Subject: Re: Lichtung
Date: Tue, 11 Dec 2001 13:23:22 -0800



>
> In "The principle of reason" (GA10), Heidegger sees in this absence of
ground
> - that is: that Being is not catcheable by ground as ratio or causa or
> principle - ,
> more than a simple negation of ground, because the "reason" of that
deficiency
> is, that Being as ground cannot have a ground itself, because it itself IS
> ground.
> But 'a' ground, from which ground stays out: ab-ground.
> SO IT HAS TO BE SEEN AS GROUND IN ORDER TO BE SEEN AS AB-GROUND.
> Because the abysmality is (hides) 'in' ground, not behind or under it.
> And, therefore, what he didn't see in 1928, is not the abysmal of
> being/ground,
> - angst and freedom - but the (self-evident) groundedness of Being/ground
> So that one can say, that, treating Leibniz' principle, he was himself
> blinded by its light.
> Strange eh?
>

Utterly. I was reading GA10 again over the weekend, mostly the last few
lectures where it is a question of attuning the "second tonality" of the
principle of reason where what one hears is that reason and being are the
same and that is 'heard' as an utterance of being. Being (the one we often
spell b-e-y-n-g on this list) addresses us and that is a Geschick of being.
The passage into this second tonality is a leap. First I wanted to point out
that this leap is another way of approaching the task of transcendence in
GA26 and then understanding of being in BT. Heidegger makes us aware of this
when while discussing that  (and situating, putting into place a
conversation) a "stand" in the clearing and lighting of beyng by which we
are claimed [Anspruch] and are cast into time play-space refers back to BT
by saying that all this means that "the basic trait of Dasein, which is
human being, is determined by the understanding of being. Here understanding
of being never means that humans as subjects possess a subjective
representation of being and that being is a mere representation" (GA10:
145-147). The way a human being takes a stand is everything and no easy,
simple task. So Heidegger goes on, "understanding of being means that
according to their essential nature humans stand [steht] in the openness of
the projection of being and suffer [aussteht] this understanding so
understood [...] According to their essential nature, humans are thinking
beings  only insofar as they stand in the clearing and lighting of being."
Again, transcendence as in GA26 or leap as in GA10 or the understading of
being of BT is a *task,* an exercise and this is the meaning of the
expression "being-in-the-world". In other words, there is not  much point to
making a sharp distinction between H1 and H2. For the most part, it is an
academic distinction.

There is something I have been trying to bring out but it's hard. It has to
do with what appears to be a trivial thing to say and it's close to how I
read the word "task" as working in a conversation and in no way is this an
attempt to direct anything that happens on this list in any particular
direction. It has to do with a matter that is, I don't know, a determination
of a conversation where "determination" does not mean filling up words with
representational content. No matter what happens one has to stay close to
the topic. There is a kind of loyalty I suppose that I haven't talked about
much but now I want to try to articulate more.

First a quote from lecture eight GA10, the beginning of the second
paragraph:

"Everything rests on the path. This means two different things. First, it
means that it all comes down to the path, to our finding it and remaining on
it --  which means our persistence in staying "under way." The paths of
thinking that belong to the situating discussion have the peculiar character
that when we are under way on them we are nearer to the site than when, in
order to become ensconced there, we convince ourselves that we have reached
the site [...] Second, that everything rests on the path suggests that
everything that we must bring into view shows itself  only under way on the
path. Whatever is to be brought into view lies on the path. Within the
purview opened up by the path and through which the path leads, whatever can
be brought into view at any given time is gathered from some point along the
path. However, in order to reach the path of the discussion situating the
principle of reason, we must leap" (GA10: 106-107).

So everything rests on being able to remain on a path, to take a stand such
that in discussions everything finds it's proper place, it's site. To do
this, to situate a discussion is to leap, transcend. And also, this  is the
meaning of the expression being-in-the-world.

Okay, take a breath...


gulio



     --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---