File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2001/heidegger.0111, message 150


From: GEVANS613-AT-aol.com
Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2001 09:12:22 EST
Subject: Dasein For Dummies



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Content-Language: en

Rene,
For me the modern AITist representation of the meaning or significance of
Aristotle's hypokeimenon or primal matter, the substrate of all entities is
the molecular/energetic matter, which has spatial and temporal presence
throughout the cosmos.  It could be said therefore that all entities in the
cosmos are existential modalities of the hypokeimenon.  Change is nothing
more than the result of a continual degradation and reformation of the prote
ousia into new forms. Up to this point it is possible that you and I are in
agreement, on the other hand you may disagree and point to some spiritual
explanation for this phenomena, which is your prerogative.

Turning now to your remarks on predication. For some reason you have
suggested that my statement implies that Annabelle is the gesamtsumme of
Annabelle's predicates, which is not what, Isaid.  My actual words were: 
'The gesamtsumme of Annabelle's existential modalities is Annabelle, and
Annabelle is the gesamtsumme of  Annabelle's existential modalities.'

In fact one of the few truthful statements that you can shout from the
rooftops of Amsterdam without any fear of contradiction from church,
university or bar-room is that the gesamtsumme of an entity's existential
modalities is the entity, and the entity is the gesamtsumme of the entity's
existential modalities.'

You CANNOT however make the same assertion about an entity's sentential
predicates, for all propositions such as: 'Annabelle is six feet tall,'
(thanks Rene I got your correction here) or  'London is covered by a sheet of
ice 12 inches thick,' whilst they are grammatically  correct sentences, do
not inhere to the existential modalic gesamtsumme of their subjects unless
they are truthful statements.

In this way  what I have to say has nothing at all to do with Leibnitz =E2=80=93
least of all with his monadism.
It  can be seen from this,  that it  is not up to me to demonstrate how
Subject and Predicate refer to reality, but rather to the reader or listener
to a statement.
If I say to you: "I am the King of Siam,"  It is up to YOU to decide whether
or not I am telling the truth.  In this way Rene I must warn you not to
believe everything that you read in the newspapers. ;-)

The role of the 'is' word is not to make any judgements as to the veracity of
a statement,   but merely to enable the statement to be made.  The 'is' word
doesn't care a fig if I am really the King of Siam or not the King of Siam=20=E2=80=93
it is up to YOU  to care (if it remotely interests you.) If it DOES interest
you, then you need to metaphorically click on the 'is icon' and obtain
further information, which entails either cross-examining me in greater
detail, or ringing up the Siamese Embassy [Republic of Thailand] to find out
who really IS the King of Siam.

Back to poor old Heidegger agonising over his leaf once more.
If you read his text again you will see that Heidegger wasn't pondering about
the
Hypokeimenomic dimensions of the leaf and its greenness, he was addressing
the is of 'the leaf is green' and trying to find the 'is' in the leaf.  He
failed to understand (hence the ultimate bankruptcy of his whole conception)
that the 'is' word' just like the 'the' word in the same sentence do not DO
anything other than attribute meaning to the words with which they are
associated. In the case of the 'THE' word it attributes individuation, and in
the case of the IS word it attributes an existential modality [in this
casegreenness.]

Regarding Kant.   Kant got himself confused, as many do, concerning the
difference between what language does purely as a system or method of
communicating information, as a vehicle for the exchange of ideas - and the
fact that language expresses the OPINIONS of the speakers of statements which
may or may not be true. This is something I have been trying to explain to
John Foster.
If you say: "The stone is heavy."  You may genuinely believe it to be so, and
believe that you are making a truthful statement. To another stronger person
who picks up the stone this statement may appear false. Kant wrongfully
extrapolates from this that the 'is' [being] is not a 'real' predicate.

In fact anybody can see that it is not the fault of the 'is' word that the
stone appears not to be heavy to the second person, but it is the fault of
the first person for choosing to employ the 'is' word and for believing that
because the stone appears heavy to him that it will be the same for the rest
of humanity. When Kant says that: 'Being is not a real predicate' he is
saying the right thing for the wrong reasons, for 'being' INTRODUCES the
predicate, and is NOT a predicate itself.

In other words Heidegger and Kant are in the same boat being tossed around in
a sea of ontological confusion in this matter.
Kant however, being the more intelligent, seizing his opportunity, nimbly
jumps ashore and goes on to say that being expresses a relation of the
predicate to its subject. In this respect he is correct.
As for Heidegger, we leave him alone in his boat without oars, gazing
ruefully at his fistful of leaves searching for their 'is' as the sun goes
down and the rumble of the guns of the allies can be heard in the distance.

Serious Heideggerians? Is there such a thing? Up to now no 'serious'
Heideggerian has engaged earnestly with my real criticisms of Heidegger's
assumptions and propositions, other than with pettifogging referrals to typos
etc., and a lot of personal ad homonym, which thankfully seems to have abated
somewhat recently.

>From what I have read, the AITist critique is the first of its kind, and I
would have thought [in the long run at least]  that it presents a bigger
threat to Heideggerian thought than what has  hitherto been published =E2=80=93 for
this is an attack on the Grundbegriffe itself, and is not particularly
concerned with the plethora of spurious extrapolation which has been
developed from this false basic premise.  The only serious observations and
colloquy I have ever received on this list are from your good self and from
Allen in the past,  for which I am grateful and for which I thank you both.

