its just that i'm not that excited by Heidegger,
actually its depressing reading the Contributions and the nostalgia...

> I've done that too, in the past, bringing Nietzsche in against a not
> understood Heidegger.
> So I've nothing against that as well. In "What is called thinking",
> Heidegger quotes
> Nietzsche, suggesting his philosophy of WtP may be a last revenge of one
> who suffers heavily.

 It's not easy avoiding a reactionary, imaginative revenge when you are
under a lot of distress and suffering. Nietzsche understood this.

> Nietzsche on priests, that's funny.

He wasn't serious. Actually he was extremely suspicious of the air of
seriousness as if there were some sort of sacred drama in the makings. If i
make fun of Heidegger it's just for my well being.

human all too human,

> In things cold and warm I follow Heraclitus
> As if we know what a farmer is. Botho Strauss writes, watching
> a shepherd, technologically equiped, camera's etc.: if he would
> be for 1 second a real shepherd, he would drop dead instantly.
> With gods probably the same thing.
> Rene
> >Does he
> >mention any further thoughts on anxiety or boredom for say understanding
> >reading of the moment that "in its default Being veils itself with
> >which is the way Being essentially occurs in default, [and] is the
> >as Being itself". That's from "nihilism as determined by the history of
> >being" which for me is in the vol. 4 of his Nietzsche texts. Default
> >(Ausbleiben) as a failure to appear is the withdrawal that has been
> >mentioned and points to the sense(if this word is appropriate) of
> >abandonment that he already mentions in BT. Being in its failure to
> >brings out an abandonment that "applies to beings as a whole, not only
> >being which takes the shape of man, who represents beings as such, a
> >representing in which Being itself withdraws from him in its truth." And
> >more, in staying away and failing to appear, for discoursive judgement no
> >doubts,  he says that, " there comes to be a relation to something like a
> >place, away from which the staying away remains what it is: the default
> >unconcealment as such. That place is the shelter in which the default of
> >unconcealment essentially persists. But it is precisely concealment that
> >remains in the staying away of unconcealment as such, then the staying of
> >concealment also retains its essential relation to the same place."
> >then persists in its sheltered dwelling when its shows how words in their
> >very meaning indicate their hidden, secret side as they withdraw thinking
> >thinking the unthought. But this is all rhetoric in a way, an art of
> >seduction that Nietzche clearly understood. The eternal return is perhaps
> >not that far from anticipatory resoluteness that holds onto possibility
> >possibility and so is a passive confrontation with nothingness where the
> >play of consciousness has quieted down, has become patient before the
> >strangeness of the things themselves in its pure beholding. That's
> >Nietzsche's sense of hospitality and art then would operate as minimalist
> >expression which i don't think has to involve the absence of elaborate
> >of imagery as long as one knows how to erase the tracks of language so to
> >speak.
> >
> >
> >> Now one could go on till "Zeit und Sein" (1962), which drops the
> >> des Seins'
> >> (truth of Being) in favour of the 'Lichtung'.
> >> But, Heidegger writes: the question of Being presupposes a
> >of
> >> the
> >> being of man (Dasein), this still remains. Because the appearance of
> >> question
> >> of Being, which is BT, hasn't been understood by nobody. Which isn't
> >> accidental,
> >> but part of the question of Being itself, which is not a normal
> >> but presupposes
> >> the hiding of Being, and not merely the human forgetting of it.
> >> And more: In "The end of philosophy and the task of thinking",
> >> together with
> >> "Time and Being" in "Zur Sache des Denkens", he writes in a note that
> >> lost a decisive
> >> insight, already there in BT, German p. 219: Aletheia cannot be
> >> with 'truth'.
> >>
> >>
> >yep, the words truth and meaning also have a cetain air to them. I don't
> >like them. I don't know, they are just too tied up with cognitive
> >theoretical thinking and propositional discourse that closes off any
> >of the essential withdrawal at the heart of Being that leaves Dasein in
> >abandoned situation like an orphan if you'll excuse a symbol.
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >> >The aim of finally disclosing temporality as the meaning of care is
> >related
> >> >to the question of a total mooded understanding of Dasein. To disclose
> >> >temporality as the meaning of care is just what makes the whole
> >phenomenal
> >> >analysis "primordial" and this means whole or total. He writes for
> >instance,
> >> >"If the interpratation of Dasein's Being is to become primordial, as a
> >> >foundation for working out the basic question of ontology, then it
> >> >first have brought to light existentially the Being of Dasein in its
> >> >possibilities of authenticity and totality" (BT H233). In the next
> >he
> >> >writes, "In terms of temporality, the articulated structural totality
> >> >Dasein's Being as care first becomes existentially intelligible".
> >> >quotes are taken from the intro to II when the question of totality
> >really
> >> >comes out. He goes to discuss anticipation and death in II, i and then
> >> >resoluteness and conscience in II,ii. Finally in II,iii he puts both
> >them
> >> >together as anticipatory resoluteness. Now in section II,iv it becomes
> >> >question of giving a "concrete temporal Constitution of care" which
> >> >going over again through understanding, state-of-mind, falling, and
> >> >discourse, the whole analysis, but this time in terms of the temporal.
> >> >Heidegger is clearly looking for a united total view: " The current
> >temporal
> >> >Constitution of these phenomena [i.e. understanding, falling, etc.]
> >> >back in each case to that _one_ kind of temporality which serves as
> >to
> >> >guarantee the possibility that understanding, state-of-mind, falling,
> >> >discourse, are united in their structure" (H335, section67).
> >>
> >> I myself was reading back from Befindlichkeit to the beginning of BT,
> >> concept of phenomenology, legein and noein. And thinking of Malcolm
> >> Riddoch and Greek/Husserlian aisthesis, the 'schlichte sinnliche
> >Vernehmen',
> >> and whether this is the beginning of BT. But if one reads (C). The
> >> Fore-concept
> >> of phenomenology (Vorbegriff der Ph.), phenomenon 'par excellence' is
> >> which
> >> shows itself, by remaining hidden, like e.g. the symptom of a disease,
> >> and because logos and phenomenon are both apophainesthai,
> >> legein is also basically hiding.
> >>
> >
> >where is Malcolm Riddoch? This list is always more interesting when he is
> >posting.
> >
> >
> >> But you herebove take the other direction to the Ganzheit, unity of
> >Dasein,
> >> of which I, honestly said, hadn't thought, but of course ....
> >> Being is there, where you expect it the least.
> >>
> >
> >yes Rene, don't think too hard, the advent of Being is a surprise, why
> >a passive confrontation, but there is a sort of sober fascination that
> >seduces thinking. More could be said with regards to how certain art (not
> >just poetry) revolves around a void and finds there its source of
> >inspiration. The Need you mentioned above too, i take it he means it as
> >something that points to not a lack as if one were missing something that
> >the withdrawal of Being would have fullfilled but possibility as
> >possibility, no?
> >
> >
> >> And this has again to do with another Kennethian phrase: the T-echo.
> >> Heidegger sometimes says, that, if you have one thing, another thing
> >> might appear across (quer) to it. At the moment I know only of one
> >example:
> >> in "Kant's thesis on Being".
> >> The one thing is the proposition. It has a S-P structure
> >> The other thing is the subject in its relation to the object.
> >> The one thing slides ACROSS to the other
> >> (meaning, that Kant could only take this direction, but not SEE it)
> -----------------------------------
> drs. Ren de Bakker
> Universiteitsbibliotheek Amsterdam
> Afdeling Catalogisering
> tel. 020-5252368
>      --- from list ---

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