Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 16:02:47 +0200
From: Rene de Bakker <rbakker-AT-bs18.bs.uva.nl>
Subject: Re: thuggery


>>I think, the breakdown of the subject is quite a thuggery affair.
>>Otherwise it remains just a topic for wishy-washy subjects.
>
>
>So thuggery is a rhetorical technique for the breaking down of 
>subjects in their wishy-washiness.  It almost seems as if some 
>version of it is essential to accomplishing the task, the 
>task-in-the-world, i.e. the wordly-worldly task, of phenomenology.

Allen and everybody reacting,

I am now busy with GA45 since two years. There are 2 items:
Grundstimmung and Geschichte, which must be understood
in their interconnectedness, in order to gain access to the Contributions,
which I'm planning to begin with soon now. That'll cost 10 years probably,
there are some more GA volumes from the same time (GA 66: Besinnung
GA 69: Geschichte des Seyns) and there are still the Pre-Socratics and
Hoelderlin.
And so on.

Stimmung in BT is Befindlichkeit. It functions, within the hermeneutics of
Dasein, as a principal constitutive moment of being-in-the-world.
A year ago, I've written about the wall BT is running into, and which has
to do 
with metaphysical or subjective remnants, before which also and esp. a new
kind of questioning sees itself posed. Malcolm Riddoch's discussions
centered also
around this point, I felt (the problem Vorhandenheit-Zuhandenheit is
involved too).
The colleges of these years (departing from Leibniz and Kant), together with 
"Vom Wesen des Grundes", radicalize the direction of BT, in order
to get a clearer insight in the nature of the hindrance, that is exercised
against
the light of Dasein's Entwurf. And now I wanted to go to GA26, the Leibniz
volume (1928)
wherein this hindrance is taken in its ontical irreducibility, or at least
that's how it seems.
The 'theme' of freedom is also essential here, as Gulio rightly sees. (freedom
also in the second part of "Vom Wesen des Grundes") 

This leads to another approach (than BT) of the Grundstimmung in "Was ist
Metaphysik"
and esp. in GA29/30. Shortly after that, in 1932, Heidegger decides  the
'project'
of the Contributions.  That's the time, Geschichte came into his view. It is
essential, I think, to experience the necessity of Geschichte IN
Grundstimmung.
Or: to experience Grundstimmung (Angst, boredom) as something essentially
geschichtlich. (everything, as I see it, comes down to *experiencing* the
time-space
of the Contributions) 

Geschichte is somehing that can only be SEEN (er-sehen). 
Necessary, but not enough, is a thorough reading of Plato till Nietzsche.
(But this can only be really thorough, when there is already an idea of
Geschichte:
return of hermeneutical circle) 
In GA45 Heidegger doesn't treat Plato/Aristoteles and Nietzsche historically,
but the first as "the first beginning", meaning still anfaenglich/beginning
now in the end
of this first beginning,  which end is Nietzsche.  In every real thinker,
thinking 'begins'.

>>Grundstimmung is such a something that, if you have acquired it,
>>you won't talk about it.
>
>You can only somehow "reflect" it?

There must indeed be some kind of access, otherwise it becomes magic.
I only wanted to say, that talking ABOUT is disastrous, because this
is always done subjectively.  The destruction of the subject in BT remains
necessary, in order to enter existential ontology, but is vis-a-vis Geschichte
NOT sufficient. The answer to Richardson remains clarifying: Heidegger 2
goes deeper than Heidegger 1, but in order to get to H 2, one has to begin
with H 1. 

> As an attitude toward.  But this 
>attitude can only show itself as a 'correction' of the orientation 
>the other seems to be taking.  And so sometimes, the orientation of 
>the other is "intentionally" misunderstood in order make a path for 
>phenomenological saying as a correction of course.  Doesn't Heidegger 
>employ this intentional misunderstanding ( perhaps "mis-reading" is a 
>better term) to almost any philosopher he serves up?  And so you 
>sometimes "serve up" Michael.  I enjoy when such inter-thugging pops 
>up and threatens to self-destruct the conversation, but then always 
>seems to take care of itself.

Heidegger's productive misreading is something different from 
blind polemics. But also this could be 'profitable'.

>Perhaps I said too much.

Not at all. And c'est le ton, qui fait la musique.

>Sorry.

No, why? I'm a wishy-washy subject too.
As in the case of Nietzsche it is necessary to say:
I am the last man. Nietzsche did this. Every attack
by Nietzsche is an attack against himself. If will to
power is self-centered, has no windows like the monad,
one can only turn against oneself, against what one has 
become by incorporation. "I write with blood."
The case of Wagner, the strongest ennemy, should be
seen against this background. 

One cannot talk with someone, who has no idea of all this.
I don't know if they still do, but the Hottentots used to chop
off the legs of their ennemies.  

rene


-----------------------------------
drs. René de Bakker
Universiteitsbibliotheek Amsterdam
Afdeling Catalogisering 
tel. 020-5252368              


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