Cheers,

Jud


--part1_124.7d8d1a4.292e61c6_boundary

HTML VERSION:

Content-Language: en Rene,
For me the modern AITist representation of the meaning or significance of Aristotle's hypokeimenon or primal matter, the substrate of all entities is the molecular/energetic matter, which has spatial and temporal presence throughout the cosmos.  It could be said therefore that all entities in the cosmos are existential modalities of the hypokeimenon.  Change is nothing more than the result of a continual degradation and reformation of the prote ousia into new forms. Up to this point it is possible that you and I=20are in agreement, on the other hand you may disagree and point to some spiritual explanation for this phenomena, which is your prerogative.

Turning now to your remarks on predication. For some reason you have suggested that my statement implies that Annabelle is the gesamtsumme of Annabelle's predicates, which is not what, Isaid.  My actual words were:  
'The gesamtsumme of Annabelle's existential modalities is Annabelle, and Annabelle is the gesamtsumme of  Annabelle's existential modalities.'

In fact one of the few truthful statements that you can shout from the rooftops of Amsterdam without any fear of contradiction from church, university or bar-room is that the gesamtsumme of an entity's existential modalities is the entity, and the entity is the gesamtsumme of the entity's existential modalities.'

You CANNOT however make the same assertion about an entity's sentential=20predicates, for all propositions such as: 'Annabelle is six feet tall,' (thanks Rene I got your correction here) or  'London is covered by a sheet=20of ice 12 inches thick,' whilst they are grammatically  correct sentences, do not inhere to the existential modalic gesamtsumme of their subjects unless they are truthful statements.

In this way  what I have to say has nothing at all to do with Leibnitz =E2=80=93 least of all with his monadism.
It  can be seen from this,  that it  is not up to me to demonstrate how Subject and Predicate refer to reality, but rather to the reader or listener to a statement.
If I say to you: "I am the King of Siam,"  It is up to YOU to decide whether or not I am telling the truth.  In this way Rene I must warn=20you not to believe everything that you read in the newspapers. ;-)

The role of the 'is' word is not to make any judgements as to the veracity of a statement,   but merely to enable the statement to be made.  The 'is' word doesn't care a fig if I am really the King of Siam or=20not the King of Siam =E2=80=93 it is up to YOU  to care (if it remotely interests you.) If it DOES interest you, then you need to metaphorically click on the 'is icon' and obtain further information, which entails either cross-examining me in greater detail, or ringing up the Siamese Embassy [Republic of Thailand] to find out who really IS the King of Siam.

Back to poor old Heidegger agonising over his leaf once more.
If you read his text again you will see that Heidegger wasn't pondering=20about the
Hypokeimenomic dimensions of the leaf and its greenness, he was addressing the is of 'the leaf is green' and trying to find the 'is' in the leaf.  He failed to understand (hence the ultimate bankruptcy of his whole conception) that the 'is' word' just like the 'the' word in the same sentence do not DO anything other than attribute meaning to the words with which they are associated. In the case of the 'THE' word it attributes individuation, and in the case of the IS word it attributes an existential modality [in this=20casegreenness.]

Regarding Kant.   Kant got himself confused, as many do, concerning the difference between what language does purely as a system or method of communicating information, as a vehicle for the exchange of ideas - and=20the fact that language expresses the OPINIONS of the speakers of statements=20which may or may not be true. This is something I have been trying to explain to John Foster.
If you say: "The stone is heavy."  You may genuinely believe it to=20be so, and believe that you are making a truthful statement. To another stronger person who picks up the stone this statement may appear false. Kant wrongfully extrapolates from this that the 'is' [being] is not a 'real' predicate.

In fact anybody can see that it is not the fault of the 'is' word that the stone appears not to be heavy to the second person, but it is the fault of the first person for choosing to employ the 'is' word and for believing that because the stone appears heavy to him that it will be the same for the rest of humanity. When Kant says that: 'Being is not a real predicate' he is=20saying the right thing for the wrong reasons, for 'being' INTRODUCES the predicate, and is NOT a predicate itself.

In other words Heidegger and Kant are in the same boat being tossed around in a sea of ontological confusion in this matter.
Kant however, being the more intelligent, seizing his opportunity, nimbly jumps ashore and goes on to say that being expresses a relation of the predicate to its subject. In this respect he is correct.
As for Heidegger, we leave him alone in his boat without oars, gazing ruefully at his fistful of leaves searching for their 'is' as the sun goes down and the rumble of the guns of the allies can be heard in the distance.

Serious Heideggerians? Is there such a thing? Up to now no 'serious' Heideggerian has engaged earnestly with my real criticisms of Heidegger's assumptions and propositions, other than with pettifogging referrals to typos etc., and a lot of personal ad homonym, which thankfully seems to have abated somewhat recently.

From what I have read, the AITist critique is the first of its kind, and I would have thought [in the long run at least]  that it presents a bigger threat to Heideggerian thought than what has  hitherto been published =E2=80=93 for this is an attack on the Grundbegriffe itself, and is not=20particularly concerned with the plethora of spurious extrapolation which has been developed from this false basic premise.  The only serious observations and colloquy I have ever received on this list are from your good self and from Allen in the past,  for which I am grateful and for which I=20thank you both.

Cheers,

Jud
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