Date: Mon, 08 Oct 2001 16:17:32 +0200
Subject: Re: Self-showing of hiddenness


At 22:22 4-10-01 +0200, Michael Eldred wrote:

>Thanks for this and your earlier post from 01-Oct.
>
>I follow what you say (I know you hate that).
>Your Nietzsche is Heidegger's Nietzsche.

Michael,

Please keep the hate. 
You apparently do not follow, when you write what you write.
I am only interested in Grundstimmung. I will stay there and
not run away to something else. 

The need of not knowing-in-or-out is something too enormous 
to understand one two three.
Do you follow me when I indicate that in its In-between lie the origins of:

1. the OD
2. The as-structure
3. the distinction essentia-existentia 
4. the relation Being - thinking?
  
That's enough for me. 

>You say that for Nietzsche, "everything is nothing", but it really should be
>said as everything is worth nothing, i.e. everything is of no value since the
>supreme values have been devalued. And where did everything derive its value
>from in the long metaphysical tradition? From some kind of transcendence
>understood as some kind of Hinterwelt, a world behind the world somehow
>dependent on a supreme being.
>
>But there is value in the world itself. This is what Nietzsche saw and he
>asserted an affirmation of life.

This is rhetorics.
Affirmation of life is necessary, because the world has no value.
The whole cannot be valued / Das Ganze ist unabwertbar.
You seem to miss a basic knowledge of Nietzsche.

>There is an implicit phenomenological ground
>for this in everyday life in the world in that Dasein (being-out-there in the
>world) values the things of daily life. Things, in their being, are
>good-for..., they are good for this or that as enabling a possibility of
>Dasein's mortal existence. Heidegger saw that in SuZ.

More rhetorics. 
All notions in BT are formally indicating, Things are bedeutsam, meaningful.
They, and the world, cannot come into view otherwise. That's an ontological
(phenomenological)  character. 
Thematizing this is essentially different from valuing things in the
everyday world.
I said earlier: Everydayness is itself nothing everyday-ish. You followed me?

>In another way, Marx saw that there was value in everyday life. Dasein's
>entire economic existence, its 'householding' is concerned with valuable
>things, ranging from very valuable things to worthless things (worthlessness
>is the negation of value and thus still situated in the dimension of
>valuableness).
>
>In Marx there is therefore a radical turning away from transcendental values
>to values in the world. This has been called materialism and has been
>associated with the real-existing socialist/communist countries with their
>'atheist' regimes. Such materialism is practised nihilism in denying
>transcendental values.
>
>And this is where Heidegger comes in: he discovered transcendence closer to
>home in that which is closest to us and which is almost the most hackneyed:
>there could be no value, no beings being good-for... without a transcendence,
>a 'climbing over' (Ueberstieg) to the world, which is nothing other than the
>openness of being. The world opens to and for Dasein in it being open to
world
>in its understanding and mood, including fundamental moods. In fundamental
>moods such as Angst, boredom, amazement (enwonderment) or composure
>(Verhaltenheit, not restraint), the opening of the world as such can be
>experienced if we _think_ about it. In such thinking there is the possibility
>of seeing phenomenologically the opening of world itself, the granting of
>beyng itself. Not just that beings as such are granted, but that the openness
>of world itself is granted.
>
>In that which is closest to us lies what is most valuable. No need to climb
>over to Hinterwelten, to worlds behind the world as it is still practised
>today in the attempt to overcome the nihilism of mere 'materialist values'.
>
>That is why it is important to think about value in everyday life, in the
>mundane details and simplicity of going about our daily business. When Marx
>thinks the essence of capitalism as the movement of self-augmenting value,
>this calls on us today to think about what this value-augmentation (which
>includes also annihilation of value as its negation) has to do with beyng.
>This includes thinking through what the phenomenon of dealing in values on
>markets of all kinds signifies. How do things, ranging from screws and apples
>through to money capital and stocks and stock options come to have value?
What
>does it mean that all these things have a price? What is price as a mode of
>being? Neither Nietzsche nor Heidegger took up such questions, so it is no
use
>just following faithfully in their footsteps..

Not only that, it is impossible.
It appears, you don't see even the starting problem of GA45: truth as
correctness.
Truth as truth value is a subspecies of truth as correctness.

Rene







-----------------------------------
drs. René de Bakker
Universiteitsbibliotheek Amsterdam
Afdeling Catalogisering 
tel. 020-5252368              


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