File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2002/heidegger.0201, message 2


Date: Sat, 5 Jan 2002 09:27:52 -0800
From: Kenneth Johnson <kenn-AT-beef.sparks.nv.us>
Subject: metaphor clip



thot this was in[ter]resting, specially the 2nd par., from:

http://www.focusing.org/philo.html
Focusing and Philosophy
-k
---

Gendlin proposes experiential concepts as bridges between phenomenology and
logical formulation. His method moves back and forth, aiming to increase
both natural understanding and logical formulation. On the subjective side,
the concepts require direct reference to felt or implicit meaning. There is
no equivalence between this and the logical side. Rather, in logical
"explanation", the implicit is carried forward, a relation shown by many
functions. The subjective is no inner parallel. It performs specific
functions in language. Once these are located, they also lead to
developments on the formulated side.

To show some of this, Gendlin modifies Lakoff and Johnson's theory of
metaphor, and expands it into a theory of all language use. He denies that
a metaphor consists of a pattern or image, shared by two situations. There
is only one situation - the metaphoric one. The original situation is
actually a family of many uses (in the Wittgensteinian sense). As in all
speech, a word makes sense only as its use-family "crosses" with an actual
situation in the actual spot in a sentence. Subjectively, a metaphor means
this crossing. From it, long chains of new similarities and differences can
be generated. Ways to study the functions and features of this crossing are
proposed.




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