File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2001/heidegger.0111, message 139


Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 16:36:56 +0100
From: Rene de Bakker <rene.de.bakker-AT-uba.uva.nl>
Subject: Re: Dasein For Dummies



>Jud: 
>Aristotle in his 'Categories' classifies all existential modalities into ten 
>ultimate types, and in the 'Topics' introduces the as different kinds of 
>predication that can be predicated of subjects. AITism claims that there is 
>only ONE category to which all existential modality 'belongs' and that 
>category is named with the name of the entity itself. Thus the gesamtsumme 
>of Annabelle's existential modalities is Annabelle, and Annabelle is the 
>gesamtsumme of Annabelle's existential modalities. 

Jud,

First, Aristotle's 'prote ousia', or hypokeimenon, as the what-about of
speech, is the ONE category, all others depend on. To adress the green of
that leaf, as something that is "in the hypokeimenon", a hypokeimenon is
presupposed, which can't be purely logical: the
ousia tode ti: the thing here.

Second, that the name of a subject contains all its predicates, is Leibniz'
inclusionist theory of the judgment, for which he points back to
Aristoteles' 'first substance', and to the scholastics. Scotus'
haecceitas', thisness or thatness (tode ti) comes to mind. 
It can't be purely logical too, because to be able to say: '"This Annabelle
here is 6 feet high" is true', the predicate 'young' must be IN Annabelle,
or the meaning of 'young' must somehow be identical with that of Annabelle.
This leads Leibniz to the conclusion, that the real 'subject' of judgment
is the monad, i.c. the monad that can say: 'I'. (and that considers all
judgments it develops as predicates of itself as subject, the fundamental
of which, such as: 'everything that is, has a reason', leads it even to its
own ground)
But then we are in hard-core metaphysics, as to which I don't think you
will follow Leibniz, but which is at the beginning of his logic.

Calling Leibniz light in the head, would not be very sensible, because he
co-founded mathematics and physics, which are the guarantees of your ontology)

Which leaves for you to demonstrate how S and P refer to reality. Because
if they don't, you might assert anything, e.g. 'Annabelle is 10 feet high'.
And this was Kant's starting point: how can I say: the stone IS heavy, and
not merely: it feels heavy. It, the stone ITSELF is heavy. Surely he says:
being is not a real predicate. It doesn't add something to its sensible
qualities.
The concept 'hundred actual guilders'  does not contain something above the
other concept, hundred possible guilders. BUT IT MAKES A LOT OF DIFFERENCE
TO THE SUBJECT, REPRESENTING THE TWO CONCEPTS. 
Therefore Kant says: being is a predicate, but of another kind than the
'real' (=realis, belonging to the res; res is the thing insofar it has an
essence) One that expresses the RELATION of the thing to the representing
subject. (relation is Kant's fourth heading in the table of the categories.) 
We see a similar re-flective move onto the (human) subject, as in Leibniz.
And it is 'metaphysical' as well.

But Heidegger explains this much more clear and distinct in GA26. 

Like you, he keeps on talking about S and P, so I cannot understand
why you are so much neglected by the serious Heideggerians here.
Your writings abound in possible ties. 
    
cheers,

Rene 

-----------------------------------
drs. René de Bakker
Universiteitsbibliotheek Amsterdam
Afdeling Catalogisering 
tel. 020-5252309              



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